Tunisia and the Arab Winter
As I was checking the new Foreign Policy blog Transitions, by the Democracy Lab, I ran into a post called “Revolution Year One” in Tunis. It is hard to believe that it has already been a year since Tunisia, now called “the cradle of Arab revolutions”, overthrew Ben Ali. And they have been moving fast – the country had elections, the new Parliament is working and a new Constitution is on its way.
What is interesting is how the mood has turned sour so quickly. Expert Daniel Byman wrote for the Washington Post that “the peaceful demonstrations in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen that were supposed to bring democracy have instead given way to bloodshed and chaos, with the forces of tyranny trying to turn back the clock.” And he is not the only one to claim that the Arab Spring has become the “Arab Winter”.
But does the bitterness start with unrealistic expectations? Haven’t the real tests only just began?
In Tunis, it seems reality sank in, and now the arduous work of building a new democracy takes the space where before we could find excitement and hope. On the anniversary of the revolution, the general feeling was apparently lukewarm. Protesters were not chanting that the fight continues, and joyous Tunisians were not partying too loudly, according to the FP blog.
There were complaints that the celebration was taken over by the parties, instead of leaving it for the people. The moderate islamist Ennahda, the big winner of the recent elections, was allegedly the happiest one around, but many others showed up. I’m not sure that is a bad thing. Party strengthening is supposed to be an important feature of the process, and at least there is some organization at that level.
Of course, one should look at the level of support, participation and representation Ennahda and others enjoy now and going forward. At this stage, there seems to be an increasing gap between parties and people, which is cause for worry. One example is the recent outcry against the attempt by the new prime minister (a leader of Ennahda) to appoint media editors, threatening the freedom of the press. After protests, the government gave up, but it was too close to home for Tunisians used to life under Ben Ali, and the attempt brought back a lot of suspicion.
There is also disappointment with the state of the economy. Unemployment might stay close to 20% for the time being, although no one should have reasonably expected a large improvement so fast. The BBC reports that the number of acts of self-immolation increased five-fold in the past year, mostly inspired economic desperation (and the example of the young vendor who set himself and triggered the revolution over a year ago).
And there is the issue of controversial alliances, with the emir of Qatar and Hamas figuring at the top of the critics’ lists.
All that in a country deemed the most likely to succeed in building a new democracy. Egypt and Libya are much worse, of course, and I won’t even start on Syria. But still, I would caution against letting pessimism grow; instead, it is perhaps time to adjust expectations and keep working.
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I agree fully. We know a thing or two about democratic transitions. One, countries usually fail in their fist attempt to democratize. Two, the likelihood of a successful transition correlates strongly with the state of the economy. Thus, we have no reason to expect countries which have never been democracies to have successful democratic transitions if they are attempting to do so in a weak economy. What we are seeing in the Middle East at the moment – a lot of stalled transitions – doesn’t defy the model prediction. It is the model prediction.
It’s always a little dangerous to derive black and white conclusions (like an Arab Winter) from messy and fluid circumstances. Transitions are rarely linear, and as Barak pointed out we have decades of examples that demonstrate this clearly. Coining the “Arab Winter” does nothing more than infer that the promising spring, which gave way to a long, hot summer of struggle, has since withered and died on the vine. It’s attractive imagery, yes, and perhaps inevitable once we start down the road of seasonal vocabulary. But the larger point remains — revolutions are conducted in poetry, and transitions in prose. It’s not surprising that once the excitement of liberation gave way to lingering political realities, optimism waned and disaffection yet again set in. The challenge for all of these countries is still forthcoming, generating and mobilizing enough public will to continue the process of upward pressure as new institutions are negotiated, built, and staffed. We’ve seen many false starts and setbacks, and we’ll certainly see more. Yet asking “what went wrong” — as Byman did — not only makes the mistake that Barak mentioned, but creates an unreasonable benchmark that says 11 months is enough time to judge the success of a transition that typically takes a generation, or more.
Absolutely. Thus far nothing has gone wrong. It’s all been very predictable.