“An Awakening”
On May 21 Dominique Venner, deemed ideologue of the extreme right in France, committed suicide in the Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris. He left a note, whose contents has not been made public, but given his last appearances in the media and the last entry in his blog, it is thought that he decided to end with his life in reaction to what he perceived as the endangerment of the “great replacement” of the French population due to the recent approval of the same-sex marriage law and the increase of the Muslim presence in the country.
Venner is not a lonely figure in France, neither historically or currently. Historically, he is more or less associated with the group of people that actively supported the Nazi occupation and their policies against the Jewish population. Currently, he is linked with the National Front, to which chauvinist politicians such as Marie Le Pen belong to. Their conceptions about the public space are not dissimilar to those of other right groups in Europe or elsewhere: calls for a “pure” nation, safe from the influence of foreign social groups or people going against the “authentic values” of the society. In the last years, in France this has meant a fight against what they assess as a growing presence of Muslims and, specifically in the last months, against the same-sex marriage.
In any democracy, all voices can find a space to express themselves as long as they respect the rules or interaction. In his blog, Venner mentioned that protests against the same-sex marriage were necessary because even if the law was approved, it could always be reversed, suggesting either popular pressure or the coming to power of the extreme right could achieve so. In spite of his scorn for the law approving homosexual marriages, Venner did not attack its beneficiaries neither the democratic foundations of France. From this point of view, he always acted within the institutions of his country.
Marie Le Pen, leader of the ultra conservative National Front, mentioned that Venner’s suicide was a “political act with the objective of waking up” the French people. Under this interpretation, it was supposed to shock. An elaboration of this point of view is that Venner was so opposed to the same-sex marriage that he preferred to end his own life than to share the country with those who thought different. Clearly, such an attitude is anything but democratic.
Dominique Venner is illustrative but not the only kind of representative of the extreme right in France. For instance, another figure, Frigite Barjot, who had organized previous anti-same-sex marriage protests, mentioned that she would not participate in the demonstration of May 26 because the recent death of Venner could bring about violence, a risk she would not dare to take. But Venner’s suicide and reactions such as those of Le Pen point out an issue of concern about extreme positions in democratic regimes: some of its actions are not condemned as unnecessary and contrary to the spirit of democratic deliberation, but as sources of some kind of lesson. If anything, they remind that although they might project the image of being respectful of institutions, extremists of any sign are willing to go very far to impose their own perceptions of what is appropriate and what is not.
Icelandic Elections
On Saturday Iceland celebrated elections for its unicameral parliament, the Althing, under an open-list proportional representation system. The Independence Party (right), led by Bjarni Benediktsson, won with almost 27% of the vote. On second place is the Progressive Party (center, agrarian), chaired by Sigmundr David Gunnlaugsson, with 24% of the vote. The incumbent party, the Social Democrats, fell to the third place. The Independence and Progressive Parties each won 19 of the 63 available seats, for which a center-right coalition government will rule the country.
It has been widely underlined by the press that the victory of those two parties is, in a way, very surprising as they were in power when Iceland had the financial crisis in 2008 that almost drove the country to bankruptcy. However, the story is not so different to what happened and has happened in other places of Europe, a political swinging going from resentment against the parties that were in power when the economic crisis began and that had to agree on rescue measures, to anger against the opposition parties that had to implement those measures.
In Iceland banks were lending cheaply a lot of money, but on 2008 this scheme became unsustainable, and the whole financial system collapsed, followed by debt and currency exchange crises. The incumbent government Independence Party lost support from the Parliament, a political crisis emerged, and the then third party, the Social Democrat, headed by Johanna Sigurdardottir, obtained the relative majority in the special elections of 2009. Its task, of course, was to apply the austerity measures negotiated by the previous administration with the International Monetary Fund, which translated into tax increases, unemployment, and reductions in the welfare system.Now that the legislature is over and elections were scheduled, the Social Democrat party is paying the price of implementing a policy it did not negotiate that had tangible social costs. Electors are upset with the negative effects of the austerity reforms, and a relevant element of support for the social democrats, negotiations to join the European Union (EU) which could facilitate the economic recovery, has waned due to the fading of the signs of the crisis. In addition, Sigurdardottir’s promises to deliver a new Constitution and a protection wall from eviction to morose homeowners failed. Thus, platform under which the Independence Party is running includes propositions such as tax reduction, forcing banks to assume losses in order to reduce mortgages, and stop negotiations to join the EU.
Commentators that showed surprise about the return of the Independence-Progressive alliance to power wonder if Icelanders have forgotten that those were the parties that caused the crisis with similar policies to the ones they promote now. It might be the case. However, it is also true that the Social Democrat Party arrived to power by default (it had always been a relatively minor party) and, once in office, had the infamous charge of implementing unpopular and harsh measures that it did not negotiate. The outgoing Prime Minister Sigurdardottir said she felt sad about the electoral results. Now, the Social Democrats have to work to constitute themselves as an attractive political alternative if they want voters to vote for their candidates again.
Il Presidente
Yesterday Italy began the voting rounds to elect its next president. 630 deputies, 315 senators, 4 senators-for-life, and 58 regional delegates have the right to vote. Formally there are no candidates, although each party or alliance represented in Parliament usually supports one, who in theory can be any citizen over 50 years of age. Vote is by means of secret ballots. The candidate with at least two thirds of the vote (672 votes) wins. If no candidate receives that proportion, the election is repeated a second and a third time. Afterwards, just an absolute majority is required (504 votes). The position lasts seven years, with no limits for reelection. The term of the current President, Giorgio Napolitano ends next May. As he said he was not interested in running for office again, elections were hold. As of Friday morning, three voting rounds had taken place and no winner had emerged.
Parliamentary elections in Italy took place in February. Although the Democratic Party (PD, center-left), led by Pier Luigi Bersani, won the most seats (295 of 630), choosing the Prime Minister and forming a government required negotiation with the other political forces. These are the Five Star Movement (5-SM, left), chaired by former comedian Beppe Grillo, and People of Freedom (PF, right), headed by Silvio Berlusconi, former Prime Minister and media tycoon. No agreement has been reached to the day. Berlusconi calls for a coalition government, which is rejected by Bersani. Grillo says he will not support any Prime Minister coming from either of those parties. Weeks after the election, President Napolitano created two “special groups” of notable Italians to help with the negotiations. After being received with mistrust, this proposal failed.
Presidential elections take place without a Prime Minister. Voting rounds reflect the stalemate among the most important political forces. Originally, Bersani supported the former leader of the moderate CISL union, Franco Marini, as Presidential candidate. He even got Berlusconi to back him. As an alliance between the PD and the PF was sketched, optimism sprouted for the election of President and Prime Minister and for the formation of a new government. However, Bersani’s rival for the PD leadership, Matteo Renzi, opposed Marini, taking 50 votes with him. In the first round of the Presidential vote, Marini just got 521 votes, falling to 15 in the second round. Stefano Rodotà, backed by Grillo, got the first place in that ballot, but with 240 votes. Somewhat expectedly, in the third round the majority of votes casted were blank, legislators deciding to wait until the fourth ballot, requiring just absolute majority, to play again. No strong candidate appears yet for such occasion.
As Head of State, the Presidency of the Italian Republic is a largely ceremonial role (government authority is given to the Prime Minister, formally known as President of the Ministers’ Council). However, in this particular context, during his first days in office the President will have the task of brokering, or at least facilitating, the negotiations between the political parties represented in Parliament to elect the Prime Minister and form a government. As the original candidacy of Marini suggested, the agreements reached to nominate and support a presidential candidate could foreshadow the coalition that will form a government, killing two birds with the same stone. At the same time, as remembered by Renzi’s withdraw of support for Marini, parties can split. Uncertainty remains in the Italian political system.
Cuts

Prime Minister of Portugal, Paulo Portas, speaking after the Constitutional Court rejected his budget austerity program (from Al-Jazeera).
Last Saturday, Portugal’s Constitutional Court rejected the austerity measures proposed by the government in order to meet the goals established by the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Central Bank (ECB) troika in budget deficit reduction. The Court said that some items in the austerity program, such as reductions in government workers’ salaries and benefits for retirees, unemployed, and the sick were unconstitutional. In response, Prime Minister Paulo Portas said he respected the decision, although disagreed with it because it would not allow keeping its promises with international lenders. In order to avoid financial problems, Portas added that spending on education and social security could be reduced instead. The troika said it would not make any decision on Portugal until its government reaches an agreement on the budget.
As has been seen time and again in Europe, the reduction of wages and social welfare benefits usually mean the problem is translated from the international lending markets to the pocket book of ordinary citizens. These are textbook examples of the socialization of losses. At the same time, businessmen have argued that as people do not have sufficient money, consumption is reduced and the economy contracts, further deepening the problem. In spite of theoretical arguments for such a strategy, real-world evidence on reducing budget to hamper a financial crisis just moves the problem to other issues.
The government has tried to defend its actions. Next to the statement of having to comply with its promises made abroad, authorities have insisted that the cuts the Court rejected are the necessary next step in the recovery plan. If they are not implemented, then the previous sacrifices made by Portuguese citizens would become useless, as the economy would lose any momentum pushing towards recovery. In a worst-case scenario, the Prime Minister suggested, without the cuts the situation would become so critical that yet another bailout would be necessary.
Nothing here seems to be new in these discussions, except that the Court’s decision could set a precedent for the European countries that are dealing with severe austerity measures: cuts to the national budget promised to international lenders reach a point in which they are illegal due to the burden placed on citizens. Evidently, this does not solve anything, as the government will still have to look for some kind of spending reductions. But at least there is one first case in which not only citizens, but a court, have said “enough”.
We Meet Again
After the announcement that Cypriot authorities had reached an agreement with the troika formed by the European Union (EU), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to receive a 10 billion euro bailout to prevent the collapse of the national banking system, citizen protests began.
Officials from financial institutions who participated in the bailout negotiations agree that although the deal might bring hard times in the near future, it will help to rebuild trust in the Cypriot banking system. Difficulties are already tangible for Cypriots. Banks are closed since last week’s Monday (they are expected to reopen on Thursday) and ATMs allow to withdraw no more than 120 euros a day (100 for Laika, the bank in the worst situation), in order to secure the 5.8 billion euros necessary to qualify for the bailout. Expectedly, many businesses are just accepting payments in cash, of which there is insufficient availability. Additionally, in the upcoming weeks the percentage to be levied from deposits of over 100,000 euros to pay for the bailout will be fixed; estimations put it between 6.5 and 30%.
Some officials try to see the “not-so-bad face” of the deal. Deposits under 100,000 euro have been guaranteed against levy, and would just be moved to the Bank of Cyprus, the largest in the country. Even more, many of the deposits over 100,000 are said to belong to Russian tycoons, for which their levying would not affect as many Cypriot citizens. And finally, that although the size of the 10 billion euro bailout as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) is 57.1%, it is smaller than that of Greece in 2012, (67.1%), and much smaller in absolute terms compared to the Spanish (100 billion euro) or Irish (85 billion euro) bailouts. This would mean that the problem in Cyprus is not as grave; but the 10 billion bailout is a reduction from the 13 billion original proposal, which was seen as unbearable for the size of the Cypriot economy.
In a way, most of those arguments can be sustained or rebutted by numbers. What citizens fear the most is to see in their own country the problems already seen in Spain, Greece, or Portugal: a reasonable mid-term macroeconomic plan is unsustainable in the individual short-term perspective. As a result of budget cuts, privatizations, and re-structuring of the national economy that derive from the agreement for the bailout, people expect to lose their jobs, their homes, social welfare, be unable to pay their bills, and, in the worst case, not to be able to bring food to the table. It is not just a socialization of private losses; other bailout experiences in the region have not clearly demonstrated that to implement strict spending measures in fact contribute to the recovery of the national economy. Finally, it is a plan that no Cypriot asked for and that feels to be imposed from abroad. Although it might be too early to make a specific assessment on the Cypriot political reactions to this scenario, these conditions are the same that have brought about support for radical rightist parties such as New Democracy in Greece.
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