Browsing articles from "August, 2012"
Aug 31, 2012
Center for Democracy and Civil Society

Conventions, Mozambican Style

American taxpayers, through no fault of their own, invested US$ 136 million in the Republican and the Democratic conventions this year: US$18 million for each “party” (in every meaning of the word) plus US$ 100 million allocated for security and police force during the events.

The sum has sparked a lot of questions, but it could be much more outrageous. Far from here, in Mozambique, which as we know occupies the 4th worse place at the UNDP Human Development Index, the party in power, Frelimo, is about to spend ridiculous US$ 8 million for their X Congress Convention, where it should be decided who will  “run” for president next.

Frelimo’s Congress will take place on September 23-28 in Pemba (north), and 3000 party delegates and 2000 guests are expected to attend. In order to host all these people, part of the budget – around US$ 3 million, according to Frelimo’s secretary general, Filipe Paunde – is being used to build infrastructure.

At least it is not taxpayer money. Paunde said that the millions were given by members and supporters of Frelimo and that contributions have started a year ago. Still, the political implications are big. Around Maputo, rumors run rampant about who exactly is contributing: the most common stories involve big industries, organized crime, drug lords and rich immigrant communities such as the Indians. (I’m obviously mentioning this to give an idea of the general feeling of Mozambicans, and want to make clear that these are just rumors.)

Asked during an interview about spending that much money in a party congress during a crisis, the secretary general said: “We must understand what it is to govern. To govern is to make a plan and prioritize. The congress is the most important part of the party, the one which will make decisions about the next five years of Frelimo.”

Armando Guebuza, Mozambican President

Not using public money might be an advantage in terms of waste of resources, but the non specified donations sound very tricky. At least the Frelimo Congress has one big advantage over the US conventions when it comes to popular interest: There is actually a surprise element. It is not known yet who the party will choose to replace the current president, Armando Guebuza, and the internal fighting seems intense at the moment. It is important to note that in spite of the fact that Frelimo has officially been in power since independence (though during the civil war they didn’t have full control of the country all the time), the head of the party has indeed changed regularly, unlike other countries such as Angola.

However, this time the chosen name might not matter that much. Guebuza, elected in 2004 and reelected in 2009, has just been nominated as candidate for president of the party, a post he has occupied since 2005. Should someone else run for president, it will be a rare occasion when the head of the party and the president are two different people. Paunde argues that, should this be the case, there will be no fragility to the presidency. “The party orients the government. There is no conflict of powers. The president receives instructions from [Frelimo’s] Political Committee and implements them in the Presidency.”

…And here I was thinking that government and party should be separate institutions.

There is, of course, the fear that he will try to change de Constitution so as to run for a third term. Frelimo has denied that this could happen. But even if he doesn’t, if  the Presidency is subordinated to the “politburo” of Frelimo, Guebuza will keep most of the power in his hands anyway.

Who wants to spell out implications for consolidation of democracy in Mozambique?

Aug 21, 2012
Center for Democracy and Civil Society

Long-awaited Somali Poll Postponed: Trouble Ahead?

The news out of Mogadishu is that yesterday’s scheduled election, in which freshly appointed members of parliament were to select a new president, was postponed. MPs announced the delay in advance of their inaugural session, telling reporters that unspecified work must still be completed before parliament can proceed with the election for both president and speaker of the house.

The reason for the delay? While it’s easy to be cynical about Somalia’s transition — the latest in a series of failed attempts characterized by violent opportunism, shifting clan loyalties, and counterproductive foreign interventions — yesterday’s announcement likely derives as much from concerns over proper procedure as it does from outright political dysfunction.

Somali representatives and government officials have been operating on an accelerated timeline following the August 1 implementation of the new constitution. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), an 8-year old, western-supported regime with only sporadic control of Mogadishu much less the surrounding regions in South/Central Somalia, lost its governing mandate on August 20 — yesterday. So by the time the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) finalized the new constitution, it had 19 days to complete a variety of tasks before the sun set on the old government. These included, among other things, publishing a public list of traditional leaders and empowering a technical selection committee to vet and appoint 275 new members of parliament. Although the technical committee’s job was made somewhat more simple by the institution of a 4.5 rule — assigning each of the four major Somali clans 61 seats, and a coalition of smaller clans a single allotment half that size — the selection criteria came under significant pressure as the committee was lobbied by not only domestic actors, but international ones as well, some of whom sent the committee intelligence information about potential selectees and their alleged roles in fomenting or organizing political violence in the past. Female representation emerged as a particularly contentious issue as well after the new constitution was passed without a 30 percent quota for parliament, which had been included in previous drafts. And clans of course engaged in fierce advocacy — and outright bribery, the UN claimed — to promote certain nominees and preempt disqualification of others.

These issues slowed the process to the point where as of yesterday morning, only 215 of 275 individuals had been appointed and sworn in as members of Somalia’s new parliament. Although the transitional procedures allow for an election with only a two-thirds quorum (184 MPs), the decision to delay may suggest that leading MPs recognize the distinction between formal procedure and legitimacy. The new constitution and corresponding 4.5 formula were built upon agreement from a fragile conglomeration of clans, traditional leaders, and members of the political and business elite — all of whom have been notorious in the past for fleeting allegiances and a remarkable capacity for disruptive behavior. Their full participation in the upcoming election may be necessary to ensure cross-cutting clan buy-in and avoid the emergence of powerful spoilers. Rather than risk disaffection by adhering to a strict timeline, the committee seems to have chosen a safer, and potentially more fruitful, path by swearing in all successfully vetted members and appointing the senior-most MP as temporary speaker to guide the representative body in its duties as the next steps are further prepared and negotiated. Early reports indicate that the decision to delay has the support of most key participants.

Still, that these calculated delays were even necessary speaks to a deeper level of political distress. The most recent draft constitution, on which the final version was based (with only minor changes), was generated on June 12. Even with a looming August 20 deadline for transition, the NCA could not move the draft into its final form for nearly two months, owing in part to fundamental disagreements over democratic principles and, as mentioned above, female participation in government. Ultimately the quota for female MPs was dropped as part of a “gentlemen’s agreement” among elders to appoint a similar percentage of female members without a permanent law mandating such representation. This wouldn’t be much of a problem if the issue didn’t emerge from a place of pretty severe skepticism over the role of women in public life. I recently spoke to a former Director General in a TFG ministry who expressed strong misgivings over current female parliamentarians, many of whom he accused of subverting traditional Somali values and engaging in dishonorable and despicable behavior that shouldn’t be repeated here. Though his opinion is not universally shared, Somalia’s largely traditional and Islamic society has lagged behind others in empowering women to take on significant public roles. And despite the “gentlemen’s agreement” that broke the stalemate a few weeks ago, the proportion of new female parliamentarians has thus far not approached 30 percent. Not even close.

Yet this issue, while important, is not the largest area of concern, nor source of potential future breakdown. That distinction, unsurprisingly, still rests with the clans and their often incompatible motivations for political engagement. While many observers are once again hailing this moment as a great achievement — the UN even released a rather optimistic joint statement with other actors that proclaimed an end to the transition — it’s important to remember that little has yet changed. Parliamentarians were selected, not elected. The 4.5 clan formula is still the basis for representation rather than districts based on population or geography. The leading candidate for president is thought by most to be the current president, a former member of a prominent Islamist Courts movement in 2006 and thought to lack political strength and a broad constituency. Somaliland’s status remains unresolved. Puntland’s transition may have difficulty moving forward without a more clearly defined political relationship between the federal regions (particularly regarding electoral systems and political parties). Public support for the whole enterprise is questionable since the TFG was never widely loved, seen primarily as a western creation that did little but prolong conflict. In a still insecure environment, communities will remain loyal to their clan which only further endows elders with political power and entrenches clan interests in the fabric of federal government politics.

If history is any guide, clans may be constructive participants only to the extent that they perceive a positive result for their communities. Political power being a finite resource, the presence of all major clan communities in Mogadishu may be the biggest, albeit counterintuitive, sign that the status quo remains. If real change was occurring, we would likely see at least a few prominent defections from those who lost out on the reapportioning of power. As it is, everyone seems to be taking a wait-and-see approach — and they’re even more inclined to do so since the AU’s intervention force, AMISOM, seems only weeks away from finally taking the last major al-Shabaab stronghold in Kismayo, south of Mogadishu. If that happens, and AMISOM further secures South/Central and the areas around Mogadishu, it will represent the largest area of influence for a non-Islamist Somali government in many, many years.

That’s a prize worth sticking around for, and the new government (if and when a president is elected and appoints a cabinet) will face much steeper internal challenges if al-Shabaab is further marginalized in both geography and operating capacity. Stability and security are two of the most important needs for Somalia, so this result would certainly be welcome in that respect. But the worry is that such stability would be illusory and fleeting if the government succumbs to the inevitable pressure that would emerge from clans and elite actors competing over access to the first meaningful state institutions in a generation. Provided access by the new constitution, all major groups are now positioned in Mogadishu to do just that. The following weeks and months will be the true test for the durability of this new transitional government.

Aug 16, 2012
Shuang Bin

What’s Wrong with China’s State-Run Sports Regime? Chinese Feel Wronged by Western Interpretation

The importance of the medals table of the 2012 London Olympics ceases as the Games came to close. The number of China’s gold medals and total medals both ranked second behind the U.S. For the Chinese, the 2012 Olympic Games were not as joyful –Western suspicions of Ye Shiwen’s dope test turned out to be invalid, the Chinese badminton scandal stirred a debate regarding Olympic Spirit, and negative reports of China’s state-run sports regime are often found in Western newspapers. On the other hand, China’s stunning sweep of a number of games’ titles brings pride to China, but concerns many countries.

There is the assumption that anything created or supported by an authoritarian government is wrong- no matter the quality of the program, it will ultimately go wrong. China’s sports industry, if it can be categorized as such, is certainly no exception to this assumption.

To diagnose the problem with China’s sports regime, most critics rush to point out the widely pervasive structure of sports schools at all levels and criticize it as a reflection of the nation’s central planning system, parallel to its economy. Even though it is effective in implementing policies from the top all the way down to the grassroots, it has wasted many resources, including the number of kids who spend their entire childhood practicing sports thanks to the taxpayers’ money poured into state run sports schools and facilities.

To some extent, the analogy between China’s methods of raw material extraction and industrial development and their investment in their athletes’ pool, sports regime and Olympic medals might be accurate. (The Chinese media have indicated that Pink Floyd’s music video might be the origin of Westerners’ impression of athletes trained under authoritarian government. Many Chinese found it as an unacceptable bias against the Chinese.) We can even push forward to say authoritarian regimes, in many respects, more or less follow this functional pattern. However, taking the individual will of China’s athletes into account might help distinguish the two processes. Kids (perhaps according to their parents’ wish) voluntarily enter into the athletes’ pool—usually sports schools which offer very limited formal education. Most parents from urban areas sincerely want their children to remain healthy and may even support their children training in a particular sport. In contrast, parents from rural areas push their children into sports because they are often attracted by more practical benefits: the potential for their kids to climb one step up on the social status ladder or to win prizes by winning games in the future. Talented kids with physical advantages are more likely to draw attention from coaches. For a family living in poverty, a decent living environment (having food to eat and a place to stay) and the chance for success are persuasive enough for parents to permit coaches to take their kids away for training. Families that are relatively wealthy focus more on formal education, which is integral to finding a good job. This phenomenon can be observed by looking at the profiles of most athletes. Those participating in the Games who suffered tremendous hardship through brutal training and have less professional association/audience are usually coming from poor families. This includes participants in long-distance races, weight lifting, and gymnastics. What drives them to achieve their current accomplishments is not purely nationalistic spirit and coaches’ coercive training approaches, but more essentially their families’ economic conditions. Their success means they could get out of their unknown village. It is an honor, but more than that it is the potential for a better livelihood.

There is a palpable rural-urban divide in Chinese sports and this has manifested itself in the Olympic Games. Poor families’ higher likelihood of choosing sports school is a consequence of the shortcomings of rural education. Everyone’s choices are based on a balanced calculation of their various interests if not taking irrational elements into account. In that sense, Chinese athletes pick the option that they believe will bring them the brightest future. The state doesn’t interfere with their choices on that level. What makes a difference is that urban kids have more options to choose from, while rural children have fewer choices and few of the options are favorable. The state’s mechanism for choosing athletes precisely fills the needs of many families who suffer from poverty, which makes the pool of athletes large and highly competitive.

Commercialized sports, emerging as a new form to organize and train athletes in China, is based more on commercial profits according to how many audience and fans they can attract. The growth of commercialized sports indicates that their might be the potential to detach athletes from the state planning system. Liu Xiang, Li Na, and Yao Ming are all top examples of this trend. While for other sports, especially those that rarely draw public attention and, therefore, are less prone to commercialization, like weight lifting and race walking, will have to continue to rely on the state planning system, at least in the short term. Currently, there is an equilibrium, a balance between the nationalistic needs for medals and rural grassroots’ aspiration of getting out of poverty, that the state is trying to manage. We have to recognize, however, the tragedy that is the significant number of local trained athletes for whom it is inevitably impossible to move up beyond even the county level due to the nature of the competition. These athletes have already devoted most of their childhood and teen years to a career that could only reward a very small number of top competitors. A large number of athletes is the foundation for winning medals, a unified phenomenon that applies to many countries. The majority of Chinese people have never recognized the large population of athletes as contributing to any single medal and even the state ceases to support them after their forced retirement from sports without providing the athletes with enough education for them to enter the work force in the first place. In their later lives, these athletes will face even harder times as they discontinued their studies long ago and can never come back to the normal track according to the design of the education system.

It should be noted that there is another attribute of the Chinese attitude towards medals that contributes to the sports regime, particularly in international competition. After almost a century of being called as “Sick Man of East Asia,” Chinese people still feel very insulted. To prove that the Chinese have become a stronger, more unified country, we want be the best in any field around the world. Using numbers to count success is undoubtedly a reflection of this nationalistic mood. Among ordinary Chinese, getting a higher GDP growth rate and building a number of buildings that break world records are not so different from winning more Olympic medals. The Chinese people have not fully restored their confidence in the greatness of their nation, though longing to consider themselves as such. We still consider ourselves as living in a developing country where everyone has to work extremely hard to earn a living, while outsiders have again looked at China through the lens of economic might. It is thus understandable that Chinese feel wronged when the successes that they have proudly achieved is interpreted by Westerners simply as indicative of entrenched problems. It is like a venerable giant walking around and showing muscles to prove its strength, but in turn scares people away. This fact partially also explains some western journalists’ mentality of digging negative news when reporting on China and why such news is welcomed in their society. The giant sees the need to strengthen its power while others already feel threatened.

To some extent, public opinion in China overwhelmingly favors more medals. The government, in responding to public opinion, has been dumping enormous resources into developing its athletic programs and found it an effective means to consolidate patriotism by stirring up a sports-related nationalistic mood. Authoritarian though it may be, authoritarianism is not the sole cause of China’s brutal sports regime. Emerging as a super power, the Chinese have to be prepared for more criticism and challenges. To really advance the country, numbers are not enough to prove its success; instead, developing institutions by building and integrating capacities of major aspects could improve the country’s real strength and competence. It might take China decades to relax, yet slowly but surely the Chinese people will become more confident in their athletic abilities, in their identity and in their country.

Aug 13, 2012
Center for Democracy and Civil Society

Wealth, Privilege and Rule of Law in China

In the past I’ve touched on issues of economics and social equality in China, but a recent Slate article on the subject just seemed too good to pass up. Written on the controversy surrounding the bizarre practice of hiring body doubles to serve one’s jail time, Geoffrey Sant’s article stirred up quite a bit of buzz the last few days.  The article, and more broadly the issue of body doubles, certainly has a bit of a Weekly World News feel to it, yet it speaks to a real issue not only in China but nations around the world.  That issue is the importance of equality under the law in promoting national stability, particularly in times of global economic challenges.

Hardly issues unique to the 21st century, the privileges afforded by wealth and the ability of the wealthy to influence the law have always presented problems for governance.  Ties between economic and social inequality have fueled conflicts throughout our history, and this trend shows no signs of changing.  As the world continues to struggle with financial crises, governments around the globe are grappling with their own methods of addressing inequality under the law, or at least pursuing means to appease the broader public.

Within the People’s Republic, claims of abuses of power among economic and political elites have added fuel to existing discontent over inequality.  Given the party’s focus on societal “harmony” disregard for the legal system among elites bears the potential to cause real problems for the state in the years ahead.  Inequality is certainly an ongoing concern here in the United States, though in obviously different ways than in China.  This national problem is sure to be a centerpiece of this year’s political season in the US yet it is a subject we have never been particularly comfortable dealing with. Although the issue of body doubles is more than a bit sensational, it serves as a visceral example of the freedoms wealth can buy and the dangers growing inequality can create.   Perhaps these past years economic woes might bring the discussion of inequality back into mainstream discourse not only in China, but around the world.

Aug 10, 2012
Shuang Bin

Independent candidate: is it legal or not?

In 2011, a unique phenomenon emerged in China: “Independent Candidates”, which brought numerous debates among scholars and ordinary people. As they actively participate in various levels of elections, increased violence against them and barriers set to block them from getting involved have called people to ask: is it legal to be an Independent Candidate?

Many cases in the last few years have demonstrated the challenges Independent Candidates face along their journey to be elected. The first barrier they have to overcome is being confirmed as a “Deputy Candidate.” In the Constitution of China, every adult citizen, without being deprived of political rights is entitled to vote and to be elected. It has been set in the Election Law that an individual who is not nominated by any organization or work unit, but still wants to become a candidate, must collect at least 10 signatures from voters from the same constituency to get nominated. In order to become a legal Deputy Candidate, they have to be further confirmed by the election committee. However, it is not as clear and simple in local practice. Rules and decrees can incredibly complicate the process to obtain official recognition. Some constituencies release the registration date at the last minute; some require the candidate to be a Party member. In some extreme cases, to prevent them from participating in the election, local authorities simply label them as inciting subversion of the state’s political power and limited their freedom from the very beginning. Even recognized as Deputy Candidate, their campaigns were often harassed or forbidden.

Scholars and Independent Candidates argue that those local authorities are violating the Constitution. However, through the whole process from registration to campaign, to the Election Day, Election Law doesn’t provide much content to support either Independent Candidates or the behavior of local authorities we have just mentioned. It instead leaves huge room for both to interpret the law in their own ways.

In China, many things should be understood through “national conditions” (国情). Part of it is the will from the top. People therefore have to guess, rather than learn from the legal book, to draw the line between legal and illegal. In this case, the signals for Independent Candidates are really mixed. Different organizations and different high officials give explanations that often conflict with each other.

In June of 2011, it was clarified by the Legislative Affairs Commission of the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee that “There is no such a thing as an ‘independent candidate’, as it’s not recognized by law.”[1] Its person in charge stressed that according to the law “one should be first nominated as Deputy Candidate and then confirmed as official Deputy Candidate in due legal procedure.” Then the China Central Television (CCTV) and other major news agencies covered the news, which brought about a debate over whether “independent candidate” is just a wrong term to use or illegal in its nature. The Legislative Affairs Commission’s clarification is ironically vague, as it doesn’t state individuals are banned to actively become a Deputy Candidate, in contrast to the traditional path of organizational nomination. However, it apparently implies their unsupportive attitude, representing a stance from the top. On social media, Netizens criticize that the tricky wording statement is designed to scare people, but doesn’t dare to directly violate the Constitution. However, it certainly projects its impact to the local level. Such an interpretation becomes an excuse for local authorities to block Independent Candidates from participating in elections.

Adding to that, Wu Ying’ai, the Minister of Justice pushed this stance forward. In a law book edited by Wu, called Q&A of PRC’s National and Local People’s Congress Representative Election at Each Level, which gave a specific explanation and suggestion— for Deputy Candidate planning to campaign on his/her own, relevant organizations should persuade them not to or stop their campaign activities. It further argues that it could facilitate the work of introducing candidates to voters being carried out in an orderly and more organized manner, which is therefore in the interest of developing the extensiveness of democracy and ensuring the voters’ well-ordered election participation.

Nonetheless, other signals appear to color the picture, which is more encouraging but also makes the whole issue more confusing.

On the 13th of June 2011, an article published on the newspaper Study Time held by the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China(CPC)[2] argues against the Legislative Affairs Commission. As expressed in the article, a citizen’s legal right to be “nominated” should be safeguarded in practice is amply emphasized. To soften the tone, it did criticize the use of the term “independent candidate” as not appropriate, since it implies other candidates are not independent. Wang Changjiang, a professor from the same school, also joined this camp by expressing that government should face the trend of public participation into politics and start building its democracy. He argues that within the Party, many people’s mentality remains unchanged : the emerging of Independent Candidates must be the result of the penetration of western opposition power. Nonetheless, they failed to notice that with the progress of the economy, people’s awareness of the link between their daily life and politics as well as individual rights have been promoted enormously, especially in the era of social media.

Regarding the motivation to become Independent Candidates, some top governors obviously have acknowledged both possibilities. Yu Zhengcheng, CPC party chief in Shanghai, made a speech in Shanghai Jiao Tong University and classified Independent Candidates into four categories:

  1. Sincerely wish to monitor the work of CPC and government. They should be supported;
  2. Sincerely wish to monitor the work of CPC and government, but by extreme means. Also should be supported;
  3. Seek the limelight and want to be recognized. Not a big deal;
  4. Want to topple China’s current system/institutions and push China to follow western political institutions.

He, however, didn’t really provide direct suggestions for dealing with the last category. But it is clear, referring to the context of speech, that China doesn’t welcome such Independent Candidates and is very defensive to prevent political “Westernization.” Looking at the first two categories, Yu promises a much larger space for ordinary people’s active participation in elections, compared to the Legislative Affairs Commission and the Ministry of Justice. In fact, many Independent Candidates made it clear that their purpose is calling for public awareness of individual’s rights. Some of their campaigns focus on informing people about the current legal system and potential space to safeguard rights and interests based on current law. For those, they accept and even have faith in the current political system and want to use the means permitted by the system to improve the society. What is not clear is how to draw the line between the so-called sincerity and opposition. This is a great gray zone that can be arbitrarily judged by individual’s “political will” rather than by behavior, which could easily be forged into a weapon whenever local authorities feel threatened by this monitoring tool.

The government certainly has been aware of the threat of an emerging competing group and correspondingly made some progresses to advance its own capacity as well as the procedure of election. In the past, most voters have not even heard of their Deputy Candidates, yet still have to vote among strange names. To respond to that, in 2009 the central government issued an announcement[3], clearly stating that if the condition is permitted, the village election committee (though much different from People’s Congress Election) should organize candidates to meet voters, to introduce their plan of rural governance and commitments and to answer the questions concerning local villagers. However, it forbids soliciting votes privately by either the candidate or his/her proxy. In the last version of the Election Law, small changes on wording are worth noting: it stresses the Election Committee should organize candidates to meet voters by changing the word “can” to “should”. Yet, it added “upon the request from voters” following the sentence, which allows flexible interpretation from local authority to get around the rule. In general, it is still a positive sign to encourage the involvement of ordinary people.

Despite individuals being entitled to contest in elections, the extremely vague law doesn’t promise the right to campaign. This challenge is becoming the second most likely barrier for Independent Candidates to be elected. Local authorities create their own decrees and limitations on the details of the election. Some activists may survive in the process of being confirmed officially as Deputy Candidates, but they may face being silenced after that- not allowed to give speeches to their audience or show posters containing their background information or governance plan. Their freedom might also be limited by the local security forces, sometimes for few days, sometimes for years. Usually individual candidates find nowhere to file their complaints.

Given the mixed signs above, it is also wrong to assume the space for Independent Candidates are equally small across the whole country. Some places are performing much more hopefully than others. For example, in Yunnan and Zhejiang Provinces, local elections are more open to Independent Candidates and even officially support their participation and campaigns. While in Jiangxi and Shaanxi, the local governments are nervous about this emerging phenomenon and always arrange “talks” with individual candidates.

All in all the issue of “Independent Candidates” is not a matter of being recognized as appropriate officially, it is just a title referring to the kind of people who individually have the will to represent voters who are supported by more than 10 voters. The debate should not go beyond the issue of legal language, because it is clear that the right to be elected is written in the law. However, the official response is more of a reflection of attitudes from the top Party leaders which certainly matters more than the language itself. It is reasonable for local leaders to fear being monitored and ousted from their positions which could bring them and their family intangible and tangible benefits; it is also reasonable for the top of the Party to feel anxious that opening this door could lead to further and deeper political reform which they would easily lose control over. On the other hand, some argue that allowing Independent Candidates to contest is a great channel to lift a bomb of social discontent. It raises a question: Can the Party create a new balance to satisfy ordinary people’s desire to have real representation in political decisions as their socioeconomic interests are diverging, while at the same time keep maintaining the privilege power for elites. At this stage, I feel most Chinese tend to believe Beijing is capable enough of managing that balance, though it is tough.

Founded in 2004, Democracy and Society is a biannual print journal published by the Center for Democracy and Civil Society at Georgetown University. The D&S Blog provides web-only content, including special reports and investigative series, on issues relating to democracy and development.

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