The Rules of Engagement (2)

Prime Minister of Tunisia, Hamadi Jebali, announcing his resignation (from The Guardian).

This month, but particularly the last days, Tunisia has faced a major political upheaval. First, it was the assassination of the secular opposition politician Chokri Belaid, generating suspicion against Islamist parties. A special target was Ennhada, that to which the Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali belonged to and which has the largest share of seats in Parliament. Next, there was a conflict between the secularist party Congress for the Republic and Ennhada because the former wanted some cabinet members to be removed under allegations of bad performance. Then, it came a proposal from the Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali to replace all the cabinet with technocrat (and, supposedly, politically neutral) ministers. He said that if this suggestion was rejected, he would quit. And the suggestion was rejected, mainly by his own party, apparently because he made such comprise without any previous consultation. So he quit. Now, Ennhada will have to pick one of its members for the position of Secretary General, thus becoming the new Prime Minister. Its leader, Rached Ghannouchi, said they will try to replace the moderate Jebali with someone more conservative.

This chain of events has raised concerns about the present and future of Tunisia’s political system. About its present, because it was largely believed that this country was an example for other Arab Spring countries to follow. The previous authoritarian ruler was ousted, elections were held, a Constituent Assembly is functioning, and a coalition government was installed. Therefore, there were reasons to think that the institutions necessary for a democratic regime were obtaining sound foundations. The relative facility with which the government has fallen prompts to think twice about the commitment of national political actors to the advancements made towards democracy. The future of Tunisia comes into question because another government must emerge from the Assembly that is currently working on the Constitution. With the same correlation of parties with which the previous cabinet fell down, will a new one come about? If not, apparently the option to consider is elections. Will a new Constitutional Assembly take over the work on the Constitution? What will happen to the articles already drafted and agreed upon?

Of course, no part of the previous discussion includes a suggestion that the transition and democratic institution building processes in Tunisia are now under severe threat. That is a central feature of parliamentarian regimes: allow for a government to leave if it comes to a gridlock. The risk is what replaces it. As has happened in other times and places, Ennhada can present itself as the only party with sufficient capacity to bring order back to the country, while using an expected wider support to push for its Islamist policies, driving the country away from democracy. However, this last sentence is speculation. Political regimes can be thought of as rules to solve problems of power distribution. Now, the problem is that a new government must be formed, and that the Constitution is still pending. The way in which this issue is dealt with can be seen as a test on how firm is the ground on which democratic institutions are being built in Tunisia.