How far should we go?

The recent crackdown on international pro-democracy organizations in Egypt wasn’t only a cold reminder of the real dangers for those involved in the field. It also questions the limits of political action for foreigners in transitioning countries. Pushing those limits is in many cases the most important part of the job… but does it ever become too much?

Right now it seems members of at least three D.C. based organizations – IRI, NDI and Freedom House – are under investigation by the Egyptian military, alongside dozens of other foreign and local NGOs. Their offices in Cairo were raided and shut down on December 29th, and now part of the staff is under travel ban, including Sam LaHood, the son of Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood, who directs the Egyptian program of IRI.

After LaHood was prevented from leaving the country, the organizations probed and discovered that at least 40 foreigners (six Americans) are under the ban as a result of the investigation.

IRI said they have been questioned about funding and their legal status in Egypt, and that the investigation might lead to formal charges.

Neither inquiry is completely far-fetched: it is undeniable that there is foreign money coming to Egypt for purposes related to the political situation, and apparently the organizations still have problems in getting totally cleared to operate in the country.

Of course, authoritarian, semi-authoritarian, transitioning or in any way questionable governments will always have an interest in making life difficult for foreigners who try to get in any way involved in local politics. If that was reason enough to prevent the organizations from working, they might as well give up now and close their offices. The fact that there is work to be done in opening up, strengthening and democratizing the political scenario is exactly why they are needed. Not to mention it is a common scapegoat to blame foreigners for popular unrest.

On the other hand (and let me be clear: I am NOT talking about Egypt or any of the above mentioned organizations right now), I wonder if in some cases the involvement doesn’t turn into interference. Let’s face it, sometimes foreigners are indeed engaged in supporting uprisings. And with good reason. But where should it stop? Or shouldn’t it?

I personally would never side with, for example, the Kremlin in its attempts to circumvent the work of international NGOs, but I do think there is space to talk about how far they can or should go. With so many new countries joining the list of transitional ones right now, the situation in Egypt might provide a good opportunity to re-discuss the safety and boundaries, if any, of the activities of international pro-democracy groups.

Call for Papers – After the Revolution: Looking Forward

Democracy & Society, Volume 9, Issue 2

We are seeking well-written, interesting submissions of 1500-2000 words on the themes below, including summaries and/or excerpts of recently completed research, new publications, and works in progress. Submissions for the issue are due Monday, February 27th, 2012.

After the Revolution: Looking Forward

The wave of uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 set a precedent for political and social change. Starting with Tunisia, people began to publicly call into question the leadership of governments and individuals that hitherto they feared challenging or accepted as their political fate. However, shortly after the Arab Spring, the stark realities of political transitions have become clear. Some regimes, such as in Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria, sought to use force to crush nascent uprisings. Even in the successful revolutions, most notably Egypt and Tunisia, securing political leadership that acts in the interests of the people remains a challenge. More broadly, we are witnessing revolutions still in progress, where the prospects for successful democratic transitions seem uncertain. What challenges exist to these nascent democratic movements? A number of questions emerge, including:

Opportunities and Dangers: Political transitions present groups with opportunities influence the direction or nature of the change. Notably, in the context of the Middle East and North Africa, revolutions may present Islamic parties with an opening to advance their ideologies and gain support. On one hand, this may lead to a more peaceful redefinition of groups that were repressed by previous regimes. But on the other hand, the political vacuum revolutions create may encourage the rise of more extreme ideological parties.

State and Society: The revolutions and uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa have also called into question the fundamental basis upon which the state relates to society. To what extent have these political transformations altered peoples’ expectations about government accountability and notions of popular sovereignty?

The Role of the External Actors: To what extent has political change in the Middle East and North Africa called into question the capacity of external actors, such as the United States and Iran, to cultivate politically compliant regimes? Can democratic countries that were supporters of overthrown dictators, like the United States and France, play a constructive role in helping to foster democratic transitions?

The Role of the Media and Technology: There exist many untested hypotheses about the role of the media, notably Al Jazeera and technology like the Internet, added to the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. Can we state with any degree of specificity the role these media played in them?

The Challenges of Governance: Democratic transitions often place political groups previously in opposition to the regime with the challenges of actually having to govern. What are some of the problems they face, or impose on these transition?

Slow Pace of Change: Many lament the slow pace of political change in the region since the uprisings began one year ago. Is this pessimism justified? Or should we expect political transitions in much of the region to be lengthy processes that are prone to backsliding?

Resistance from Regimes in Power: In the case of Bahrain, Syria and Yemen the regimes in power resorted to harsh tactics to crush dissent. Whereas in Egypt and Tunisia, leaders stepped down without much of a fight. How can we account for these differences?

These are just a few of the questions that arise as the challenges of the Arab Spring become more prominent. This issue of Democracy and Society will take a broad, analytical perspective on determining what these issues are. We seek to understand it from both a US, global, regional, and country-specific perspective. Please email submissions to democracyandsociety@gmail.com by February 27th, 2011. For additional information, please contact Andrea Murta or Ayesha Chugh at democracyandsociety@gmail.com.

DC Event: The US-Turkey-Iran “Triangle” and the Arab Spring

The Center for Democracy and Civil Society at Georgetown is excited to host a panel discussion on how the United States, Turkey, and Iran played a role in the Arab Spring and how they may play in to future democratization attempts in the region.

The Triangle
United States-Turkey-Iran: A new role in the Arab Spring

Friday, January 27, 2012
3:00 – 5:00 PM

Mortara Building
3600 N Street, NW
Washington, DC 20057

Conference panel featuring
Colin H. Kahl – Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University
Erol A. Cebeci – Executive Director, The SETA Foundation
Geneive Abdo – Fellow and Iran Analyst, The Century Foundation

Moderated by
Joshua W. Walker – Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund

RSVPs are requested to rsvpforas@gmail.com.

Fidel strikes again

Newsrooms, particularly in Latin America, were flooded this past week with rumors of a grave deterioration of Fidel Castro’s health, prompting journalists to update those old obituaries that have been accumulating dust for the best part of the last decade.

Rumors about the death of the ailing Castro, 85, arise all the time. But given the credibility of the current gossipers _ including the venezuelan reporter Nelson Bocaranda, one of the first to write that Hugo Chávez had cancer _ the “news” were greeted with more concern this time. The american media didn’t to pay much attention to the story. But I saw experts here fastening their seat belts and waiting for a huge amount of requests to analyze yet again the post-Fidel era. A couple of them told me that the rumor was strong in Havana as well, although cubans would probably be the last ones to know for sure.

Even if the claim probably is false, the considerations about it are timely. The gradual economic and (more limited) political reforms that have been under way in Cuba bring new sides to old questions about the survival of the system without the presence of the leader, even though the transition has been fairly smooth since Raul Castro took his place. Have recent moves to open more space for new generations within the communist party been enough to maintain fidelity, or did it foster ambition? Is the admission of frustration by the leaders with the pace of reform generating impatience or sympathy? Will the agricultural reform be accelerated? How will those factors play when outside pressure mounts, catalyzed by the death of Fidel?

Perhaps most interesting, though, were old-fashioned reactions to the rumors that came from some circles 90 miles north of the island. This is how a third generation cuban-american expressed his sadness to me: “My family will be relieved. But I do not want to see a McDonald’s on every corner of Havana”. And markets apparently agreed with the idea of rapid change to come. Funds that have been waiting to profit from a resumption of US trade with Cuba already experienced a surge due to the latest rumor, some companies up to 25%.

Do people still think it would be that easy? Fidel passes away, and puff – overnight we have foreign companies distributing communications services around. I doubt even hard-line lobbists believe so.

In any case, Fidel himself must find it amusing that, five years after he fell ill, we are still fretting about what will happen when he is gone for real. That is, if he ever does. Other octogenarian leaders defy that notion. Just ask Robert Mugabe, 87, still exercising every morning.

New initiative examines future of Kirkuk referendum

Some of our intrepid DG colleagues have have undertaken a tremendous new project: the brand new Center for Kirkuk Referendum Options. A collaborative initiative of the Center for Democracy and Society/DG program, the CKRO addresses key questions about the Kirkuk referendum and the national constitutional and political issues it brings up for Iraq. This is your one-stop shop for background reading on the issue, including the comprehensive policy paper written collaboratively by Jeff Fischer‘s fall 2010 electoral policy class, among additional resources.

Kudos to Jeff and the DG students who made the CKRO a reality–looking forward to seeing its future research and work towards someday achieving a free and fair referendum in Kirkuk.