The Prince in Catalonia

Today Catalonia goes to the polls to elect a new Parliament, out of which the President of the Generalitat (the name for the government of this autonomous community) will emerge. For this anticipated election the polls and bets point toward a victory of the incumbent Convergence and Union (CiU) party, with left and nationalist tendencies, and its leader, Artur Mas. The narrative of the campaign has been that of Catalonian independence or, following a relatively softer term previously used by its supporters, statehood within Europe. Hence, the expectations are that the victory of CiU and Mas will represent the first but decisive and firm step in the path of Catalonian statehood.

The call for a Catalonia separate or different from Spain is not new. The instauration of the Second Spanish Republic in 1931 meant a current of fresh air for Catalonia, given the relative autonomy and protection for minority rights, like language, granted within the new republican institutions. As well, Catalonia was a stronghold for the left, at that time incarnated in diverse socialist and communist organizations. This is one of the reasons for which the autonomous community was the last to fall to Franco. Not surprisingly, once in power he forbade the use of the Catalan language (later during the dictatorship it was allowed but under certain restrictions) and suppressed any other trace of autonomy or protection of minority rights. When democracy was being rebuilt in the seventies, one of the first actions of the Catalans was to demand autonomy. As part of the decentralization reforms undertaken by the new authorities, the corresponding statute was approved. With some opposition and without much enthusiasm from the population, it was deepened in 2006.

What triggered the narrative of independence in today’s elections is the massive demonstration last September calling for “Catalonia: the new state in Europe”. Most protestors coincided in saying that the immediate cause were the budget cuts ordered by the national government (in 2008 Catalonia was the autonomous community with the highest GDP in Spain) of Mariano Rajoy, inaugurated at the end of 2011. In fact, the popularity of CiU and Mas began to diminish earlier this year because of the implementation of those cuts which, as in other regions of Spain, meant wage reductions to public officers, an increase of the copay in medicines for health system beneficiaries, or higher taxes. In this context, Mas tried to negotiate a “fiscal pact” with Rajoy, which would give Catalonia special concessions over the administration of its public finances. The model for this was the “pact” which already exists between the national government and the Basque Country (which has by far the highest GDP per capita of all the autonomous communities in Spain). However, the project was not advancing, further diminishing Mas’ popularity and, more gravely, support in the local Parliament (even more, accusations of corruption against CiU began to emerge). Some analysts in the Spanish press speculate that Mas was waiting to obtain a firm negative from Rajoy to sign the “fiscal pact”, demonstrate that he had tried to solve the problems while the President refused to do so, rally support around him and call for elections. All this was supposed to happen in 2013, provided that the Parliament did not call for a vote of confidence against his government sometime in between.

Or provided that no better opportunity came about. Notwithstanding the reality of the plans to call for elections in 2013, Mas made his Machiavellian move. While the September demonstration was occurring, CiU’s position was unclear: some of its members supported it and others did not. Mas seized the chance saying that his party indeed backed the demonstrations, even suggesting from time to time that statehood for Catalonia is a project pushed by himself, and called for elections. Thus, he hopes to get an absolute majority in the Catalonian Parliament, to reduce the chances of being challenged by the opposition in the projects he undertakes, and to prevent a vote of no confidence against him.

The narrative of autonomy seems to have paid for him. As mentioned above, Mas and CiU are likely to get an absolute majority in the local Congress (how much above 50% + 1 is still an open question). Furthermore, these elections are registering the largest participation rate since the eighties. However, regardless of the electoral result the path to statehood is not as close as the campaign makes it appear. The most probable way to get there is this, as explained by an analyst of El País. Mas calls for a local referendum for sovereignty, which would just be good to illustrate the popular support for the project, as without a sanction from the King it is just consultative, not binding. If pro-statehood it wins, then a formal request to have a binding referendum on that issue would be presented to the President, who would discuss it with the King. Finally, he would authorize it. But the Constitution does not consider secession of any of the components of the state, reason for which any referendum should be focused first on a constitutional reform allowing secession.

That is just to speak of the path to attend the most immediate part of statehood: achieving it. Other issues, such as the relation with the EU (allegedly, a sovereign state of Catalonia would not automatically be a member) or the fiscal system (separate from the negotiations for the “fiscal pact”, Mas has requested financial assistance to the national government), might or might not come later. For the time being, the only most probable thing is that he will stay in power.