Erdoğan’s defiance further fuels protests

Erdoğan’s decade in power is characterized by a series of smart, tactful, and inspired political moves. His party, the AKP, is recognized as a well-oiled political machine, seamlessly adapting to the popular sentiments of the Turkish population while drawing support from groups considered outside of their target conservative political base. As skilled politicians tend to do, Erdoğan has until now successfully struck a balance between discourse and action, appealing to a proud Turkish audience wary of the West with aggressive anti-Western statements while strengthening military and economic ties with Europe, the U.S., and even Israel. But Erdoğan’s strong political sense, contributing to a string of successes, has pushed his confidence over the edge. His defiant reaction to the ongoing protests sparked by development plans in the heart of modern Istanbul reflect a belief that his political opponents do not possess enough clout to upset his political aspirations. The protests, however, have spread beyond the urban centers of North-West Anatolia into Erdoğan’s own territory, and his best chance at maintaining popularity is certain to be a more diplomatic interaction with his rivals.

Turkish media reports protests in 67 of Turkey’s 81 provinces, including those regions traditionally lending overwhelming support to the AKP. The protests now reflect diverse and varied grievances, including the strong police response resulting in thousands of injured civilians. Turkish unions, including the 240,000-member KESK confederation of public-sector workers, have joined the fray in support of the protests calling for an end to AKP “fascism.”

A difference in approach between AKP leaders has emerged as protests continue to spread. Erdoğan’s defiant statements followed by his dismissive decision to depart Turkey on a scheduled trip to Morocco are juxtaposed by President Abdullah Gül’s conciliatory nod to the protestors in his publicized statement on Monday that democracy is more than elections. Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç, in an effort to quell resentment and placate protestors issued a public apology yesterday for police use of excessive force.

Within a matter of days, the protests have facilitated a noticeable – if easily reconcilable – divide within the AKP. Erdoğan’s defiance is being put in check by others with a more enlightened understanding of what these protests could mean for the country at a time of uncertainty. The ongoing conflict in Syria already has the regime on its toes. To boot, Turkey’s noteworthy economic trajectory has had much to do with its identity as an oasis of stability in an region of extreme volatility. Widespread protests are calling to question the wisdom of investing in Turkey for the time being, and analysts posit that the booming tourism industry will take a severe hit.

According to one author, Erdoğan longs to be the modern-day Atatürk (revered father of modern Turkey). Erdoğan’s confidence and bellicosity may reflect his denial at the deteriorating political situation and the sentiments echoed by thousands upon thousands of Turks that any love for his leadership has been lost. As the protests expand and further ignite, Erdoğan must learn from his party brethren, act democratically, and engage protestors over their legitimate political concerns. Further defiant action may teach this supposed pro-democratic leader a painful lesson in electoral politics.

#OccupyGezi yielding opportunities for Turkey’s opposition

What started as a rather modest demonstration against a redevelopment plan in the heart of modern Istanbul has spawned nationwide protests against the ruling AK Parti, particularly what is viewed as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s creeping authoritarianism.  The AK Parti, in power since 2002, promotes a socially conservative agenda rooted in political Islam. Their prior emphasis on democracy and human rights propelled them to popularity in a country traditionally ruled by a small, elite, and secular establishment. Over the past decade, their impressive governing performance coupled with the downfall of major political rivals cultivated support from diverse segments of the population.

The unbridled success of Erdoğan and the AK Parti has contributed to the emergence of a dominant single-party system, however the party’s egoism resulting from steadily growing electoral support through the 2000s may end up hurting them. AKP confidence has manifest in their recent challenges to secular norms many Turks tout as the foundation of the secular Republic. Additionally, the AKP has become increasingly devoted to quieting the opposition, throwing ex-military members, Kurds, and journalists in jail under a hazy, ill-defined definition of terrorism.

What the ongoing protests prove, however, is that Erdoğan and the AKP cannot seamlessly implement single-party rule. Despite a largely successful modernization project and Turkey’s renewed international recognition as a regional power, the party is increasingly revealing itself as the power-hungry Islamists rivals forewarned against. Moreover, Turkey’s much-publicized economic machine has not been kind to everyone. Privatization has accelerated inequality and the youth unemployment rate remains high. The AK Parti is starting to have difficulty promoting its economic successes amongst the electorate. The ruthless crackdown on political rivals in recent years, as well as a zealous campaign in service of conservative social goals, including the abrogation of women’s reproductive rights, and last month’s hastily passed restrictions on alcohol, have effectively rid the AKP of any liberal support accrued over the past decade.

The AKP’s tremendous success has been a boon to Turkey’s ongoing democratization, however the conditions originally allowing for their successes are deteriorating and the ongoing protests demonstrate potential seeds of change. The primary opposition party CHP, traditionally viewed as a stagnant, elitist club of older politicians, must redefine its brand and find ways to leverage the outpouring of anger directed at the ruling regime. If the protests do represent a larger movement for change, the potential reward for channeling that anger into votes for the opposition would result in a far more balanced democratic system. On the other hand, if the CHP fails to shake its elitist reputation, and to translate the fervent anti-Erdoğan sentiments gripping city centers across the country into political pressure and votes, perhaps a renewed campaign to weaken dissent in Turkey emerges.

The protests reflect a diverse array of grievances aimed at Erdoğan and the AKP. While the original demonstrations aimed to protect Istanbul’s Gezi Park from a planned development project, they have grown to encompass much more than that. The pro-democracy and human rights discourse that contributed to the AKPs prolific rise to power is coming back to haunt them, particularly as Erdoğan and his party adopt more authoritarian behaviors. Though the AKP has achieved much in the last decade, social conditions combined with greater levels of repression have compelled citizens to take to the streets. The opposition has an opportunity to translate this anger into electoral success in the next elections scheduled to take place in 2014, though a failure to do so could hurt chances for Turkish democratic consolidation in the foreseeable future.

First Round

A press conference of opposition legislators in Venezuela, in which they presented a recording of a conversation about splits in the group in power (from El País).

Somewhat more than a month after his election, Nicolás Maduro’s government is facing two major problems at the same time: scarcity of basic products and the ventilation of a split in the group in power. For the moment, it seems none of these issues threatens the continuity of Maduro in power or of the Chavista project in Venezuela. However, they do represent the first time in which he will have to use all his political skills to maintain Chavistas united and to prevent the support for the opposition from rising.

Scarcity of basic products is a chronic symptom of an unsustainable spending scheme, which in turn is one of the axes of Chavismo. Not surprisingly, Maduro has sought scapegoats for the aggravating situation, which made it to the international press in the last weeks due to products such as toilet paper being included in the scarcity list. The President has blamed businesses of not producing at the top of their capacity in an attempt to increase the demand and maintain high prices. The chair of Empresas Polar, Lorenzo Mendoza, which controls 48% of the flour production in the country, recoiled saying that his company is working at full capacity, in contrast with the state which, being responsible for the remaining 52% of the flour production, is just functioning at 40% of its capacity. At the same time, the Venezuelan Central Bank has hosted meetings with business representatives to discuss pricing, tax, and foreign currency exchange rate policies to increase production to satisfy the domestic market and to export. In spite of the rapprochement between the government and the private sector, some voices judge that for the internal demand to be promptly satisfied, Chavismo’s logic of controlling prices and rates must be abolished.

The other problem, the ventilation of an apparent split in the group in power, is new. For some weeks there had been gossiping about the military not entirely satisfied with Maduro being appointed as Chávez’s successor. But yesterday, a group of legislators from the opposition shared with the press the recording of a conversation allegedly between a Cuban agent in Venezuela and a popular Venezuelan TV anchor, Mario Silva. The latter talked about two antagonist groups within the government: one led by Maduro and another by Diosdado Cabello, President of the Chamber or Deputies, who would be backed by parts of the Army and the private sector. According to the conversation, while Maduro was removing from office people close to Cabello (including the chair of the foreign exchange commission, Manuel Barroso), the latter would attempt to take over the Ministry of Defense and PDVSA, the state-owned oil company, to make it more difficult for Maduro to make and implement decisions, forcing him to resign.

Maduro has not made any public commentaries on those issues. At most, in his Twitter account he still continuously blames “the fascist right” of trying to de-stabilize the country. Similarly, he said arguments about the negative effects of price controls represented “an opportunity to wipe out the vices of the speculator capitalism”. Possibly we will not know the details of any action he undertakes to face these two challenges. But their consequences on the economic performance or the support he maintains will be visible for all.

Icelandic Elections

Bjarni Benediktsson, Prime Minister-to-be of Iceland (from Le Monde).

On Saturday Iceland celebrated elections for its unicameral parliament, the Althing, under an open-list proportional representation system. The Independence Party (right), led by Bjarni Benediktsson, won with almost 27% of the vote. On second place is the Progressive Party (center, agrarian), chaired by Sigmundr David Gunnlaugsson, with 24% of the vote. The incumbent party, the Social Democrats, fell to the third place. The Independence and Progressive Parties each won 19 of the 63 available seats, for which a center-right coalition government will rule the country.

It has been widely underlined by the press that the victory of those two parties is, in a way, very surprising as they were in power when Iceland had the financial crisis in 2008 that almost drove the country to bankruptcy. However, the story is not so different to what happened and has happened in other places of Europe, a political swinging going from resentment against the parties that were in power when the economic crisis began and that had to agree on rescue measures, to anger against the opposition parties that had to implement those measures.

In Iceland banks were lending cheaply a lot of money, but on 2008 this scheme became unsustainable, and the whole financial system collapsed, followed by debt and currency exchange crises. The incumbent government Independence Party lost support from the Parliament, a political crisis emerged, and the then third party, the Social Democrat, headed by Johanna Sigurdardottir, obtained the relative majority in the special elections of 2009. Its task, of course, was to apply the austerity measures negotiated by the previous administration with the International Monetary Fund, which translated into tax increases, unemployment, and reductions in the welfare system.Now that the legislature is over and elections were scheduled, the Social Democrat party is paying the price of implementing a policy it did not negotiate that had tangible social costs. Electors are upset with the negative effects of the austerity reforms, and a relevant element of support for the social democrats, negotiations to join the European Union (EU) which could facilitate the economic recovery, has waned due to the fading of the signs of the crisis. In addition, Sigurdardottir’s promises to deliver a new Constitution and a protection wall from eviction to morose homeowners failed. Thus, platform under which the Independence Party is running includes propositions such as tax reduction, forcing banks to assume losses in order to reduce mortgages, and stop negotiations to join the EU.

Commentators that showed surprise about the return of the Independence-Progressive alliance to power wonder if Icelanders have forgotten that those were the parties that caused the crisis with similar policies to the ones they promote now. It might be the case. However, it is also true that the Social Democrat Party arrived to power by default (it had always been a relatively minor party) and, once in office, had the infamous charge of implementing unpopular and harsh measures that it did not negotiate. The outgoing Prime Minister Sigurdardottir said she felt sad about the electoral results. Now, the Social Democrats have to work to constitute themselves as an attractive political alternative if they want voters to vote for their candidates again.

Cuts

Prime Minister of Portugal, Paulo Portas, speaking after the Constitutional Court rejected his budget austerity program (from Al-Jazeera).

Last Saturday, Portugal’s Constitutional Court rejected the austerity measures proposed by the government in order to meet the goals established by the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Central Bank (ECB) troika in budget deficit reduction. The Court said that some items in the austerity program, such as reductions in government workers’ salaries and benefits for retirees, unemployed, and the sick were unconstitutional. In response, Prime Minister Paulo Portas said he respected the decision, although disagreed with it because it would not allow keeping its promises with international lenders. In order to avoid financial problems, Portas added that spending on education and social security could be reduced instead. The troika said it would not make any decision on Portugal until its government reaches an agreement on the budget.

As has been seen time and again in Europe, the reduction of wages and social welfare benefits usually mean the problem is translated from the international lending markets to the pocket book of ordinary citizens. These are textbook examples of the socialization of losses. At the same time, businessmen have argued that as people do not have sufficient money, consumption is reduced and the economy contracts, further deepening the problem. In spite of theoretical arguments for such a strategy, real-world evidence on reducing budget to hamper a financial crisis just moves the problem to other issues.

The government has tried to defend its actions. Next to the statement of having to comply with its promises made abroad, authorities have insisted that the cuts the Court rejected are the necessary next step in the recovery plan. If they are not implemented, then the previous sacrifices made by Portuguese citizens would become useless, as the economy would lose any momentum pushing towards recovery. In a worst-case scenario, the Prime Minister suggested, without the cuts the situation would become so critical that yet another bailout would be necessary.

Nothing here seems to be new in these discussions, except that the Court’s decision could set a precedent for the European countries that are dealing with severe austerity measures: cuts to the national budget promised to international lenders reach a point in which they are illegal due to the burden placed on citizens. Evidently, this does not solve anything, as the government will still have to look for some kind of spending reductions. But at least there is one first case in which not only citizens, but a court, have said “enough”.