Last week my 5-person U.S. Army Reserve team arrived at the site of a devastating landslide in Bududa, Uganda. At the request of the Ugandan Government, we were diverted from our normal mission in the northern Karamoja region (where we have worked for 6 months) to respond to the disaster. While the U.S. Embassy had allocated $50,000 to the Ugandan Red Cross for relief efforts, we ourselves had no resources or funding as such to contribute upon arrival. Our mission would be a limited one: we were to support our counterparts, the Ugandan People’s Defense Force, in our capacity as civil-military relations specialists, and to determine opportunities for future military-to-military disaster support.

But if there is one thing that we have learned in Uganda, it is that it is difficult to limit expectations or manage perceptions – especially in uniform. This is not Iraq or Afghanistan: our ACU uniform does not help us blend in with the landscape or with thousands of other soldiers. We are often the sole representatives of the U.S. government (and certainly the powerful U.S military) in the areas where we work – and by this virtue and others, we are a spectacle everywhere we go. This does not put us in danger, but it means that we must limit the time we spend on the ground assessing a potential project, for example, so that our presence does not start to raise expectations as well as eyebrows. Read the rest of this entry…

According to Sharif Ahmed.  He makes some good points, but I”m not sure it is correct to say that the rest of the world thinks that Somalia is of no consequence: the piracy, terrorism and generally bad situation there means that lots of people are paying attention.

To make his case, Ahmed cites the underfunding of the AU mission and the need for more Somali troops.  He is right to say that more is needed in both cases, but I fail to see how either qualifies as evidence of neglect.   The AU is chronically underfunded, in part because it is an independent African association (or supposed to be) and African countries don’t have many resources to share.  This is a reason to help develop Africa, but that’s not entirely our fault (Ahmed appears to be addressing the West; if he is directing his remarks at African leaders – as he should be – then my apologies).

He also states that Somalia needs more troops.  Again, I’m sure he’s right, but this is not always a case of underfunding; witness Iraq and Afghanistan or Pakistan.  The US has poured in billions of dollars and all three still lack adequate forces, both national and otherwise.  Years of war across the globe have stretched everyone a little thin, even while there is will to help.  It is unfortunate, because peacekeeping troops probably could help Somalia stabilize, but I’m not sure where they’d come from.  Even with stability, there is no guarantee that Somalia will emerge from this as a successful state.  So far it seems that the Somalis just don’t like each other, and that is not a good start for nation-building.

I wish Ahmed luck.  I think he needs to lead the international community in rebuilding his country, and he can start by not expecting us to simply follow.

I am not posting much these days because USAID’s expectations of what I am supposed to achieve in three weeks in Tanzania are completely unrealistic. So instead of witty insight from me today, you can read this.

The role of business people in politics is a big issue here in Tanzania as it is in many countries. Many people view the issue cynically: business people go into politics solely to use the political process to increase their profits. While this is part of the reason, I also believe there exists a more charitable explanation. Like many developing countries, Tanzania’s regulatory institutions are weak. As a result, business people often need powerful political allies to protect their investments. Business people may thus see going into politics as an investment when regulatory institutions are weak. While collective action to produce a better regulatory climate may be the socially optimal outcome, collective action problems make individual political action – investing in politicians or becoming one – the rational strategy.

It is well noted in the literature of international law that the primary challenge facing the discipline of international law is the problem of how order is created and observed among sovereign states. This necessarily leads to different paradigms in exploring contemporary explanations of sovereignty and the powers and limits of sovereignty. Most notably, sovereignty (whether embodied in governmental institutions, quasi-government institutions or non-governmental institutions) furthers itself through the expansion of power manifested through territorial gain, economic gain and advancement of its institutional imprint. Will international law in a now globalized economy of “sovereign equals” further a new order and narrative of sovereignty? Are we now in a post-modern narrative of sovereign equality between nation-states?

Tanzania does not have extensive press freedom. Transparency in media ownership is a problem as well. This is making for a rather frustrating experience in attempting to map politics in Tanzania. While business people with close connections to the ruling party own lots of newspapers, self-censorship and opaque ownership structures make interpreting the news a bit of a challenge. Instead of naming people, articles use terms like “certain people.” Moreover, vague discussions of issues make it difficult to determine substantive differences on issues from personal vendettas. A free press and clear knowledge of who owns what would make my job a lot easier. Ugh!

Elster posits that “norms do not need external sanctions to be effective,” because when “norms are internalized, they are followed even when violation would be unobserved and not exposed to sanctions.” Further, he cites that “shame” or “anticipation of it” are sufficient internal sanctions. The way in which social scientists understand norms has direct bearing on the functioning of institutions. The way in which societies utilize institutions and their “rules” either by law or custom, is largely dependent on the norms of the players who play or do not play by the “rules.”