The Return of Politics

The drama of the harrassed blind Chinese activist who is asking for help to get out his country and come to the US has captured the attention of the small share of the media that has an interest in China. It has even overshadowed the much more dramatic tale of the ouster of the ex-Communist Party  rising star Bo Xilai. The fate of Bo, however, is much more important for Chinese politics and might be telling a lot about its trends.

The Bo scandal has all the ingredients of a best-selling novel:  power, intrigue, money, and murder. So much so that he made the cover of “Time” magazine this past month. CP secretary of China’s Chongqing municipality, Bo was ousted in March and expelled from the Politburo in April. He is under investigation for corruption and abuse of power, and his wife, lawyer and author Gu Kailai, is under detention for accusations that include arranging for the murder of a British businessman.

Beyond the better-than-fiction surface, the story also shows cracks in the seemingly apolitical structure of the CP, as Fareed Zakaria wrote at one of his recent columns.

“We don’t think much of the [Communist] Party as a political organization these days”, says Zakaria. It is dominated by technocrats obsessed with economic and engineering challenges”. It wasn’t always like that, he contends; the Revolution began with “pervasive” traits of “court politics, intrigue, ideological posturing and mass politics”. Only in the 1970s and 1980s, with Deng Xiaoping, a conscious decision was made to “end the high drama of Chinese political life”.

The author makes it sound like the political purge was successful until now. “For two decades, China has been run like a company, not a country”. It makes sense at first glance, but there is an inevitable factor that has always been present and cannot be dismissed: human nature, and human choices. Parties and countries are not machines, and as much as you try, you can’t completely eliminate the social aspects of politics. Bo may have shed light into it, but there have always been other political wolves operating in China. He is far from the first or only charismatic or corrupt leader around. That much should be obvious.

It doesn’t take out of the fact that the international scandal, let’s repeat, shows the cracks. These don’t surface unless there is a lot going on behind covers. If being more overtly “political” is a trend, perhaps it is associated with the growth of China’s world influence. The larger the empire, the more it has room for new types of leadership to emerge, and more and more control is needed to keep it in the original path.

It is worth noticing one thing here: when we say that “there is a return to politics”, the word “politics” mean conniving activities, corruption, populism and the such. “Politics in China is xenophobic, populist, nationalist, messy and certainly unpredictable –like politics everywhere”, argues Zakaria.

But where is the good part of politics, the search for legitimacy, the conquering of support? Have we become that cynical? Maybe an injection of “politics” would not be so bad for the PC after all. It would also be great if the PC could, for example, change positions with some international bodies that really should not be so “political”. Take the IMF, for example. That is one institution that could learn something from what China tried to be.

The Syrian Business (or Friedman part II)

This post is much delayed, but I didn’t want to miss the chance to continue the Friedman-palooza trend that I had agreed on with my esteemed colleague here. So I must comment on Thomas Friedman’s other piece that captured our attention this past week, this time about Syria and Lebanon.

Friedman makes two points: in one, he compares Syria’s Assad with Lebanon’s Hassan Nasrallah, head of the Hezbollah, who are allies. Then, he goes deeper into the Syrian issue and warns that the longer the conflict takes to be resolved the more dangerous and unstable the next government will be (assuming Assad falls).

Outside of his specific group of followers, whose loyalty is basically assured by sect membership, Assad seems to be the target of a regional hatred that grows by the day. According to Friedman, that hatred is spilling over to his allies, such as Nasrallah, as well. Not only it is very unpopular to be on the side of a dictator murdering his people to avoid relinquishing power, but comparisons are rising. “Assad and Nasrallah have long called themselves “the resistance” to Israel, using that to build their legitimacy and to justify arming themselves against their own people. What is stunning to me is how much their masks have now been ripped off by their own people”, says Friedman. It is getting more costly to remain silent on atrocities committed in Syria, and one must wonder how long it will take for the cost to get so high that Assad will be finally abandoned. If we are optimistic, either that happens or allies pay a heavier price, becoming targets of revolt themselves.

The thing is, Assad was successful in turning the resistance into a violent civil war with sectarian overtones, and things are that much more complicated now. If he falls tomorrow, it is very likely that whoever takes his place will have more in mind in terms of power distribution than merely ensuring a democratic transition.

“The bloodier and more sectarian the fight to depose Assad gets, the more deformed, violent and Islamist-dominated the post-Assad regime will likely be — and the more the civil war there will spread to Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan or Iraq. That is why just arming the Syrian opposition and standing back is a bad idea”, affirms the author.

It all goes to cool off hopes, if they still exist, of a nice transition in this decade. But that is how it goes –transitions are messy businesses, and the best we can do at this point is try not make it worse. I’m not so sure we are doing that right now.

Let’s All Feign Surprise Over Democracy Promotion

If you stick around you’ll see that it’s going to be Friedman-palooza here on D&S today, a concept which would normally nauseate me. But the NYT’s mustachioed bloviator-in-chief did touch on some excellent topics this week, namely the elephant in the room among foreign democracy promoters concerning Egypt.

“When the U.S. decides to just give away the military aid to Egypt without considering the consequences on us,” Okail told me, “it sends a message that the West and the U.S. don’t care about democracy and human rights. They just care about strategic stability. We, the defendants, felt betrayed. The battle we fight standing in that cage, hearing calls for our execution, is not a battle for our freedom but a battle for liberating Egyptian civil society.”

Okail referred to here is Dr. Nancy Okail, director of Freedom House’s Egypt office. Okail, an Egyptian citizen, is imprisoned by the SCAF and facing trial long after the military council freed the Americans it charged with stirring unrest. Suffering the inexplicable ramifications of an objectively good deed–building civil society, strengthening the party system, and just giving Egypt a hand transitioning into a well-functioning and fair democracy–Okail and her compatriots are rightly shaken.

But pay attention to the seeming betrayal that Okail is feeling now. Why is this, partially for someone working directly with a group like Freedom House but especially for an American like Friedman who observes them, such a hard and abrupt landing? It has long been painfully obvious that the U.S. only does promote democracy in locales and contexts where it strengthens, as she puts it, American “strategic stability.”

Consider Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report. By critically evaluating each country’s political freedoms and civil liberties, it makes a extremely unbiased judgement of both U.S. allies and nemesis. In the 2011 report, Saudi Arabia received a much-deserved 6.5 “Freedom Rating” (out of 7–I’ll let you guess which way the scale points) as well as rebukes on the country’s widespread corruption, government control of academia and press, unlawful detentions, treatment of women, and torture. Freedom House takes out all the stops, using words that U.S. government figureheads would never say in any Middle East speech.

But where does Freedom House operate? Not Saudi Arabia. Take a look at their office locations, all in relatively tame but strategic places around the world. Cameroon, for instance, a sought-after AFRICOM center in the natural resources hub of the Gulf of Guinea. Kyrgyzstan, home to U.S. air fleets and a peg in the complex Central Asian counterterror operation. Mexico, whose strategic stability as an American neighbor goes without saying.

We are much, much better off with groups like Freedom House than we are without them. Indeed, it is unreasonable to expect the U.S. to operate democracy promotion efforts everywhere, and Freedom House has excellently chosen locales where their programming has been effective and, until Egypt, more or less well-received. As a student of democracy promotion myself, I support this. I honestly do. But I always, even subconsciously, remember the inherent linkages between government-supported NGO activity and strategic interests. That’s just the way it is.

I suppose I get Friedman’s approach to encouraging Americans to keep a critical eye on U.S. foreign policy. He causes cognitive dissonance by setting up a simple example, like Okail in her prison cell, and compares it to our ideals, like the U.S. helping everyone get a fighting chance at democracy. And, sure, most  NYT readers probably aren’t international democracy buffs. But there is so much more to the story than, like he says, “stand[ing] up firmly for our own values.” And it’s a shame that although he says the mouthpiece to say it, he doesn’t.

Europe x the BRICs

Christine Lagarde, french, managing director of the IMF

Not even the threat of an impending Euro-mageddon is enough to tame Europe’s cling to traditional positions of power. The current dispute at the IMF is witness to that. Europeans want the Third World to participate in building collective firewalls (in the form of new funds for bilateral loans) that are obviously meant to keep their own countries afloat; but when reminded of promises to reform the decision making structure at the institution, they tend to change the subject.

 Europe’s collective whining at this year’s IMF and World Bank Spring Meetings, which ended this past weekend in DC, won them US$ 430 billion in extra funds for the firewall. The money is to be made available by the IMF officially for whoever needs it. “It is basically to tell the markets: calm down, we have resources”, an IMF spokesperson told me. Europeans themselves contributed with the largest amount, about US$ 200 billion –which sounds right, if not insufficient. They have the money (well, some of them do) and this is obviously for their own sake. Japan gave US$ 60 billion; the UK, Korea and Saudi Arabia, US$ 15 billion each. BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), meanwhile, are being pressured to give at least as much as Sweden and Switzerland (US$ 10 billion), and billions more than Australia, Norway or Denmark. The US did not give a cent.

Not so fast, they said.  Before opening their wallets, they wanted the big ones to move on with the implementation of the reform of the voting quotas at the IMF, which was agreed to in 2010 but remains just a promise. Not only that, they want to discuss more reforms. The BRICs thus decided to act as if they were a united group (they keep trying…) and declared they will join the firewall efforts, but before announcing the size of their contribution, Europe must commit to the reform of the quotas.

 It is not an unreasonable demand. But, unfortunately, it does not seem to get them very far.

First of all, the message came out clumsy and it only conveyed once again the confusion that is characteristic of the group. First Russia stated that it would contribute with between US$ 10 billion and US$ 20 billion, then the Russian Finance minister took it back and said no minimum amount was on the table just yet. Brazil, as usual, complained to everybody about the unfairness of the international system and from the start refused to talk numbers. India gave an interview saying that there was no conditionality whatsoever to the collaboration; it was not about the reform, it was just that they needed to discuss the matter with their domestic audiences first. And China didn’t say much.

Christine Lagarde, managing director of the IMF, was clearly displeased. She made ironic comments during press conferences and rolled her eyes when asked about the BRICs. I was covering the Spring Meetings this past weekend and asked her what did the Brics tell the IMF after all, since they each said a different thing to the public. She just smiled and replied to me: “Of course. It is in their interest to create as much confusion as possible. What they told me is clearly something that they do not want the press to know.” Lagarde is teasing, implying that Brazil, Russia, India and China did talk numbers with the institution, but want to pretend they are the tough guys now. Will it work?

Germany’s response to a question about the quota reform shows the Bric’s blackmailing attempt will be difficult. Berlin will keep its end of the bargain, they said. The agreements of 2010 will hold. But as for going further, like the BRICs want… the best answer the Germans could give was to say they “acknowledge” the desire. And then, they changed the subject.

Enter the 2012 D&S T-Shirt Slogan Contest!

You’re a DG wonk and proud of it. But how many articles of clothing do you own that really put it out there? That’s why Democracy & Society, in conjunction Georgetown’s Democracy and Governance Studies program, is excited to announce its first-ever t-shirt slogan contest.

On Friday, April 20th, from 10:00am until midnight EST, our Twitter and email hotlines are open to hear your best DG-centric slogans. Got any one-liners that really stick it to the man about the awesomeness of the DG field? Any catchphrases that make you snort milk out of your nose when you hear them? Any slogans that would get you high-fives when jogging outside the Ronald Reagan Building?

We’ll pick our favorite entry to be printed on t-shirts. And, yes, the winner will have this snappy new wardrobe item hand-delivered (within the DC area) or mailed directly to them.

How do I enter?
1. On Twitter, tweet entries to @GeorgetownDG or with the hashtag #DGslogans anytime on Friday, April 20th.
2. Via email, send entries to democracyandsociety@gmail.com with the subject “Slogan Contest.”

The contest is open to anyone, not just DG professionals or Georgetown students. Good luck! And may the odds be ever in your favor.