Iraq’s Electoral System

Jack Santucci, alum of the MA in Democracy and Governance program, has a good analysis of Iraq’s electoral system at the Democratic Piece.

United Russia looks East

The “China model” has garnered attention as an alternative for liberal development, but comparisons are largely drawn on the experiences of economic liberalization taking place under one-party dictatorships in Southeast Asia. Outside these regional comparisons, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seemed to have little applicability to political organization in the rest of the world. Now, according to this New York Times piece, Putin’s United Russia party believes the CCP deserving of study. The article describes a special meeting held earlier this month that featured senior Communist Party officials describing their ruling methodology and quotes from various United Russia leaders on the value and success of the CCP template.

China itself has a similar history of sending its officials abroad to learn techniques of governance they believed suitable for China’s future. Since the 1980s the CCP has demonstrated interest in the People’s Action Party (PAP) in Singapore. David Shambaugh’s book, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation, reveals that the CCP values the PAP model for “guided democracy” in which the PAP sustains itself through successful policies and co-optation of the opposition”.

Each of these cases is evidence of oft assumed authoritarian cooperation, but what the implications of this learning between authoritarians are for democracy advocates and practitioners is unclear. The ability of democracy assistance or democracy/reform advocates to exert any kind of pressure on authoritarian regimes is minimal. However, a regime’s selection and analysis of case studies is perhaps indicative of direction. In China, corruption could potentially undermine the ability of the CCP to claim itself an efficient manager and capable steward of economic expansion. Singapore is the logical choice for the CCP to study given its economic success and the PAP’s ability to retain control of the state during and after economic modernization. Shambaugh believes the interest of the CCP in semi-authoritarian regimes is one example of the CCP undergoing renovation in order to retain power. If similar direction can be assumed from United Russia’s choice of China as a model then the implications are less positive. That direction might best be summed up by Sergei Mitrokhin, leader of the liberal pro-Western Yabloko party, who is quoted in the NY Times article as saying “the China meeting demonstrated that United Russia wants to establish a single-party dictatorship in Russia, for all time”.

Boycotting a Useless Government

Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai announced Friday that he and the MDC would be boycotting the unity government, meaning they will not attend Cabinet meetings, council of Ministers meetings, and the weekly meetings among the parties to the unity government. This does not represent an official pullout, however; the MDC is retaining its positions. The party is protesting continued ill treatment by Mugabe’s dominant ZANU-PF, culminating in the re-arrest (and subsequent release on bail) of the MDC nominated deputy minister for agriculture, Roy Bennett, who faces charges of terrorism, insurgency, sabotage and banditry. These accusations are generally understood to be fabrications.

This boycott is unlikely to have much effect on how things are run in Zimbabwe. ZANU-PF officials have failed to consult with their MDC counterparts in most serious decisions, and the prime minister has been ineffective in most of his duties (beyond attracting a small amount of new international aid and interest). He has not made any headway on getting the military out of the diamond mines, and despite repeated pleas he has not been able to stop farm invasions. ZANU-PF has been undermining MDC authority whenever it can, particularly through its mouthpiece the state Herald. A recent teachers’ strike against the policies of the MDC-controlled Ministry of Education was violently enforced by ZANU-PF militia, who beat teachers who tried to return to work. The MDC has certainly not been a real partner in the government.

Tsvangirai hopes that this boycott will lead to fruitful negotiations over several outstanding issues, including Mugabe’s refusal to appoint several MDC governors. This is not overly likely to work. ZANU-PF seems undisturbed by the pullout, saying “If MDC wants to disengage … we don’t have a problem with that… We were having problems with MDC, working together.” There are strong elements in ZANU-PF that want to end the unity government, and this may be the opportunity they have been looking for. The party can simply refuse to negotiate terms with the MDC.

By pulling out, Tsvangirai has at least proven to his doubters that he has not been bought by ZANU-PF and that he is willing to put action behind his pronouncements that the government is not working. Unfortunately, circumstances in Zimbabwe are not conducive to MDC’s gaining real state power in the near future. Just about any compromise that brings the MDC back into this government is going to be unacceptable or unimplemented.

This is not to say that they should not return. The slight improvement in economy and stability that has come from being less of an international pariah has certainly been worthwhile. But we should not kid ourselves that Zimbabwe is anywhere near the verge of political change; no elite pact is going to lead to democracy in this case.

Guinea, China, and the Utility of Sanctions

Following the attack by the military on demonstrators who had gathered to protest in a soccer stadium in the capital, Guinea’s coup leaders face increasing international pressure. The AU, EU, the regional organization Ecowas, and the UN united to call for targeted sanctions against the military.  It is unclear what impact sanctions can have on the conflict. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, Guinea’s economy is dominated primarily by subsistence farming and mining. Bauxite and aluminum constitute around 60% of exports annually and a further 25-40% come from gold and diamonds. This suggests few avenues for effective sanctions and even fewer opportunities for targeted sanctions that punish only the military.

Further undermining the ability of sanctions to produce desired outcomes are $7bn from Beijing. Chinese interest in Guinea is surprising. Earlier in the year the New York Times reported that Chinese investors were becoming weary of pumping resources into the more politically unstable countries in Africa. This suggests that the Chinese government is convinced  the military can provide enough stability to protect its sizable investment, which greatly exceeds Guinea’s annual GDP of $4.6bn

The growth of Chinese aid to Africa is well-documented elsewhere, but it remains unclear what the consequences of Chinese aid will be. The initial popularity of Chinese investment is dwindling in many parts of Africa. Headaches caused by anti-Chinese sentiment in these countries combined with international pressure for Beijing to act responsibly in its role as a global power have forced Beijing to confront the limits of “no-strings attached”.

For example, fecklessness by the government in Burma and strong international support have dampened China’s unconditional support for the military regime in Naypyidaw. The ability of China to influence its more unsavory allies should not be overstated, but China has shown an interest in moderating these regimes both for its own investors and its credibility as a rising power. It remains to be seen if China can exert similar influence in Africa or if it will be interested in doing so. However, in Guinea the international community has little leverage to force compliance. If China can develop that leverage on Camara and his cronies in Conakry, then the strategy of international outrage combined with ineffective sanctions should be reconsidered as the preferred response to human rights crises.

Good point

Matt Yglesias makes a good point about Afghanistan.