The Unanswered Question

How to describe the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)? Last week, the rebel group March 23 (M23) took over the Eastern city of Goma. In their communiqué they mention this is “the result of a deliberate decision of the Kinshasa regime of refusing to implement the peace agreements negotiated on March 23, 2009 in Goma”. These agreements marked the end of a previous rebellion, many of whose participants take arms again. It appears to be clear that the current rebellion is a continuation of long-time grievances between ethnic groups in the East of DRC, Uganda and Rwanda. But is the takeover of Goma an expected development of this long-lasting conflict or is it just people trying to seize a window of opportunity for personal gains? Is it possible to dig into the true and deep motives of the M23 or its relationship with foreign governments in the region?

First, the genealogy. In 1994, Tutsi rebels took power in Rwanda days after the genocide against this group. Hutus, fearing repression, fled into then Zaire (now DRC). Three years later, Laurent Kabila took power in Zaire by overthrowing Mobutu Sese Seko, who had ruled the country since 1967. Rwanda, whose security forces entered the country to raid Hutus, backed Kabila. However, the next year after taking office Kabila was accused by Rwanda of not acting against Hutus, thus threatening to overthrow him. This provoked a five-year war which involved the DRC (Kabila thus renamed the country), Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe and in which more than three million people may have died. The conflict formally ended in 2003, but clashes between Hutus and Tutsis continued in the east DRC, just next to Rwanda. In 2006 the first elections were held in DRC; Kabila’s son, Joseph, won. Later that year the DRC army officer Laurent Nkunda formed the rebel group National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). This group took over Goma in 2008. The next year an agreement was signed on March 23 between CNDP and DRC to stop the fighting; CNDP members were reintegrated into the army and Nkunda was imprisoned. To some extent this was possible because Bosco Ntaganda rebelled against Nkunda and said he would help Rwanda fight against the Hutu. In April 2012 Ntaganda and some of the soldiers under his command rebelled against the government of the DRC, backed again by Rwanda. The most recent installment in this rebellion is the take over of Goma.

It is very tempting to say that this series of rebellions was guided by a greed for power of their leaders. Nkunda and Ntaganda are sought by the International Criminal Court for crimes committed during the five year war and for recruiting children for their militias. Indeed, the reincorporation of the CNDP to the DRC army served as a kind of insurance that their crimes would not be further investigated and that participants of these rebellions would have jobs in the government in the region of North Kivu, which borders Rwanda and where Goma is. Allegedly, the DRC did not respect this latter part of the agreement as the salaries and positions received by former CNDP members did not correspond to their military ranks. In an interview with Al Jazeera, former UN official Jason Stearns (http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/11/20121126936588395.html) suggests that the reason for the April rebellion was that the government wanted to reduce the benefits received by former CNDP members, most importantly the free accumulation of wealth by means of bribes and smuggling, all protected with patronage networks. The DRC, Stearns continues, expected to apply the strategy of “divide and conquer”: some of the former CNDP members would not be fired, but redeployed to other parts of the country. So, it do seems to be the same old story of a government facing opposition from the group whose privileges are being affected.

Neither group appears to have the sufficient strength or legitimacy as to reach an outcome other than a military gridlock. In their communiqué expressing the motives for the takeover on Goma, the M23 accuses the government of not respecting the truces brokered throughout the year, attacking them by night. Without a question, Kabila’s rule is corrupt and unpopular, and the very same networks which benefited former CNDP members could restrain an effective military move against the rebels. On the other hand, inhabitants of Goma and the surrounding towns are blatantly afraid of the M23 and his leader, nicknamed “Terminator”. In contrast with other insurrections which in one way or another garner the support of the local population, giving them some additional strength or legitimacy, this seems not to be the case of M23. A group feels threatened in its privileges, but apparently cannot do much to defend them after its first move.

A factor that could be decisive is the help Rwanda could give to M23. This country’s Tutsi government has been very close to the rebels in DRC as long as they have collaborated on the attacks against Hutus. It is also tempting to think of a larger involvement of Rwanda in the development of the series of rebellions in DRC, but this conspiracy-theory perspective does not seems to hold for long. In any case, far from harassing the Hutu the question remains of what are the expected gains for Rwanda with it involvement in DRC.

In their communiqué, the M23 has asked the government for the cease of attacks against them, the demilitarization of the airport of Goma, the opening of borders so displaced people can collect their first-need belongings, and an open declaration informing the start of negotiations with them. Authorities have said no. Rebels have said they will not leave their positions until the government accepts their demands. Whatever adjective is used to describe this situation, prospects do not look good for the region.