New Report Challenges U.S. Military’s Use of Aid in Africa

Should the U.S. military use humanitarian and development aid to further its security interests?

As a U.S. Army Civil Affairs specialist, my whole job is based on the premise that the answer to this question is “yes.”  Civil Affairs soldiers use development projects and aid distributions – mostly on a small scale – to achieve a number of objectives, such as improving relations between the U.S. military and a local population, or enhancing the capacity and credibility of the host nation government.

Most of my experience has been with the latter: in Afghanistan, I worked with the local leaders of Ghazni province to plan and execute small projects or humanitarian distributions based on the needs of the population.  The idea was to enhance the local government’s ability to manage projects and plan ahead, while demonstrating to the people of Ghazni that the government was working for them.

Now in Uganda, my team is again working to build the capacity and enhance the image of another entity the U.S. is partners with: the Ugandan People’s Defense Force.  We work in Karamoja, an area of the country in which the UPDF is carrying out a disarmament campaign that has strained civilian-military relations.

The nature of these assignments alone raises a number of questions; a team of researchers at Tufts University, among others, has started trying to answer them.

A few days ago, the Feinstein Center at Tufts University released a report that challenges many of the assumptions on which my job is based.  Using Kenya as a case study, it challenges the link between how the U.S. military provides assistance and its security objectives.  It asks important questions about civil affairs operations that, in my opinion, the military should pay attention to, and that are arguably long overdue.

One of the report’s main contentions is that “hearts and minds” operations do little to alter people’s perceptions of the United States, which are based on a multitude of factors.  But often, as the report touches on, CA teams are striving not to enhance the perception of the U.S military or the U.S government per se, but rather that of our strategic partners.   And this is usually tied into efforts to bolster the capacity of these partners – be they local government or local military forces – to act responsibly and competently.

I think that over the years, CA probably has contributed positively –if perhaps intangibly – to “good governance” efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere – but as the report suggests, there is no evidence of this.  And in exploring an issue as complicated as DOD efforts to bolster good governance in different environments, I believe there is much more room for input and analysis.  Civil Affairs teams may not contribute to “good governance” in the way or to the extent that is envisioned for them, but I would maintain that they generally go beyond equating good governance with building infrastructure (see p.79).

Which brings me to another point: where is “our side” of the story?  The Feinstein center is doing a great job, I think, of asking difficult question about the growing “militarization” of aid.  Where are the DoD or other reports that show Civil Affairs’ accomplishments throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and beyond?  If they are there, bring them out – let’s make this a real conversation, and give this issue the attention it deserves.

As the Feinstein report points out, over 20% of aid to Africa is currently controlled by the Department of Defense.  With the growing linkages between aid and security, how can we afford not to have more critical discussion on this issue?