Democracy Promotion in Hostile Climes
A recent ABC article detailing the impacts of USAID programs in Cuba touched on a valuable question and recurrent theme in democracy promotion. Specifically focusing on the concept of covert democracy promotion operations and whether or not they serve a purpose, the article avoids overarching challenges regarding the legitimacy of regime change motivated by external actors. In asking whether or not these types of programs might best be left to clandestine services the article essentially calls to question the ultimate purpose of democracy promotion efforts in hostile environs.
Is the U.S. involved in these areas for the promotion of democratic principles to be taken up by the populace? Or are we engaged for the sake of supporting US foreign policy interests? Certainly these possibilities overlap significantly, but where -if anywhere- is a line drawn between the two? Perhaps a more important issue to focus on is those states that are not outwardly hostile to the US or democratic principles, but are inherently skeptical of US funded NGOs developing community activists. In these places would we be better served to work strictly with the regime, or should we still endeavor to engage the populace directly despite potential pushback?
To a degree this issue parallels several subjects of US international strategy including but not limited to the justifiable use of force. The question here seems ultimately whether or not the tools chosen do more to help when successful than they do harm when they miss their mark. The value of running programs which fly “under the radar” of anti-democratic forces should certainly be weighed against the risk involved with those programs discovery. However if the risk is deemed too high should this suggest that we would be best served simply not to get involved in democracy promotion in some areas?
One of the interesting realities of studying Governance or anything in the field of Politics, is that often there can be no certainty regarding long-term impact. It might be decades before we know whether or not attempts to influence populations to rise against autocrats were successful. Unfortunately in diplomacy the possibility of failure seems often to hinder our willingness to take potentially worthwhile risks. When weighing the benefits of change motivated by the populace, compared to change brought about by military intervention, the value of these missions might be cast in a much different light.
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