The Return of the King?

Yesterday Mohammed Morsi became the man of the hour thanks to his role in brokering a cease-fire between Israel and Gaza after more than 150 fatal victims. Foreign policy usually is a good asset for a new government (Morsi took office five months ago), even more if it substantially contributes to peace efforts in neighboring countries. Some theories suggest that foreign policy is a reflection of domestic policy: coherent, strategic (with clear means and objectives) and successful actions towards the exterior imply that the government has the capacity to create internal consensus around them and to effectively rally the resources to implement them. Otherwise said, if you can do things for the outside it means the inside is under control. Notwithstanding the circumstances which actually led Morsi’s brokering to succeed (like the international and media pressure on Israel), it just does not seem that everything is under control at home. Rather, Egyptians are calling for a massive demonstration against the way Morsi is trying to keep things at bay.

Some months ago, Morsi acquired de facto legislative powers after the Supreme Court dissolved the Parliament and he, who had just taken office, sent back to the barracks the Council of Generals who tried to take over budget planning and legislative authority.  And yesterday, he issued a decree by means of which he sacked the Attorney General, ordered the retrial of those who were acquitted by the Court for the murder and murder attempts of protestors (including Hosni Mubarak) during the protests last year in January and February. The decree also prohibits the Court from challenging any decision taken by Morsi since he took office. One of those decisions was also made yesterday: the Constitutional Assembly will not be dissolved in two months’ time if it does not complete the draft of the new Constitution within that period.

On the one hand, there is Morsi’s and the official interpretation of this decree. As expected, all the moves are said to protect the revolution. The officials who repressed the Egyptians during the Tahrir Square protests last year will not go unpunished. The task of writing a new Constitution is arduous, and the rhythm of work of the Assembly does not necessary match deadlines. And, in the end, many members of the Court were in a close relationship with Mubarak, reason for which its impartiality is not guaranteed. Without going through the details of any of those assumptions, it can be granted that Morsi has some points. However, the protestors have a larger counter-argument: with his decree, Morsi is overriding the Supreme Court, having no checks or balances on his own power and actually acquiring executive, legislative and judiciary authorities. To put it differently, the rule of law is in a hiatus. Not surprisingly, many protestors have begun to call him “the new Pharaoh”.

It is not new to witness leaders assuming legislative and even judiciary powers during times of turmoil. In one of her first actions as President of the Philippines, Corazón Aquino assumed executive and legislative powers until the new Constitution was drafted and approved and a new Congress was elected. Her centralized rule lasted around a year, after which all the conditions set to return to Constitutional order were met. During that year Aquino used her powers to reorganize power structure in the country, correcting Marcos’ legacy of centralization. With the new Constitution a democratic system was in place. Just after the end of the war against Pakistan, accusations against her for fraud in the election that took place four years before, and episodes of violence backing the Court’s highly controversial ruling that she was guilty of fraud and must step down, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi asked the President to approve a state of emergency. This period lasted 21 months, during which political opponents were harassed and put in jail, freedom of speech and civil liberties were suspended. The emergency ended with elections which Gandhi’s party and she herself lost; democratically, she stepped down.

Of course, the conditions under which the suppression of the separation of powers in the Philippines and India are different between themselves and in comparison to Egypt. The point of those examples was to illustrate that a severe centralization of power does not necessarily represent the definite dismissal of democracy. However, the reference to those cases does not necessarily mean that the same thing will happen in Egypt. It is not possible at this moment to even try to outline outcome scenarios in the short term for that country. Now even more than in other moments, the political developments of Egypt are stochastic. There are too many variables involved and several unanswered questions.

For instance, one of the most important ones refers to the democratic attitude of the Muslim Brotherhood. By means of its party, Freedom and Justice, it has the majority of the Constitutional Assembly (members of the other parties which got relatively few seats in the Assembly acknowledged that the Muslim Brotherhood had more political experience and thus campaigned better, reasons for which they got the largest share of the vote). Furthermore, Morsi is one of its members. The partial draft of the Constitution released in early October did not touch on questions of the separation of powers or the role of the military in the new government. In addition, it was stipulated that Islam is the state religion, that the Sharia is the principal source of legislation, and that gender equality would be limited because of its interference with the religious law. Thus, in reaction to Morsi’s decree, protestors set fire to the Freedom and Justice offices. For the time being, it is not possible to assert that the Pharaoh is actually back. However, his shadow is becoming visible.