What if the Taliban says no?

This week, there was a big conference on Afghanistan in London. President Karzai made clear that he intends to reach out to the Taliban. The US and other governments involved in Afghanistan seem to agree (to varying extents) that a political solution with the Taliban is the only viable way to end the insurgency.

How’s that policy working out? It would appear not too well. The Washington Post reports that Taliban leaders deny meeting with Kai Eide, the outgoing head of the UN mission in Afghanistan, even though Eide reported he met with them. Ron Moreau’s recent article in Newsweek makes the Taliban’s claim credible:

The London conference was a futile exercise. Once again Washington and its allies are looking for solutions that don’t exist: a new Karzai, bribing the Taliban, negotiating with the Taliban. No Taliban leader of any stature seems to have entered into negotiations thus far. U.N. special envoy Kai Eide reportedly met in Dubai on Jan. 6 with Afghans who claimed to represent the Taliban and said they could pass messages to the Quetta Shura, but it’s unlikely that their mission was actually sanctioned by anyone in the senior leadership.

I think it’s important to ask what’s plan B? Suppose the Taliban view Karzai’s willingness to negotiate as a sign of weakness? Perhaps the Taliban think they can win, so have no incentive to negotiate. The US government has already said that there is no military solution, only a political one. The assumption here seems to be that the Taliban want to talk. I hope someone has verified this because we seem to be heading in a very dangerous direction in Afghanistan. What if the Taliban don’t want to negotiate, but want to keep fighting? What then? Do we keep fighting a war we say we cannot win? Does anybody know if the Taliban wants to negotiate?

At this point many of you may be saying “Barak, there is no such thing as the Taliban, it’s highly decentralized.” Good point. But I wasn’t the one who brought up the idea of negotiating with them. I don’t want to be overly critical, but if the Taliban does not exist as a centralized, hierarchical organization, this makes negotiations even more difficult. If it’s a decentralzied organization, Karzai will need to strike deals with lots and lots of “Taliban” who may be little more than local strongmen. Moreover, do we keep fighting those who do not want to negotiate? This would seem to require some nimble policy choices and public relations management: the US isn’t fighting the Taliban, just the bad Taliban. That will probably go over as well as New Coke.