Following the attack by the military on demonstrators who had gathered to protest in a soccer stadium in the capital, Guinea’s coup leaders face increasing international pressure. The AU, EU, the regional organization Ecowas, and the UN united to call for targeted sanctions against the military.  It is unclear what impact sanctions can have on the conflict. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, Guinea’s economy is dominated primarily by subsistence farming and mining. Bauxite and aluminum constitute around 60% of exports annually and a further 25-40% come from gold and diamonds. This suggests few avenues for effective sanctions and even fewer opportunities for targeted sanctions that punish only the military.

Further undermining the ability of sanctions to produce desired outcomes are $7bn from Beijing. Chinese interest in Guinea is surprising. Earlier in the year the New York Times reported that Chinese investors were becoming weary of pumping resources into the more politically unstable countries in Africa. This suggests that the Chinese government is convinced  the military can provide enough stability to protect its sizable investment, which greatly exceeds Guinea’s annual GDP of $4.6bn

The growth of Chinese aid to Africa is well-documented elsewhere, but it remains unclear what the consequences of Chinese aid will be. The initial popularity of Chinese investment is dwindling in many parts of Africa. Headaches caused by anti-Chinese sentiment in these countries combined with international pressure for Beijing to act responsibly in its role as a global power have forced Beijing to confront the limits of “no-strings attached”.

For example, fecklessness by the government in Burma and strong international support have dampened China’s unconditional support for the military regime in Naypyidaw. The ability of China to influence its more unsavory allies should not be overstated, but China has shown an interest in moderating these regimes both for its own investors and its credibility as a rising power. It remains to be seen if China can exert similar influence in Africa or if it will be interested in doing so. However, in Guinea the international community has little leverage to force compliance. If China can develop that leverage on Camara and his cronies in Conakry, then the strategy of international outrage combined with ineffective sanctions should be reconsidered as the preferred response to human rights crises.