Venezuela and Democracy

Citizens line up in Caracas to see Hugo Chávez´s coffin (from Agence France Presse).

Last October, the question in Venezuela after the election that gave him a fourth term in office as President was whether Hugo Chávez, in the face of an increasing opposition, would allow more plurality and, maybe, political liberalization. Now, the question re-emerges, with the difference that the President has passed away.

Chavismo had two main features: an intensive social spending and state enlargement, which relied on expected substantial revenues from oil, and the centralization of the political system around the figure of the President, a charismatic leader. As most political projects, Chavismo has left a positive and a negative legacy. On the one hand, to a large extent, his popularity derives from the perception of large sectors of the population that he has contributed to reduce the poverty, inequality, and marginalization that economic liberalization reforms brought about in the 90s. On the other hand, the incomplete implementation of many social programs because of corruption, the inability to control inflation and the exchange rate, or the limits set to the opposition are some of the most pressing problems for Venezuela.

Without Chávez, will his project survive? His charismatic authority neutralized the contrasts of his administration. Once he went behind the curtains to receive medical treatment, Vice President Maduro took the lead after being appointed by Chávez as chargé d’affaires and later, on his deathbed, as Acting President. This source of authority (which can be labeled traditional, as the charismatic leader gave it) is so strong that any critiques to it have been called an “offense”, in spite of going against the constitutional provision that in the case of a definite absence of the President, the leader of the National Assembly will be in charge. So far, Chávez´s legacy continues.

It is expected that Maduro respects the calling for elections within the thirty days after the passing of Chávez. There comes the real challenge for Chávez’s supporters: the institutionalization of Chavismo without Chávez. His charisma must be turned into a set of formal or informal rules, regulations, and behaviors that preserve his goals. Trademark policies might not be the most pressing worry; even in a worst-case scenario, the economy can be managed to continue providing funds for them. The problem is what to do with opposition and plurality, which Chávez did not face as a real challenge until his last presidential election some months ago.

Again, it was Chávez’s persona that served as a counterweight to his opponents and to the internal contradictions of Chavismo. Even invested with traditional authority, it is doubtable if Maduro will be able to continue that role. A strategy for the continuation of Chávez’s legacy is already at place: the capitalization of his image. T-shirts, pins, parachutist berets, mugs, baseball caps, posters, and all sorts of articles with the legend “I am Chávez” are sold. Arguably, people who proudly show those items to the cameras filming them while making the six-hours lines to pass in front of Chávez’s coffin must not be convinced to vote for Maduro. Instead, it is a token to show the opposition that Chávez and Maduro’s supporters are not divided and are backed by citizens. It has been confirmed that Henrique Capriles will return as the alternative candidate to Chavismo in the upcoming elections. Does he still stand as a popular and viable alternative to Chávez? Was his popularity contingent to the first signs of Chávez’s charisma wearing out, or did his programs were really attractive to some Venezuelans? Will he have any real chance of winning within the context of the media flooded with the life, achievements, and image of Chávez? Chávez supporters are doing as much as possible to answer “no” to all those questions. Capriles will have a chance to speak his mind in some weeks.