This blog got its hand on a working paper that is being widely circulated in UN circles in New York about the need for a repositioning of the organization in Mozambique after a loss of influence since the early 2000’s. It suggests that the new Mozambican socioeconomic reality opens for the UN an opportunity (not to mention a necessity) to take on a fresh normative leadership role. It is implicit here what we may call an inability of the UN to keep up with changes and evolve from a role of great importance and impact in Mozambique after the civil war to a relevant one in the current context of fast growth, new mineral wealth and great inequality, combined with rapidly changing patterns of foreign direct investment (FDI) and aid.
Not only does the paper offer a great discussion of the adequacy of the UN’s present impact in Mozambique, but it also has an extra advantage: it aggregates important data on all of the variables mentioned above, from historical charts on FDI to the percentage of investment that is tied to the booming extractive industries (an incredible 84%). I met the author, Alejandra Bujones, in Maputo, and I witnessed her efforts to obtain accurate information that was generally not readily available. For that alone her paper is extremely valuable for those interested in Mozambique.
The paper, which was commissioned by experts Bruce Jenks and Bruce Jones as part of their major study called “UN Development at a Crossroad”, hasn’t been published yet, so it cannot be made available at this point, but I can’t help presenting a tidbit of the information she gathered:
-“Prospects of foreign investment in Mozambique during the 10 years from 2010-2020 are valued at close to US$90bn (…), equivalent to seven times the country’s current total GDP of US$12.4bn.” 84% goes to extractive industries, 6% to manufacturing and only 4% to communications and transport (which, as I witnessed during my road trips there, are in great need of refurbishing).
-The top FDI investors in Mozambique in 2011 were: Brazil (US$ 908 million, nearly double the amount of the second largest investor), Mauritius, Ireland, South Africa, Switzerland, Portugal, UAE, UK, USA, Vietnam. So where is China? Their investments actually come in the form of credit, and it doesn’t show in FDI data. Beijing lent in 2011 US$ 82.2 million, according to data obtained from Bank of Mozambique Balance of Payment 2011 report.
- Aid flows have been “decreasing continually from 56% of the country’s budget in 2008 to 44% in 2010 to 39.6% in 2012. The majority of ODA received by Mozambique is either delivered through project or direct budgetary support. (…) The UN’s share of total ODA makes up only a small fraction of this”.
- “NGOs receive only 4% of UN’s programmatic funds in Mozambique (the bulk goes to the government)”.
It is easy to see that results from aid in regards to growth and social indicators have been mixed, as the stagnate progress of human development shows. In what pertains to the UN, Bujones points out an important challenge to the ability of the organization to provide aid: in the past decade donors preferred to channel resources through direct government budget support instead of through the organization’s system. The UN had then fewer and fewer resources at its disposal and, to make matters worse, it tended to spread them around “a number of remotely connected initiatives.” Thus, it lost influence both with donors and with the Government of Mozambique, and the general perception was that the UN lacked a clear and coherent strategy for the country.
In a well-intentioned attempt to act in a united effort, the UN in Mozambique tested the “Delivering as One” initiative. It was, according to Bujones, an important first step with good impacts on efficiency and economic gains. However, it meant that the country offices had to focus on internal procedures for a while, leading stakeholders to believe: “that the UN has spent too much time focusing inwards, rather than looking outwards; that projects and programs are not sufficiently cross-linked to explicitly draw upon each other and add value; that programs continue to be too disparate, lacking strategic focus; that, with the exception of some UN agencies that have a clear and visible mandate, nobody really knows what the UN is doing where; and together these factors hamper the ability of the UN to provide leadership and substantive policy input in Mozambique.”
Another problem was that the UN in Mozambique was perceived as unable to mediate effectively between government, civil society and private sector. Even the national government, although it has been the greatest recipient of UN funds and efforts, “feels that “the UN’s project spread—especially its involvement in small-scale project implementation—is a distraction that takes it away from focusing on large-scale project management and strategic support at a higher policy and coordination level.”
To summarize it: no one is happy with the status quo.
Bujones lays out in the paper several suggestions for the UN to regain the important role it played in Mozambique in the aftermath of its 16 year civil war. First, she says the agencies have to move away from the inward approach. Second, they need to gravitate from “downstream direct service delivery programs” towards serving as “a catalyst to provide technical input and upstream advice to develop policy”. And, in general, the UN in Mozambique must “use its normative agenda to serve the whole of the Mozambican State (government, civil society, private sector, media) in areas where the interests of the State clash with the interests of the Government”, such as on how to best manage its new extractives revenues.
There is certainly great demand for the changes she proposes. As says Bujones in her final remarks: Both civil society and small private sector companies (…) are keen for the UN to intervene, either directly or by empowering Civil Society Organizations and Private Sector to participate in such discussions, in order to exert influence on the government and the multinationals to promote good governance, transparency and accountability.
I couldn’t have said it better.
Tucked within a rocky valley on the eastern shore of Somalia, approximately 220 kilometers from Puntland’s capitol, Garowe, the sister towns of Bedey and Daawad — together part of Eyl District — are two of the more underdeveloped areas in Puntland State. The coastal community of roughly 200 households has experienced little economic growth over the past two decades, having endured the consequences of remote and rugged geography, poor infrastructure, limited access to education, and instability caused by the local piracy movement that not only drained the town of a large number of young men, but scuttled its reputation among the international community.
The Eyl District Council, which governs Bedey and Daawad as well as the surrounding district of 100,000 people, has taken steps to address some of these challenges in recent years. Council members have solicited international support to modernize the unpaved road leading from Eyl to other population centers to the west and north. Construction will begin in the next few months. The current single-lane road — a mix of dirt, sand, and rock — compounds Eyl’s relative isolation by dramatically increasing travel time and limiting opportunities for trade and commerce. The fishing industry, Eyl’s largest source of livelihood, is particularly dependent upon reliable and expedient access to outside markets, without which opportunities for sector growth are slim. International trade to Gulf countries via the Indian Ocean is often the most viable alternative market for Eyl fishermen, although rough water conditions and the threat of off-shore piracy have made this route hazardous as well — not only due to armed criminals, but also anti-piracy vessels that may mistake innocent fishermen for Somalis with more nefarious intentions.
Yet the impact of the piracy movement extends well beyond the fishing sector. Starting over a decade ago, outside actors offering financial reward for criminal behavior — in the form of seizing boats and taking hostages — attracted many young Eyl men away from productive trades and toward dangerous and unstable lifestyles. Some were subsequently killed, leaving behind families with few means of financial support. Others were imprisoned. Many incurred large debts with local businesses around town, using piracy as both leverage and collateral, then often defaulting due to imprisonment, death, or simple bad luck on the open seas. These businesses suffered financial hardship as a result.
Piracy has a complicated history in Somalia. What began as a homegrown movement to protect off-shore resources (particularly fish populations within Somalia’s territorial waters) from excessive exploitation by other countries and international corporations, metastasized into a lucrative criminal enterprise that shirked its founding purpose for expedient economic gain. Pirates quickly discovered that they could collect large sums of money for their trade. The movement thus became less about economic justice and more about simple financial benefit, with many young Somalis preferring the high-risk, high-reward lifestyle to the stagnant grind of daily life in Eyl.
In recent years, however, piracy has waned in both influence and its level of community support. The Puntland government, with international backing, successfully engaged the Eyl community in an anti-piracy campaign designed to wield the influence of religious leaders, elders, businesses, and families to provide a united front against the piracy movement. Traditional and religious leaders used their moral authority to convince businesses to reject money of pirate origin, whether from the individual pirate himself or his family. And these families, under the strain of financial blacklists and weary of the violence and instability wrought by piracy, began to withdraw their support for the movement as well. Slowly, as the town became increasingly inhospitable to this form of criminal enterprise, pirates and their leaders began moving their operations elsewhere.
Today, despite these mild successes, Eyl continues to stand in a vulnerable position. Although piracy has decreased through the community’s coordinated campaign, the region has not yet seen a corresponding rise in economic growth or opportunity. Fishermen lack the resources to construct durable boats to withstand the rough seas, and the community does not have sufficient refrigeration capacity to preserve the fish for shipment along the long route inland toward Garowe and other population centers. The town continues to need modernized infrastructure, primarily in the form of a permanent and paved road to facilitate a more cost-effective commute to and from the town. Farmers require metal wire to fence in land for a more productive use of livestock. Female small-shop owners, eager to expand their enterprises but lacking the wherewithal to do so, are in need of additional capital and business training. And youth, often with limited education and few employment opportunities, require enterprise skill training to improve their economic prospects and stimulate a broader entrepreneurial spirit. With few resources and little support from either the Puntland government or the Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu, the district government does not have the capacity to address these issues on its own.
All of these factors, when considered together, demand an increased level of engagement by development organizations to avoid a situation where piracy and organized criminal groups once again take root, exploiting and preying upon an economically vulnerable and geographically isolated community. Road construction is a good start, but needs to be accompanied by investment in the fishing sector to improve capacity for trade and build economic relationships with towns inland from the coast. Without creating expanded markets for Eyl products, it is difficult to envision sustainable growth. These goods, for example, could be connected to new commercial markets that are being developed in Garowe and neighboring towns, which would create new opportunities for profit within the supply chain to go along with added consumer demand.
Although Puntland is undergoing a democratic transition, sometimes the biggest challenges remain the most basic: creating sustainable livelihoods, and buffering insecure communities against organized crime and those who prey upon societies with weak governance. Long-term, Eyl’s economic prospects might rely somewhat upon the Puntland government’s ability to develop better policies for resource-sharing and inclusive political representation. But one hopes that Eyl might be able to find some solutions in the short-term as well, for a higher order of living and a further reduction in a pirate movement that continues to harm both Somalis and the international community.
Reform, itself a rather nebulous concept, is sometimes difficult to define in the context of political behavior. It begs the questions, “Reform in what area, for whom, and to what social, political, or economic end?” Many African countries for years, under pressure from international donors, have adopted policy rhetoric infused with promises of western-style “reform” in all the areas one might expect: democratic pluralism, economic liberalization, anti-corruption, institutional development, constitutional protections for human rights, and so on.
Actual progress beyond rhetoric has been slow. But not always for lack of effort from major donors and other international actors. Conditions are often placed on large aid packages that flow to governments in developing countries. The logic is that these conditional packages can be used as both a positive and negative incentive, prompting governments to embark on recommended changes in policy, while also deterring them from more destructive and parochial uses of power due to the explicit threat of losing international funds — which often account for large portions of a developing country’s budget. Predictably, many of these governments — run by powerful elites who may stand to lose under a system of vibrant pluralism and broadly distributed economic growth — nod politely and give credence to the value of reform, but do little else to codify or fundamentally institutionalize real change.
A possible exception may be Malawi. New President Joyce Banda, southern Africa’s first female head of state who rose to power last April after the sudden death of former President Bingu wa Mutharika, has used her brief three months in office to shake up Malawian politics. Some of her actions have been largely symbolic – selling a controversial private jet purchased by her predecessor only two years earlier, to name one example — but others have been more substantive. For better or for worse, she is initiating an austerity campaign throughout the country, headlined by a 40 percent devaluation of the Malawian Kwacha that has since created a minor spike in inflation. But Ms. Banda appears willing to accept the immediate domestic consequences of this campaign in the hope that it will create a more solid economic foundation for growth and also repair relations with donors that were nearly severed in recent years.
Yet Ms. Banda’s surprising behavior isn’t confined to economic policy. In a dramatic break with both her Malawian predecessor and the leadership of the Africa Union, she refused to grant Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir entrance into Malawi for the July AU Summit her government was hosting, on account of his outstanding arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court for alleged war crimes in Sudan. Withstanding tremendous pressure from the AU, Sudan, and other countries in the region, Ms. Banda eventually refused to host the summit with Mr. Bashir in attendance, forcing organizers to move the entire event to Ethiopia.
It was quite a remarkable stance for a small country, particularly in a region of much larger countries that have repeatedly avoided or sought to obfuscate their obligations to the ICC, and to human rights more generally. Ms. Banda is likely to incur significant consequences for her uncompromising position, primarily in the form of political or economic alienation by the AU when it negotiates new policies to govern regional trade and commerce.
What is equally clear, however, is that international donors are taking notice of Ms. Banda’s streak of independent and, by their view, necessary political behavior. The Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC) recently released a $350 million package it had suspended in 2011 after accusing Malawi’s previous president of malfeasance and poor governance. The MCC’s initial freeze was also in response to Sudanese President Bashir’s attendance at a conference in Malawi’s capitol, Lilongwe, last fall. In another significant event, Ms. Banda’s administration released a reconfigured annual budget proposal that built upon the direction set by their previous currency devaluation, prompting the International Monetary Fund to sign off on a $157 million aid agreement.
Movement toward reform, in the areas of human rights and economic policy, can indeed be seen in the recent behavior of Malawi’s government. And the carrot provided by large aid packages, compounded, of course, by Malawi’s own desperate need for economic growth, appears to be the primary motivator behind these changes.
I wrote last week that we should not wait for, nor expect, enlightened leaders to bring altruism into systems otherwise dominated by corruption, identity politics, and the narrow interests of elites. Though Ms. Banda appears determined to challenge this notion, far be it from me to declare her behavior as anything close to altruistic. Time will tell how effective her policies will be, as well as the degree to which she can generate a broader political movement in favor of her approach. But it does seem clear that she, more than her predecessor and many other African leaders, is displaying the courage and foresight to make tough, painful choices at the possible expense of her own domestic favorability. Austerity is likely to hurt many Malawians in the short-run, and her face-off with the more powerful AU may enrage many Malawi politicians who see little political gain in return for possible alienation. Further still, there is no guarantee that international aid will propel Malawi’s economy forward in a sustainable way, since much of its impact will depend upon the incentives of existing institutions and political actors.
Yet years from now, assuming Ms. Banda continues on her current path, Malawi may be an interesting case study to assess the ultimate impact of a leader that goes against powerful regional forces, as well as institutionalized interests, to enact reforms and collect the corresponding aid that those reforms release.
The litany of commentary and analysis surrounding the recent, and remarkable, events in Egypt has produced a consensus of sorts, if one might call it that. Though hardly a revolutionary conclusion, many believe the election of Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi carries with it a mixed bag of consequences for the region, and the West. That Egypt’s Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) allowed Mr. Morsi to win despite his deep Islamist roots is certainly a positive sign for electoral integrity and the ability to translate popular will into political reality. Alternatively, the Brotherhood now controls the highest elected office in the country, and it remains to be seen whether the Islamist group will seek to use this platform to compensate — in the form of state policy, diplomatic relations, or constitutional reform — for decades of political marginalization amid the rather secular and repressive tenure of President Hosni Mubarak.
For its part, the White House appears to be cautiously optimistic following the results of the first free and fair presidential election in Egyptian history — relieved that the SCAF did not attempt naked electoral theft, but still quite wary of ongoing challenges and concerns. This seems a reasonable stance considering the list of unanswered questions. Will the SCAF reinstate the popularly elected parliament that it suddenly dissolved earlier this month? If not, when will new elections be held, and will all parties, including those of Islamist persuasions, once again be allowed to freely contest the poll? Now that a president has been elected, will he have commander-in-chief authority over the armed forces? If not, how much latitude will Mr. Morsi be granted by the military to enact his, and the Brotherhood’s, political agenda?
These will not be answered to anyone’s satisfaction for quite some time, I imagine. But as in any transition, Egypt’s uncertainty has created new and exciting windows of opportunity. Just today, Mr. Morsi announced his intention to use the vacant vice president positions to appoint two members of marginalized communities: a woman and a Coptic Christian. This will likely be interpreted as an olive branch to the nearly 50 percent of Egyptian voters that did not want a Muslim Brotherhood presidency, many of whom were heavily involved in the initial demonstrations that sought to topple Mubarak in favor of a more open, just, and progressive form of government. Symbolically, and assuming Mr. Morsi follows through on his promise, this was a necessary demonstration of inclusivity and Egyptian unity. But perhaps more significantly, it signals to the SCAF that Mr. Morsi is not the hard-line Islamist some have made him out to be, and in fact is willing to assemble a balanced government that receives input from a variety of groups. The hope is clearly to mollify fears among the military brass that Mr. Morsi’s election was a harbinger of the inevitable and destructive clash between an ideologically driven Islamist government and the old guard that wants to maintain stability, as well as the corresponding power that comes with it.
For years, many have wondered how the Brotherhood would actually behave should it find itself with political influence, much less outright power. While some fear for the freedom and civil liberties within Egyptian society, I’m inclined to believe that governing and its responsibilities will be a moderating force on the Brotherhood, compelling it to chart a more pragmatic course in order to negotiate constructive agreements with the many powerful, non-Islamist actors that have a stake in Egypt’s future. After all, Egyptian voters will be carefully observing the conduct and success of this new government in addressing Egypt’s most pressing challenges. A stalemated government, ineffectual leadership, and divisive agendas during a time of crisis will all be judged harshly at the ballot box — perhaps incentivizing productive, expedited action at the expense of pure ideology. On the international front, the annual U.S. military and economic aid package to Egypt remains one of the largest such bilateral agreements in the world. The Brotherhood would risk this relationship at its own peril, since the Egyptian military relies upon this aid for a considerable chunk of its own budget and operations.
With all that in mind, Mr. Morsi’s intention to appoint a woman and a Christian vice president is a positive, if incomplete, sign that perhaps he understands the factors above and will govern with sober moderation. Whether or not the SCAF believes this, or is willing to loosen its tight hold on power, of course remains to be seen. As does the Islamists’ actual legislative agenda should it once again find itself with a majority in parliament, if and when it’s reconvened.
Hollywood must definitely make a movie out of this. The trial of the Egyptians, Americans and other foreign democracy-promoters charged with (basically) stirring the revolution in Egypt restarted this week and got postponed again, now to next month. Six of the accused Americans left the country months ago, easing the tension and the media attention to the story. But the trial continues, and so does the complicated relationship between US and Egyptian diplomats over democracy related programs in Cairo and elsewhere.
Obviously, the accused deny the charges, but it is hard to convince Egyptian authorities that the programs led by NDI, IRI and Freedom House had no political bias or agenda. Promoting democracy in what was then an authocracy is a political matter. Most programs worked with all parties, but according to recent news, some did make distinctions and even refused to work with the Muslim Brotherhood. I’m not sure that, in what pertains to this case, it is a good thing that the MB now happens to be in charge.
How unbiased can this programs be? Is it a matter of yes or no or is there a scale? And, deep down, is complete neutrality desirable when there is a clear objective of more openness?
The US now asks Egypt “to stop trying these individuals and instead resolve any outstanding issues that they may have on this matter in a government-to-government basis,” said State Department spokesman Mark Toner. According to him, the NGOs provided an “important component to a successful democratic transition for Egypt.”
I definitely agree that unresolved matters should be dealt with in a government-to-government basis. Still, development and democracy programs have here a great opportunity to analyze their work under the eyes of the countries that operate in.
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