Red Corruption

This weekend the Chinese Ministry of Supervision informed that it was conducting an investigation for “serious discipline violations” against the Deputy Director of the National Development and Reform Commission (in charge of economic planning), Liu Tienan. As of Tuesday morning no more information has been officially released on the specific charges faced by Liu or what sanction he faces.

At first glance this seems another case of a high-level public officer in China accused of some form of corruption or misbehavior, with prospects of being fired, expelled from the party, exposed in a media scandal, stripped off from any kind of benefit he would have right to for his years of militancy in the party and of service to the state, and being barred out of the public light for the rest of his life. Undoubtedly, Liu’s case contains all those elements. But this time the investigation was prompted by the commentary on Weibo, the country’s Twitter version. The government-sponsored English-language Chinese newspaper The Global Times indicated that since the most recent Party Congress in October, in which citizens were called to have a more active role in supervising the government, 17 investigations against public officers have started after citizens blew the whistle, many times using the internet. What is more, this is the first time that a journalist is the source of the denunciation.

In December last year, Luo Changping, editor of a financial magazine, said that Liu had authorized fraudulent contracts in the name of the Commission for which he works, had sent death threats to a former mistress, and had lied about academic credentials. Quickly, the press office of the Commission dismissed the information. The case remained silent until now, that a Ministry confirms the investigation.

It is a good thing that governments prosecute corruption, mostly if it involves high-level officers. The question in this case is that given the opacity with which the Chinese public administration works, there is always some room for suspicions around the real motivations for the investigation of officials accused of corruption. Is he really guilty, or will he be used as a token of President’s Xi Jinping’s efforts in combating government corruption? Is the fact that the denunciation originally came from the internet supposed to indicate that the government has not diminished its capacity to review the activity on the web and act when something undesirable appears? What are the limits for citizen supervision of the government? Is it possible that a larger reliance of the government on the internet to obtain denunciations will play against it in the medium or long term? Will anyone be benefitted by the eventual conviction of Liu? Maybe all of these questions are mere over-speculation about the Liu case; he might be guilty of all the offences mentioned by Luo and that is the end of the story. But, again, in authoritarian governments the point of combating corruption is not so much to ensure a good utilization of public resources, but rather to eliminate any activity that could endanger the position of the ruling group. And China has frequently shown that is a goal it constantly keeps in mind.

Kim III: Year One

Kim Jong-Un one year ago, when elected First Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party (from China People’s Daily).

On Wednesday, in the midst of the growing international missile tensions, the North Korean official news agency published that “the whole world extended warmest congratulations” to Kim Jong Un to mark the first anniversary of his election to the newly created position of First Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). This replaced the Secretary General of the KWP Central Committee Secretariat, held by his deceased father Kim Jong Il, who was named Eternal General Secretary of the KWP. As part of the domestic celebrations, high-school students dressed up in solider uniforms and performed military exercises, and statues of Kim and of his ancestors were cleaned up by citizens and school children.

Kim’s speech in the occasion of his ascension was a prelude to many of the features present in today’s growing tensions. He said that his “first, second, and third priorities” were to strengthen the military. Missiles were shown in a following parade, which had the aim of demonstrating that North Korea had a strong and state-of-the-art Army. A reporter of the New York Times questioned if the missiles showed were real or a mock-up, given the failed launching attempt of one of them weeks earlier. Under this light, it could almost be considered logical that the next step would be to show not only North Koreans, but the whole world, that the country actually has sufficient military capacity to respond to any threat against it. This is what Kim is trying to do now, and the assessment of the U.S. government is that indeed he has attack and response capacity.

In parallel, some analysts commented that the appointment of Kim as First Secretary, a position effectively identical to that hold by his father, was a way to mark the beginning of a new leadership, with its own support base from the KWP and the Army, the two pillars of the North Korean regime. In this sense, it was noted that a considerable age gap existed between the high ranks of those two organizations (at least 60 years old) and Kim (believed to be in his late twenties or early thirties). Continuity with the previous government would be necessary, mostly because of the political and administrative inexperience of Kim. But he also would like to have his own loyal generals and party cadres. For instance, the retirement and ulterior disappearance of public light of the Chief of the Military General Staff because of “illness”, along with other top military figures throughout the year following a similar path, aroused suspicions that the old leadership of the Army was being purged.

Hence, in his first year in office, Kim Jong-Un has worked, on the one hand, to demonstrate the world that North Korea has sufficient military capacity to respond to a foreign attack, and, on the other hand, to ensure that a set of Army and party top figures will follow his policies. It is uncertain whether the military capacity is real, or the extent to which it can inflict damage to other countries. In relation to the escalating tensions, following a worst-case scenario the U.S. has assessed that Kim actually has the capacity to attack. The question, then, is whether such a decision will be made. Again, in a worst-case scenario, it can be ascertained that the levels of decision discussions among the new top figures of the Army and the Party, loyal to Kim, are low. The worrisome issue is that if in countries in which government decisions are the object of substantial public scrutiny some very flawed measures can be taken (such as the U.S. invasion of Iraq), in countries like North Korea mistakes could be even worse. But, again, these are just worst-case scenarios.

History and Justice

Ieng Sary during a trial in 2012 (from Reuters).

Yesterday the United Nations-backed Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC) informed that the Foreign Minister during the Khmer Rouge government, Ieng Sary, died. Arrested in 2007, he was facing charges of genocide and crimes against humanity committed during his tenure. Allegedly, he convinced Cambodian diplomats abroad to go back to their country to help the Khmer Rouge revolution, only to be sent to “re-education” camps and be assassinated, and actively participated in other executions. Due to his death, the Court suspended the process against him.

With the death of Sary, the chances that former members of the Khmer Rouge face justice are reducing. Under the leadership of Pol Pot, this movement ruled Cambodia between 1975 and 1979, provoking around 1.7 million deaths. The Khmer Rouge followed a radical version of communism. For instance, they forced city inhabitants to move to the fields to work in agriculture, and the use of glasses was punished as they were seen a symbol of the bourgeoisie and capitalism. In 1979, a Vietnamese invasion ended the Khmer Rouge government. Some of its leaders (including Pol Pot) fled, while others remained in Cambodia out of public light or resumed their political careers, mostly in the People’s Party, which has been in power for 27 years, with Hun Sen as Prime Minister.

Sary was one of the four top Khmer Rouge figures to face trial. Kaing Guek Eav, a prison commander, was sentenced to life prison in 2012. Nuon Chea, Khmer Rouge’s ideologue, and Khieu Samphan, the formal head of state, are still in trial. Pol Pot died in 1997 in a community of Cambodia controlled by remnants of the Khmer Rouge.

Organizations such as Human Rights Watch have serious doubts that any of the remaining former leaders of the movement will face justice. There is a similar concern with former top officials in other authoritarian regimes, such as militaries in Latin America and Southern Europe. The first problem is age; these leaders are around their 80s. Furthermore, given that the crimes of which they are accused occurred decades ago, it is difficult to retrieve and present the necessary evidence to convict them. However, a key difference between Latin American and Southern American, and Cambodian processes is that in the former regions governments are ready to conduct or to allow a process of revision and reconciliation, which is viewed within the larger context of democratization. Conversely, with the People’s Party still in power, there is little space for a similar opportunity in Cambodia. Even more, there have been complaints that judges in charge of Khmer Rouge trials have, under purpose, not investigated as thoroughly as possible evidence against Pol Pot’s aides, and have suspended without reason the processes.

Is it then that Khmer Rouge figures will not meet justice? Yes and no. On the one hand, Human Rights Watch’s worries that, due to whatever obstacles set or to their advanced ages, defendants will not listen to their sentences are very real. On the other hand, paraphrasing Fidel Castro, “history will judge them”. The legacy of authoritarian regimes is source of controversy in many countries. For instance, Chile’s Augusto Pinochet was a repressive leader, but achieved the stabilization of the economy after the severe crisis during the last months of Allende’s government. Or Castro himself established a regime that curtailed liberties while promoting socioeconomic equality. However, there is not much debate around the fact that Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge experiment left anything else than death and chaos in Cambodia. The movement is clearly labeled by history as one of the worst crimes in history. Surely this is not enough for victims, but it leaves little, if any, space for a good assessment of Pol Pot and his clique any time in the future.

Great Expectations & the Desires of the Electorate

A few recent articles on Wukan’s elections and their aftermath touched on recurring themes of democratic development.  Reaching beyond the People’s Republic and their experiments in democratic governance, these themes extend to shifts in governance and popular expectations contrasted by bureaucratic realities.  In Wukan as in other places around the world, the hopes and exhilaration of the public continue to be muted by the often gradual nature of democratic change.

The protests and push toward elections in Wukan were fueled in part by disputes over land rights, claims of corruption, and the capture of public resources by private enterprise.  Villagers perceived self-governance as a path toward addressing the problem as others have in several other locations in Guangdong province including the nearby village of Shangpu.  Once newly elected officials were in place it was, expected that in short order these property issues would be resolved.

Unfortunately change is rarely as swift as those who demand it might hope. Promises made during elections, even if made in good faith, are often riddled with challenges in implementation. All too often the resulting failure to bring about swift change and reparation for perceived ills is viewed as a flaw in Democracy rather than just a reality of governance.

Interesting parallels might be drawn between the situation in Guangdong and our slow (when functioning) US system with its tendency to mute change. I like many others, am often quick to judge elected officials, particularly those responsible for legislation. Yet often I’m sure my expectations stretch well beyond the realm of reason, particularly with relation to the speed of institutional change.

In 2008 the nation, particularly young adults were jubilant over the election of President Obama.  The sea of successes and frustrations of the past few years have likely gone a long way toward reinforcing some of the worst assertions of those who see democratic participation as pointless, yet how many of our expectations four years ago were truly reasonable?

More recently the election of Elizabeth Warren has gained my attention as one of the high marks of potential change among our representatives. As with the President however I often find myself wondering just how much Senator Warren really is capable of changing and/or fixing the systematic flaws which landed us in our current economic mess. In states near and far striving toward democratic governance, the challenge of the electorate’s expectations rears its head time and again.

These expectations and the gulf between campaign promises and political reality present real problems for those who would govern.  Particularly once the realization sets in that not all that a politician promises on the campaign trail will ever come to fruition. There is the decision of whether it would be best to limit the goals set in advance and potentially lose an election, or push wild promises with the hope that the public will understand failures after election.  Is there a way to mitigate the expectations of the electorate without dampening faith and trust in the system?

China and its Information

Caption that appeared when a term searched for in Google was censored. (From Le Monde.)

Largely unnoticed at the time that it happened in December, Google China removed the feature from its browser that allowed users to know that a term they were searching was censored. Some specialized websites have highlighted the contrast between the relatively large diffusion with which the anti-censorship tool was introduced in May 2012 and the lack of information regarding its elimination. Apparently, this was only made public in the West thanks to the Greatfire.org, a censorship-monitoring in China organization. Later on, the news was retrieved by the press.

It is not so easy to assess how to understand this move. The blog of the British paper The Telegraph reads it as an act of cowardice or surrender. Chinese censors were able time and again to fight back against any tools proposed by Google to counter walls in the national internet. Therefore, Google got tired of it and decided to give in to censorship. Even more, Chinese authorities would have threatened Google with completely blocking its services if such anti-censorship tools were not erased. The Telegraph reminds the reader that although the presence of Google in China is relatively small (around 5% of all internet searches), it still represents 25 million users. It might be too costly to close such a market. The muteness with which the anti-censorship tool was removed is a point in favor of those arguments.

Except for the concerns originally raised by Greatfire.org, there seems not to have been much opposition against Google’s move. This contrasts with a set of protests in the rapidly industrializing city of Guangzhou, in the southern province of Guangdong (Canton). Here, some journalists and citizens have called for more freedom of expression and democracy, supporting the efforts of the local weekly publication Nanfang Zhuomo, which called in its New Year editorial for China to undertake political reform and become a full and real constitutional government. Authorities have had a clear reaction: many communiqués have been issued, blaming “foreign forces” and dissatisfied former employees of the publication of organizing the protests.

These incidents show that the Chinese government is apparently in very good shape to exercise control over information in its territory, either by making the best of the very large market its population represents or by making it clear that freedom and democracy are topics not to be discussed in the public space. This further strengthens the idea that the Chinese government is aware that one of its potential vulnerabilities is the free flow and discussion of information.