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	<title>Comments on: Outbidding the Taliban</title>
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		<title>By: Barak</title>
		<link>http://www.democracyandsociety.com/blog/2010/01/26/outbidding-the-taliban/comment-page-1/#comment-472</link>
		<dc:creator>Barak</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Jan 2010 19:58:17 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Two points. One, I don&#039;t think that people will join depending on who they think will win the war. Rather (and I should have made this clear), I was talking about this in the context of the credibility of Taliban threats. The Taliban has a history of punishing people who cooperate with the US. What I meant was that this threat needs to recede for the program to work. Two, I agree that it would work in the context of a larger strategy. The problem is that strategy does not exist. It appears now that Karzai is determined to negotiate with the Taliban and bring them into a power-sharing agreement.  Thus, in a very short period of time, the policy has changed from weakening the Taliban to negotiating with them. If this is the case, why do we need a program to outbid Taliban foot soldiers?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Two points. One, I don&#8217;t think that people will join depending on who they think will win the war. Rather (and I should have made this clear), I was talking about this in the context of the credibility of Taliban threats. The Taliban has a history of punishing people who cooperate with the US. What I meant was that this threat needs to recede for the program to work. Two, I agree that it would work in the context of a larger strategy. The problem is that strategy does not exist. It appears now that Karzai is determined to negotiate with the Taliban and bring them into a power-sharing agreement.  Thus, in a very short period of time, the policy has changed from weakening the Taliban to negotiating with them. If this is the case, why do we need a program to outbid Taliban foot soldiers?</p>
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		<title>By: David</title>
		<link>http://www.democracyandsociety.com/blog/2010/01/26/outbidding-the-taliban/comment-page-1/#comment-470</link>
		<dc:creator>David</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Jan 2010 19:29:10 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>I think “futility” is a pretty strong word for this idea.  Sure it’s far from certain how successful this program will be, but that doesn’t mean it can’t be one important part of a larger strategy.  I don’t know why we should assume that someone’s incentive to join is completely dependent on who they think would win the war.  If that was the case, could we assume that anyone who signed up for the bribes inevitably felt the Taliban was destined to lose?  You can’t make the statement that they are apolitical fighters and then turn around and say nobody will join anyway.  As you mentioned, it doesn’t have to completely cripple the Taliban, but sucking away a base of support isn’t insignificant.  I thought one of the most embarrassing revelations of the war came when it was learned Taliban fighters were being paid better than government ones.   If this program is run successful, it can go a long way in altering incentives.   

On the topic, Peter Neumann, wrote his thoughts about this in Der Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,674593,00.html</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think “futility” is a pretty strong word for this idea.  Sure it’s far from certain how successful this program will be, but that doesn’t mean it can’t be one important part of a larger strategy.  I don’t know why we should assume that someone’s incentive to join is completely dependent on who they think would win the war.  If that was the case, could we assume that anyone who signed up for the bribes inevitably felt the Taliban was destined to lose?  You can’t make the statement that they are apolitical fighters and then turn around and say nobody will join anyway.  As you mentioned, it doesn’t have to completely cripple the Taliban, but sucking away a base of support isn’t insignificant.  I thought one of the most embarrassing revelations of the war came when it was learned Taliban fighters were being paid better than government ones.   If this program is run successful, it can go a long way in altering incentives.   </p>
<p>On the topic, Peter Neumann, wrote his thoughts about this in Der Spiegel: <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,674593,00.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,674593,00.html</a></p>
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