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The Department of Defense is going to release its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) this week, setting out the strategic priorities of the Department of Defense. Abu Muqawama has posted an advance copy of it. Below are the priorities for dealing with the Taliban in Afghanistan.
…prevailing against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and its border regions requires a comprehensive approach employing all elements of national power. Focusing resources where the population is most threatened, our military and civilian efforts align with the following primary objectives:
Reversing Taliban momentum through sustained military action by the United States, our allies, and Afghanistan’s security forces;
Denying the Taliban access to and control of key population and production centers and lines of communications;
Disrupting the Taliban outside secured areas and preventing Al Qaeda from regaining sanctuary in Afghanistan;
Degrading the Taliban to levels manageable by Afghanistan’s National Security Forces (ANSF)…
This policy seems at odds with the current situation. Here’s what the New York Times reports today:
The Afghan official in charge of reconciliation acknowledged Monday that the government had been in talks for some time with Taliban leaders to bring them into the government and end the war, dismissing the Taliban’s denials.
The official – Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, a top security adviser to President Hamid Karzai – made the statement at a news conference to discuss last week’s international Afghanistan conference in London and later elaborated on his announcement in an interview.
There are some contacts and these contacts will continue, on the local, regional, national and broader political level…
President Karzai has said he would welcome talks with top Taliban figures like its leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar.
This doesn’t sound like what’s in the QDR at all. I see lots of things about weakening, the Taliban in the QDR. I don’t see anything about “reconciliation” or “negotiation” with the Taliban in the QDR.
President Obama assured us that he and his administration undertook a thorough analysis of US options in Afghanistan before his West Point speech. As far as I can tell, little new has emerged about the Taliban or the situation in Afghanistan more broadly since then to justify the new policy approach. What has happened since the West Point speech is that Pakistan has said it wants Afghanistan to negotiate with the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan has announced it has been talking to the Taliban for some time. Did these governments not make their positions clear to the administration when it was devising its Afghanistan policy? Did the Obama administration know the Government of Afghanistan has been negotiating with the Taliban? Did the Obama administration listen? Was the West Point talk about weakening the Taliban deliberately misleading? Can someone – please – explain why the policy has changed?
To be clear, I am neither for nor against negotiating with the Taliban. I have no idea whether it is a more reasonable policy than fighting them. Rather, my more prosaic concern is whether there is a policy on Afghanistan or whether the administration is just making it up as it goes along. Contrasting the yet-to-be released QDR with today’s news me think it’s the latter.
- Published by Barak in: Blog
6 Responses to “What is US policy on Afghanistan?”
The only reason the Taliban would negotiate is that they perceive that, a) they have maximized their potential power and can extract a lot from the government, or b) they are losing to the military and feel they should “get what they can.” They are obviously not losing the military, so option B is off the table. That leaves option A. But in order for them to believe they have maximized their position vis-avis the government, there has to be a threat. Enter, QDR and the DoD policy of rolling back the Taliban.
The policy of the Department of Defense is not (and should not be) diplomacy. Rather, think of the DoD as representing the stick if reconciliation fails. If reconciliation works, it’s easy for DoD to tell their soldiers to change tactics (ie, stopping shooting at these people), but you don’t want the military talking about reconciliation – you want them talking about pushing back the threat to make reconciliation more likely. When looked at through that lens, the policy makes perfect sense: the military is basically saying to the Taliban, “our objective is to drive you out of population centers, weaken you and kill your fighters.” Meanwhile, the Afghan government will try to siphon Taliban fighters off with the threat that the military is still going to try to kill them.
A few points. First, the QDR is about US national security, not DoD policy, so “diplomacy is not our job” doesn’t hold. Second, this program and these articles lead me to believe that the US is not serious about weakening the Taliban, but is looking for the exits. I increasingly think the West Point speech was a distraction.
Barak: I think you’re ascribing a little too broad a scope to the QDR. It is primarily a DoD policy document: there’s a bit in there about strengthening contacts with DoS, but really diplomacy isn’t DoD’s job and I think that’s reflected in the QDR. I think your second point is correct, but again I think that, at least judging by the public statements of the actors concerned, the main opponents of the government of Afghanistan have overestimated the depth of American withdrawal.
I’ll take your point on the QDR. I stand by my point on US policy, however. McChrystal’s recent comments that the security situation in Afghanistan is stabilizing met some pretty harsh criticism.
Solution:
A. The RPG Project
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1. Outlaw the RPG, including for police/Afghan army.
2. Collect all RPGS, $50 per tube, $5 per round. Destroy them.
3. After 60 days public warning period, shoot on sight anyone carrying an RPG.
4. US secretly buys 70% stake in Russian manufacturers of RPGs.
5. All RPG rounds made thereafter have internal transmitters so they can be located, receivers so they can be remotely detonated, and 6-month deactivation chips.
6. Sell the new style RPGs on black market to insurgents.
7. Map where they end up, and visit.
8. Every once in a while broadcast that det code.
B. The Tora Bora Factor
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1. US demands compensation for blood and treasure spent in Afghanistan.
2. Afghan government cedes the Tora Bora region to US as permanent US sovereign territory, enraging insurgents.
3. Build military bases, intelligence stations, and a ski resort there, directly challenging insurgents from their own former redoubt.
C. Up the Wazoo
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1. US publicly supports full independence for Pakistan tribal areas such as Waziristan.
2. US privately pressures Pakistan to grant them independence, and rewards Pakistan when they do so.
3. Pakistan washes its hands and is relieved of the endless burden of tribal insurgency.
4. US and UN publicly offer aid to the new independent tribal nations if they expel terrorists.
5. US legally declares war on the new nations when they refuse. (They aren’t part of Pakistan anymore.)
6. US legally invades and destroys insurgent bases in Wazoo and other terrorist havens; surviving terrorists flee with no safe refuges; strategic victory.
These are certainly ambitious suggestions.
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