Browsing articles in "Governance"
Nov 24, 2013
PEstrada

Honduras: Back on Track?

Honduran presidential candidate Castro in campaign (from SDP).

Honduran presidential candidate Xiomara Castro in campaign (from SDP).

Today Honduras is celebrating general elections. It is the second time Hondurans go to the polls after the 2009 coup against Manuel Zelaya. Later that year, a contest was held, and Porfirio Lobo won the presidency, apparently restoring democratic procedures in the country. However, since then Honduras has suffered an increase in violence, next to the continuing problems of poverty and inequality in wealth distribution. In addition, for many Lobo’s administration was illegitimate. Now that he is about to complete his term and that the electoral process is being carried out as scheduled, an opportunity could emerge to definitely bring political order back to the country.

President Manuel Zelaya was ousted from power in 2009 by the military when he insisted on having a referendum that would have allowed him to run for reelection. The Army had the support of Congress and the Supreme Court, all which declared the illegality of the referendum. Yet, Zelaya garnered the support of the international community, even to the degree of Honduras’ membership in the Organization of American States being suspended until the crisis was solved. Months later, elections took place under an environment of criticism. Some local and foreign observers thought that the exercise was a way to legitimize the coup against Zelaya, whose possibilities of being reinstated in office waned as Porfirio Lobo took office. On the other hand, the military and the interim President, Roberto Micheletti, considered their intervention was necessary to ensure the protection of the constitution, and kept their promise to remain in power just the time necessary to get everything ready for new elections (Micheletti was president for five months).

The most evident reasons for arguing that today’s electoral exercise will contribute to restore democratic order in Honduras is that elections are being carried out according to the schedule, and that no political actor is even close to suggest retorting again to non-democratic means to solve conflicts around power. However, there is an element of uncertainty in the emergence of this opportunity, found in the relatively new plurality of the ballot.

There are three main candidates competing for the election (there are nine of them in total). First, Juan Hernández, from the rightist National Party, proposing to increase the tasks of the Army in combating organized crime (incumbent Lobo also belongs to this party). Second, Mauricio Villeda, from the also conservative Liberal Party, campaigning under the banner of an intense fight against corruption and the promotion of the private sector as solutions to poverty in the country (ousted Zelaya was a member of this party). These candidates represent the two parties that have shared power for the last decades, effectively reducing the spaces available for other political groups. Respectively, surveys project they will obtain 28% and 14% of the vote.

The third candidate is an outsider. She is Xiomara Castro, wife of ousted Zelaya, from the leftist Liberty and Re-founding Party. This is a party created during Lobo’s administration. She proposes to elect a Constitutional Assembly, reduce the presence of military, and re-found the republic combining capitalist and welfare-state elements. Surveys project she will get 27% of the vote.

The uncertain prospects of elections contributing to finishing with the crisis in Honduras is not found on the individual traits of each candidate, but on the real possibility that an outsider, Castro, can end with the nationalist-liberal equilibrium of the Honduran political system. In addition, the Church, with substantive power in Honduras, has attacked Castro’s party because, with the support if receives from the homosexual and feminist communities, is in favor of measures to protect their rights. Will these actors yield power to the wife of ousted Zelaya? Furthermore, the small distance in the preference of the vote between the two top candidates, Castro and Hernández, pushes to think of a potentially problematic post-election scenario. The difference between the first and second places will very likely be less than 1% of the vote. This small margin increases the need to count every single vote and to take the strictest measures to prevent any kind of fraud.

Of course, an alternative scenario is that, notwithstanding the victor in the election, results are reliable and uncontested. This is the only outcome that can contribute to strengthen democracy in Honduras and to end with the crisis that began in 2009. In turn, this depends on the behavior of actors and their sympathizers. Their reliance on the electoral process to regain whatever losses they might have had will be a key factor in regaining political order in Honduras.

Other
Nov 21, 2013
PEstrada

Chilean Elections: Wrapping-up the transition to democracy

Michelle Bachelet (L) and Matthei (R), the two contenders in the runoff presidential election in Chile (from BBC).

Michelle Bachelet (L) and Evelyn Matthei (R), the two contenders in the runoff presidential election in Chile (from BBC).

Chile held general elections last Sunday. Leftist candidate and President from 2006 to 2010, Michelle Bachelet, got the largest share of the vote, 47%, but will have to face a runoff on December 15. Then, she will face Evelyn Matthei, candidate from the right and former Labor Minister, who received 25% of the tally. Although Bachelet’s votes are almost as twice as those of Matthei, a runoff was not a possibility seriously considered by her team. Anyhow, her New Majority, joining Socialists, Christian-Democrats, and Communists, will have the majorities in both legislative chambers, actually increasing its current presence. What is the political scenario surrounding the runoff contest?

First, the possibility that Matthei actually wins must be acknowledged, although this is quite unlikely to happen. In her favor she has being the official candidate and that the third and fourth places in the presidential race got 10% of the vote, less than half of what she got. Assuming she is able to move their supporters for her cause (something also very improbable, as these candidates are independent, leaning towards the left), she would noticeably increase her constituency. However, there are heavy factors that play against her. First, the popularity of incumbent Sebastián Piñera is low; despite a relative successful economic performance, many Chileans are aware that their country has the worst wealth disparity scores among the OECD members. Second, it could be argued that she does not have such a solid base of support within her own party, given that she was the third option for being a candidate of the right (the winner of the primaries stepped down adducing depression, while his replacement refused to participate in a renewed primary election).

Even if she wins, Matthei would have a hard time interacting with the Congress, which would be controlled by New Majority. Its members have garnered the confidence of voters campaigning under the same banners of Bachelet. The left has promoted two goals in ths campaign. First, to reduce economic inequality. Bachelet and the left intend to introduce a major reform to the public finances, giving more weight to corporate taxes and alleviating the tax load on individuals. With this, New Majority expects to increase the state revenues and allocate more funds available for, among other things, funding the public education system, even at the university level. In fact, this is one of the main reasons that have affected incumbent Sebastián Piñera’s popularity: his decision in 2011 to increase college fees provoked massive protests throughout the country. Even more, four of the leaders of these mobilizations have been elected to Congress, signaling the relevance of the finance and education reforms for the constituency of the left and the parties’ directives (however, these student leaders belong to radical parties, for which their backing to Bachelet’s projects on these topics are not necessarily granted).

The second major goal of the left is to wrap-up Chile’s transition to democracy by removing the underpinnings left by Pinochet and the military when they retired from public life. Bachelet and New Majority are for a new Constitution, replacing that of 1980, written under the authoritarian rule (which, since the political openings of the 1990’s, has undergone some changes). On the contrary, Matthei proposes deeper constitutional reforms, not an entirely new document. In particular, the new constitution defended by Bachelet and her alliance colleagues would grant new rights and guarantees for Chileans, including abortion, same-sex marriage, no discrimination, political participation, and access to water and housing, none of which were considered by the military in 1980. Furthermore, the left would want a new equilibrium of powers giving new capacities to the Congress, increasing civilian control over the military, and reviewing center-region relations.

If Michelle Bachelet wins on December 15, which is the most probable thing to happen, she and her New Majority will undertake the task of reforming the state by removing the reminders of the authoritarian legacy and replacing them with new institutions protecting the rights of a plural society. It might still be too early to ask whether or not they will succeed, or what obstacles they could face (although the left controls Congress, it cannot simply ignore the opposition). However, the expected vote of most Chileans for Bachelet indicates that they are willing to leave behind a past of repression and leave no question that the country is a democracy.

Nov 17, 2013
PEstrada

The Maldives’ Second Try

Yameen (from the BBC).

 Abdulla Yameen, the new President of the Maldives (from the BBC).

Today, the winner of the second multiparty elections in the Maldives (an archipelago to the west of India, with a population of about 330,000 people, overwhelmingly Islamic), Abdulla Yameen, will be sworn as President. For some students of transitions from authoritarian regimes, the second electoral process is central in assessing the progress of the democratization process. If a turnover of the party in power takes places, or if not, if the contest is qualified as free and fair, then it is acknowledged that opposition is allowed to have a voice in the public discourse and that there are spaces open for contestation. Under this light, it can be thought that democratization is advancing in the Maldives. However, although not necessarily dismissing such statement, a revision of the weeks leading to Yameen’s election illustrate the need to pay attention not only to the outcome of the election, but the circumstances in which it was carried out.

After thirty years of Maumoon Abdul Gayoom’s rule, President Mohamed Nasheed was elected in 2008. In the midst of protests from the police and the military in reaction to his attempt to have the top criminal judge arrested under charges of being bought off by Gayoom,  he left power in 2012 in a situation he called a coup. Mohamed Waheed, the Vice President, took over the government. Following the expected calendar, elections were called for in September 07, 2013. His popularity remained high, as surveys projected Nasheed as the winner of the election. He got 45% of the vote, and in second place with 25% of the tally came Abdula Yameen, half brother of former dictator Gayoom and who would eventually be elected. As no one received the absolute majority of the vote, the electoral law provided for a runoff between the two top contenders.

It was then that the electoral struggle began in the Maldives. After complaints of irregularities pressed by the third place in the race, businessman Gasim Ibrahim (namely that votes had been casted on behalf of dead people or ineligible voters; observers did not share this view), the Supreme Court first suspended the runoff and then annulled the results of the original election. So, the contest was rescheduled for October 19. However, on the eve of this fresh exercise, it was cancelled: just one of the candidates, Ibrahim, complied with the requisite of all participants approving the electoral registry. Notably, it was the police that prevented electoral material from being distributed. Hence, a third attempt to carry out the election was planned for November 9.

In the meantime, President Waheed was receiving major criticism for his handling of the situation. Himself a candidate, he was forced to step down from the race. At the same time, he expressed concerns about the legitimacy of the election set for October 19. In the end, he reacted to the mounting pressure and stopped pursuing his goal by leaving the ballot. Furthermore, citizens began protesting calling for politicians to end this turmoil, as instability was affecting the Maldivian economy, heavily dependent on tourism.

The November 9 election occurred as planned. But, as in the first attempt, there was no candidate obtaining more than 50% of the vote: Nasheed was the first place with 47% of the vote, again this result being short of the required absolute majority. The original election plan stated that if a runoff was necessary it would have to be carried out on the next day, on the 10th, as President Waheed’s term expired on the 11th. However, just hours before polls opened, the Supreme Court decided that the second phase could not take place immediately after, but should be delayed until the 16th. The reason for this is unclear, but it seems related to pressure from Yameen, who asked for more time to campaign. Rather reluctantly, President Waheed requested for an extension of his tenure for one more week. Himself and the Court received widespread criticism within and outside the country for this unexpected move.

Finally, the election took place on the 16th. Somewhat surprisingly, although Yameen had constantly been in second place in the previous attempted elections, he won the runoff with 51.3% of the vote. Ex President Nasheed accepted his defeat.

After the original election was held, it took more than two months and four tries to elect the new president. This turmoil could cast doubt on the stability of the Maldivian democratic institutions, as electoral processes can be interfered with and, even, stopped. At the same time, it can be alleged that, with the possible exception of the last deferral of the contest, interruptions in the electoral process always took place because regulations had not been attended, and they counted with the approval of the Supreme Court. Further, there are no indications that the incumbent president was trying to hold on to power or that he was rigging the ballot.

Maldivians must take their time to sit down and discuss what went wrong in this occasion. Was the time frame too short, so that electoral disputes had to be solved as soon as possible without adequate deliberation by the Supreme Court? Was the fact that it was the country’s second election that arouse suspicions leading everyone to check on and complain about everyone else, obstructing the smoothness of the process? Or was it that the intention to be fully respectful of the law ended up making the process stiff? Were there institutions other than electoral regulations that played against governance in the country? The Maldives second election did end with an elected president, and democratization can be said to have taken root. But there are many issues pending for the country’s third election, scheduled for 2018.

Nov 14, 2013
PEstrada

Economic War

A group of people in Caracas loads a pick-up van with several home appliances, just bought at the new reduced prices ordered by President Maduro (from El Universal).

A group of people in Caracas loads a pick-up van with several home appliances, just bought at the new reduced prices ordered by President Maduro (from El Universal).

Earlier this week, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro ordered the stores of the major retail chain Daka to be “seized” by the government. The reason he argued was that their managers were staging an economic war against the country by artificially inflating the prices of their products, leaving them out of the reach of most Venezuelans and obtaining unacceptably lucrative earnings with their sales. The government “seizure” of the company implied discounts in the price of products, around 50%, removing their managers from their positions (five of them have been arrested), and putting the stores under control of the military. Further, Maduro urged Venezuelans to make the best of this situation and leave all store shelves empty by acquiring the goods they need. In some cases, lines of up to 400 people in front of retail stores have been reported.

The President’s decision to regulate Daka’s prices must be understood as part of a series of political and economic tendencies that have been going on for some time, related to three major problems Maduro has. First, the chronic bad shape of the economy. Although there have been a number of devaluations over the last months, the official exchange rate of the bolivar is still below that of the black market. This scenario is aggravated because the government has the monopoly on the distribution of foreign currency, sold recurrently in auctions. While the reduced official exchange rate could be compensated when bidders are willing to pay more bolivars for one dollar, there are several reports that the government is failing to deliver on time the money thus acquired. It can be thought that most people do not need dollars in their daily lives; however, international trade transactions work in that currency, and businessmen have complained that they cannot meet the paying plans for their suppliers, for which they cannot get the inputs for their production. In addition, without sufficient dollars it is difficult to import products into the country. As the press has been increasingly reporting since this summer, for the average Venezuelan this means scarcity in the most elementary products, such as toilet paper.

The second problem for Maduro is that there is an organized political alternative to Chavismo, the project he belongs to. This alternative is led by the governor of the state of Miranda, Henrique Capriles, and his Democratic Unity Table alliance of parties. In contrast to most of the time in which Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chávez, was in power, when there was a very high party volatility in the sense that the same party rarely appeared twice in a row in the electoral ballot and opposition parties received a rather low share of votes, Capriles has been able to maintain himself as a popular opposition figure. The clearest example of this is how close he has been to the winner of the 2012 and 2013 presidential elections: an 11% gap in the first case (in the previous election the gap between Hugo Chávez and his closest competitor was 25%) and 1.5% in the second case. Whether or not Capriles’ policies make sense or could contribute to ameliorate the situation in the country is beyond the point here; the relevant issue is that people have consistently voted for him. The most immediate consequence of Capriles’ popularity is that the support for Maduro and Chavismo has decreased.

The third problem of Maduro is that, in an environment of economic problems and a popular opposition, there are municipal elections on December 8. The seizure of Daka and the imposition of price discounts can be understood as part of the electoral strategy to improve the chances of a good performance of Maduro’s party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, to secure the position of Chavismo now that Chávez is gone, and to remove the threat posed by Capriles. Some other electoral actions are the proclamation of December 8, this year’s Election Day, as Hugo Chávez’s Day (which implies a flooding of images of Chávez and of reminders of the benefits of Chavismo); the granting of legislative powers to Nicolás Maduro in corruption issues (which could be used to eliminate political adversaries); constant accusations against Capriles’ supporters of benefitting from speculating with prices; or attempting to impose restrictions to the press to talk about the scarcity problem.

The scenario for the December 8 elections is quite uncertain. Some polls taken several weeks ago suggest that Maduro’s party will get the most votes, while others project the contrary result. Anyhow, the tendency seems to be that no political group will receive an overwhelming majority of the electorate’s support, implying that no substantive change in the political scene will take place: economic problems will continue and both Maduro and Capriles will retain their own support bases. Leaving economic and institutional manipulation aside, as long as electoral processes continue to be carried out in a legitimate way they can offer an escape valve to citizens’ concerns about politics. A much more serious problem will emerge if and when, as some local analysts have considered, either of the top political figures describes the situation as a stalemate and a zero-sum game between them.

Nov 10, 2013
PEstrada

FARC: From Weapons to Votes?

Dialogues

A meeting in Havana between FARC and Colombian government representatives, part of the peace negotiation discussions between those two parties (from Agencia de Noticias Nueva Colombia).

This week the peace negotiation process between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) gave a major step. The two parts agreed on the conditions for the process under which the armed group will eventually join the institutional political life, mostly likely as a party. Although major details will be discussed in the future, this seems to be a substantial contribution for the end of the armed conflict in Colombia.

Last year the government of President Juan Manuel Santos opened a discussion table with the FARC in order to stop the fighting between them and to allow the armed group to formally enter into the political system of Colombia. Some of the points in the agenda have already been discussed, such as policies of agrarian development in areas where the FARC are active and, now, the political participation of current guerrilla members. Other issues are pending, including the judicial processing of militia members, the question of illegal drugs, or the assistance to victims of violence. Noteworthy, the dialogues are in an “all or nothing” fashion: either there is an agreement on each of the points on the agenda, or there is no agreement at all. With a deal on the institutional political participation of former FARC members, the two parts can move on to the next point on the schedule.

What is and is not the political agreement about? While it is a long-term goal, it was not decided that the FARC will become a political party and enter the electoral arena. Instead, there was a consensus on two broad issues: guarantees for the political organizations that emerge once the peace accord comes into effect (expectedly, they would be closely related to the FARC) and measures to promote the democratic participation in national and local politics of effectively disenfranchised and marginalized groups (some of whom the FARC argued to fight for, mostly in the rural areas). None of those guarantees and measures have been detailed. Instead, that will be the job of an ad hoc commission in principle formed by representatives of the political parties and scholars. Next to enhancing guarantees and rights of political participation, this commission will also push for the reconciliation among previously conflicting actors, increase transparency and accountability to facilitate citizen participation in public affairs, provide more certainty to electoral processes, and review the electoral system to adapt it to the expected new political environment. As the “all nor nothing” clause states, this commission will begin meeting only if and when a complete agreement is signed by the FARC and the government of Colombia, which some project could happen next year.

At first glance, the agreement on the future political participation of FARC is greatly ambitious, aiming at a reform of the mechanisms of citizen and organizations participation in politics in Colombia. At the same time, this objective is subordinated to a more primordial interest: the political survival of FARC. If and when political parties related to the guerrilla are created and granted access to the electoral process, their persistence will only be attained with a minimum threshold of votes. The protection of participation rights to citizens and the review of vote-counting processes and electoral laws would be to ensure that every person that supports FARC-related organizations has the opportunity to speak up in the ballot and that those votes count.

For sure, such guarantees are required. The FARC is protecting itself and the future organizations that derive from it from an eventual “black hand” of the government. In fact, the dialogue process is being pushed by President Santos because he wants to have the credit of ending with the armed conflict with the guerrilla before the Presidential election in May next year. Rumor has it that if a final agreement has not yet been reached, he will not present himself for re-election. Political speculations aside, no institutional protection for the FARC against the malfeasance of other political actors will ensure its survival unless it has something to offer to the electorate. Next to (or possibly, before) thinking of ways to protect the votes it receives, its related organizations must ask how they are going to get those votes. This is the most important question that remains open if FARC want to thrive once they have access to the formal and electoral arenas in Colombia.

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Founded in 2004, Democracy and Society is a biannual print journal published by the Center for Democracy and Civil Society at Georgetown University. The D&S Blog provides web-only content, including special reports and investigative series, on issues relating to democracy and development.

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