Mis-underestimating the Taliban

Michael Cohen succinctly summarizes – and adeptly questions – the justification of the Battle for Kandahar:

The US military plan seems to be predicated on the notion that the US will bloody the Taliban, seize some level of control in Kandahar province and push the Taliban closer to negotiations…

If we’re wrong in Kandahar and it doesn’t push the Taliban toward negotiation; what do we do next? Do we stay and go through the long process of stabilizing and pacifying the city? Do we leave with the job undone?

Josh Bartlow’s reporting from Kandahar suggests Cohen is asking the right question:

In Kandahar, the Taliban’s most powerful weapon has become the calculated assassination…By executing those who work or sympathize with the government, the Taliban has made clear that those supporting the American military effort here are risking their lives. Each new death brings more dread in a city of hunters and hunted.

The killings take aim at the fundamental goal of the U.S. military’s planned summer offensive in Kandahar: to build a credible local government that responds to the needs of the people. In the past month, about six people have quit the already understaffed provincial government, and other federal ministry representatives in the province have taken leave. Targeted by bombs and killings of their local staff, foreigners working for U.S. government contractors and the United Nations have fled for Kabul.

The Times of Kabul suggests that the only strategy ISAF has left that could work is an exit strategy.

Which will be bloodier: the Battle for Kandahar or the Battle for Who Lost Afghanistan?