Comments on: What is US policy on Afghanistan? http://www.democracyandsociety.com/blog/2010/02/01/what-is-us-policy-on-afghanistan/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=what-is-us-policy-on-afghanistan Thoughts on democracy and civil society Thu, 29 Jul 2010 07:23:48 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.0 By: Barak http://www.democracyandsociety.com/blog/2010/02/01/what-is-us-policy-on-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-720 Barak Thu, 01 Apr 2010 02:19:54 +0000 http://www.democracyandsociety.com/blog/?p=1261#comment-720 These are certainly ambitious suggestions. These are certainly ambitious suggestions.

]]> By: Binky http://www.democracyandsociety.com/blog/2010/02/01/what-is-us-policy-on-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-712 Binky Tue, 30 Mar 2010 05:33:19 +0000 http://www.democracyandsociety.com/blog/?p=1261#comment-712 Solution: A. The RPG Project ------------------------ 1. Outlaw the RPG, including for police/Afghan army. 2. Collect all RPGS, $50 per tube, $5 per round. Destroy them. 3. After 60 days public warning period, shoot on sight anyone carrying an RPG. 4. US secretly buys 70% stake in Russian manufacturers of RPGs. 5. All RPG rounds made thereafter have internal transmitters so they can be located, receivers so they can be remotely detonated, and 6-month deactivation chips. 6. Sell the new style RPGs on black market to insurgents. 7. Map where they end up, and visit. 8. Every once in a while broadcast that det code. B. The Tora Bora Factor ------------------------------ 1. US demands compensation for blood and treasure spent in Afghanistan. 2. Afghan government cedes the Tora Bora region to US as permanent US sovereign territory, enraging insurgents. 3. Build military bases, intelligence stations, and a ski resort there, directly challenging insurgents from their own former redoubt. C. Up the Wazoo ---------------------- 1. US publicly supports full independence for Pakistan tribal areas such as Waziristan. 2. US privately pressures Pakistan to grant them independence, and rewards Pakistan when they do so. 3. Pakistan washes its hands and is relieved of the endless burden of tribal insurgency. 4. US and UN publicly offer aid to the new independent tribal nations if they expel terrorists. 5. US legally declares war on the new nations when they refuse. (They aren't part of Pakistan anymore.) 6. US legally invades and destroys insurgent bases in Wazoo and other terrorist havens; surviving terrorists flee with no safe refuges; strategic victory. Solution:

A. The RPG Project
————————
1. Outlaw the RPG, including for police/Afghan army.
2. Collect all RPGS, $50 per tube, $5 per round. Destroy them.
3. After 60 days public warning period, shoot on sight anyone carrying an RPG.
4. US secretly buys 70% stake in Russian manufacturers of RPGs.
5. All RPG rounds made thereafter have internal transmitters so they can be located, receivers so they can be remotely detonated, and 6-month deactivation chips.
6. Sell the new style RPGs on black market to insurgents.
7. Map where they end up, and visit.
8. Every once in a while broadcast that det code.

B. The Tora Bora Factor
——————————
1. US demands compensation for blood and treasure spent in Afghanistan.
2. Afghan government cedes the Tora Bora region to US as permanent US sovereign territory, enraging insurgents.
3. Build military bases, intelligence stations, and a ski resort there, directly challenging insurgents from their own former redoubt.

C. Up the Wazoo
———————-
1. US publicly supports full independence for Pakistan tribal areas such as Waziristan.
2. US privately pressures Pakistan to grant them independence, and rewards Pakistan when they do so.
3. Pakistan washes its hands and is relieved of the endless burden of tribal insurgency.
4. US and UN publicly offer aid to the new independent tribal nations if they expel terrorists.
5. US legally declares war on the new nations when they refuse. (They aren’t part of Pakistan anymore.)
6. US legally invades and destroys insurgent bases in Wazoo and other terrorist havens; surviving terrorists flee with no safe refuges; strategic victory.

]]> By: Barak http://www.democracyandsociety.com/blog/2010/02/01/what-is-us-policy-on-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-520 Barak Fri, 05 Feb 2010 23:16:55 +0000 http://www.democracyandsociety.com/blog/?p=1261#comment-520 I'll take your point on the QDR. I stand by my point on US policy, however. McChrystal's <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/world/asia/05gates.html" rel="nofollow">recent comments</a> that the security situation in Afghanistan is stabilizing met some pretty <a href="http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2010/02/the-afghan-credibility-gap.html" rel="nofollow">harsh</a> <a href="http://" rel="nofollow">criticism</a>. I’ll take your point on the QDR. I stand by my point on US policy, however. McChrystal’s recent comments that the security situation in Afghanistan is stabilizing met some pretty harsh criticism.

]]> By: Josh http://www.democracyandsociety.com/blog/2010/02/01/what-is-us-policy-on-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-518 Josh Thu, 04 Feb 2010 23:20:46 +0000 http://www.democracyandsociety.com/blog/?p=1261#comment-518 Barak: I think you're ascribing a little too broad a scope to the QDR. It is primarily a DoD policy document: there's a bit in there about strengthening contacts with DoS, but really diplomacy isn't DoD's job and I think that's reflected in the QDR. I think your second point is correct, but again I think that, at least judging by the public statements of the actors concerned, the main opponents of the government of Afghanistan have overestimated the depth of American withdrawal. Barak: I think you’re ascribing a little too broad a scope to the QDR. It is primarily a DoD policy document: there’s a bit in there about strengthening contacts with DoS, but really diplomacy isn’t DoD’s job and I think that’s reflected in the QDR. I think your second point is correct, but again I think that, at least judging by the public statements of the actors concerned, the main opponents of the government of Afghanistan have overestimated the depth of American withdrawal.

]]> By: Barak http://www.democracyandsociety.com/blog/2010/02/01/what-is-us-policy-on-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-513 Barak Wed, 03 Feb 2010 03:47:48 +0000 http://www.democracyandsociety.com/blog/?p=1261#comment-513 A few points. First, the QDR is about US national security, not DoD policy, so "diplomacy is not our job" doesn't hold. Second, <a href="http://www.democracyandsociety.com/blog/2010/02/02/heres-a-dumb-idea/" rel="nofollow">this program</a> and <a href="http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LB03Df01.html" rel="nofollow">these</a> <a href="http://blogs.aljazeera.net/imperium/2010/02/02/tangoing-taliban" rel="nofollow">articles</a> lead me to believe that the US is not serious about weakening the Taliban, but is looking for the exits. I increasingly think the West Point speech was a distraction. A few points. First, the QDR is about US national security, not DoD policy, so “diplomacy is not our job” doesn’t hold. Second, this program and these articles lead me to believe that the US is not serious about weakening the Taliban, but is looking for the exits. I increasingly think the West Point speech was a distraction.

]]> By: Austan Mogharabi http://www.democracyandsociety.com/blog/2010/02/01/what-is-us-policy-on-afghanistan/comment-page-1/#comment-512 Austan Mogharabi Tue, 02 Feb 2010 17:31:23 +0000 http://www.democracyandsociety.com/blog/?p=1261#comment-512 The only reason the Taliban would negotiate is that they perceive that, a) they have maximized their potential power and can extract a lot from the government, or b) they are losing to the military and feel they should "get what they can." They are obviously not losing the military, so option B is off the table. That leaves option A. But in order for them to believe they have maximized their position vis-avis the government, there has to be a threat. Enter, QDR and the DoD policy of rolling back the Taliban. The policy of the Department of Defense is not (and should not be) diplomacy. Rather, think of the DoD as representing the stick if reconciliation fails. If reconciliation works, it's easy for DoD to tell their soldiers to change tactics (ie, stopping shooting at these people), but you don't want the military talking about reconciliation - you want them talking about pushing back the threat to make reconciliation more likely. When looked at through that lens, the policy makes perfect sense: the military is basically saying to the Taliban, "our objective is to drive you out of population centers, weaken you and kill your fighters." Meanwhile, the Afghan government will try to siphon Taliban fighters off with the threat that the military is still going to try to kill them. The only reason the Taliban would negotiate is that they perceive that, a) they have maximized their potential power and can extract a lot from the government, or b) they are losing to the military and feel they should “get what they can.” They are obviously not losing the military, so option B is off the table. That leaves option A. But in order for them to believe they have maximized their position vis-avis the government, there has to be a threat. Enter, QDR and the DoD policy of rolling back the Taliban.

The policy of the Department of Defense is not (and should not be) diplomacy. Rather, think of the DoD as representing the stick if reconciliation fails. If reconciliation works, it’s easy for DoD to tell their soldiers to change tactics (ie, stopping shooting at these people), but you don’t want the military talking about reconciliation – you want them talking about pushing back the threat to make reconciliation more likely. When looked at through that lens, the policy makes perfect sense: the military is basically saying to the Taliban, “our objective is to drive you out of population centers, weaken you and kill your fighters.” Meanwhile, the Afghan government will try to siphon Taliban fighters off with the threat that the military is still going to try to kill them.

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