The Ayatollah and Democracy

Signed January 1, 2013, an opposition group in Iran sent a letter to the Ayatollah Khamenei, supreme leader of the country. The document asks for him not to enter any negotiations with the United States in relation to the national nuclear program, which has been met with economic sanctions from the international community, unless some conditions are met. The blog from the French newspaper Le Monde highlights the following. First, the celebration of free presidential elections (scheduled for this summer), so the head of government “truly represents the people”. Second, the liberation of all political prisoners. Third, the installation of a democracy. And forth, to allow political parties to retake their activities.

The requirements for a dialogue with the US asked by the opposition aim at central features of the Iranian political system. First, presidential candidates are vetted by the Ayatollah, in order to guarantee that they will always remain loyal to the religious principles of the Revolution. Second, all politicians and citizens who oppose the government are seen as a threat to the regime and are imprisoned, as happened during the aftermath of the 2009 presidential election. Third, given the barriers for the participation of some actors in the public sphere, the system is clearly undemocratic. And forth, although political parties are not banned, their role in elections is rather marginal. In presidential elections, for example, vetted candidates support parties (conversely as what happens in other systems, where parties support candidates) in exchange for some logistic support in organizing campaigns. Therefore, parties are not real aggregators and articulators of citizens’ interests.

However, none of the conditions demanded by the opposition directly touches on the issue of the confusion between State and Islam under the revolutionary government. Indirectly it does, asking for changes in the institutions which preserve the power of the ruling group in general, and of the Ayatollah in particular. But his figure or authority are not called into question, in a similar fashion to the discourse of the “left” of the Iranian political system, which calls for more civil and economic freedoms but remains largely quiet about the Ayatollah. Given that he is the center of the authoritarian political system, challenging him would be understood as a threat against the regime and would be punished at least with jail. In addition, one of the signatories of the letter to Khamenei is Mrs. Azam Taleghani, daughter of Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmoud Alaei Taleghani (a prominent figure of the 1979 Revolution), defender of human rights in Iran and qualified by the local press as a “figure with a history of religious national activism”. She is not completely independent from the religious spirit of the Revolution.

With this background it is somewhat less surprising that the contents of the letter sent to the Ayatollah Khamenei calls for changes but without criticizing his figure. Furthermore, it is almost a certainty that the document will remain as a testimonial effort to democratize Iran. As long as the Ayatollah holds real power the political system will keep its authoritarian features, and the authoritarian features of the system are the basis of the power of the Ayatollah. One cannot be reformed without the other. Changes will come about even less if they are seen as a condition for an eventual negotiation with the US; the rejection of any Western influence is yet another input for the maintenance of the revolutionary system in Iran.