The Pentagon and USAID

Michael Cohen at Democracy Arsenal observes the dangers in the Pentagon’s interest in strengthening USAID:

It’s not that the Pentagon doesn’t want to see a strong AID – it’s that they want to see a strong AID that helps the Pentagon carry out its responsibilities, i.e military operations. The idea of an independent AID that is focused on the long-term goal of development and democracy promotion in non-kinetic environments is perhaps a bit less pressing of an agenda item…

Part of the problem of what we’ve seen over the past 8 years – and continue to see today – is the subordination of all other foreign policy interests to “national security.” As a result, a disproportionate amount of AID’s budget is used in promoting democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan as opposed to helping civil society groups in fragile or emerging democracies where tens of thousands of US troops are not stationed. And it means US assistance is spent to train African armies (to fight the war on terror), instead of African police forces, which if you happen to be a African citizen would likely be much preferred.

This worries me as well.  Linking foreign aid to national security may be good for raising development budgets in the short-term, but raises a host of dangers.  For wonks, below the jump I discuss my thoughts on these dangers in more detail, especially for democracy and governance programs.

An important legacy of the Bush Administration is democracy before security: attempts to implement difficult political and governance reforms during conflict.  US democracy and governance (D&G) programs are increasingly concentrated in this endeavor.  In the Obama Administration’s Fiscal Year 2010 budget request, just over 50% of D&G funds are for four conflict countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Sudan.  Democracy before security has resulted in a major shift away from standard D&G programs, such as assisting political parties, training media, and strengthening the rule of law, to more complex and ambitious ones in basic governance, primarily human security.  In the short-term, this change has allowed for innovative programs and much larger D&G budgets.  Nevertheless, democracy before security risks losing support for D&G programs for three reasons:

• Ceding Control to the Military.  Democracy before security ties D&G program success to favorable military outcomes.  For example, Afghanistan is by far the largest D&G program the US Government funds.  Since the fortunes of these programs are tied to the overall success of the conflict, the outcome of the largest US D&G program is primarily dependent on the US’s interests and efforts in fighting the war.

• High Risk of Failure.  D&G programs tend to be most effective in politically stable countries when governments are competent and have an incentive to govern well.  These conditions rarely exist in conflict zones.  Rather, democracy before security requires a qualitative shift away from programs suitable for stable political environments, such as working with political parties, legal reform, and strengthening civil society to human security and conflict resolution.  While we have numerous models for how to approach the former, we know little about how to implement the latter.  Combined with the precarious security situation inherent to conflict zones, democracy before security faces a high risk of failure.

• Waning Support for D&G Programs.  Ceding control of D&G programs to success in conflicts and attempting to run programs with high risks of failure could result in waning support for broader D&G programs.  Advocates of these programs have won hard-fought battles to elevate the importance of political and governance reform within the foreign policy and development communities.  Concentrating D&G programs in areas where success is unlikely risks losing this support for them.

Democracy before security may a worthy objective.  Nevertheless, the risk it poses to future support for D&G programs is high.