The Unanswered Question

How to describe the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)? Last week, the rebel group March 23 (M23) took over the Eastern city of Goma. In their communiqué they mention this is “the result of a deliberate decision of the Kinshasa regime of refusing to implement the peace agreements negotiated on March 23, 2009 in Goma”. These agreements marked the end of a previous rebellion, many of whose participants take arms again. It appears to be clear that the current rebellion is a continuation of long-time grievances between ethnic groups in the East of DRC, Uganda and Rwanda. But is the takeover of Goma an expected development of this long-lasting conflict or is it just people trying to seize a window of opportunity for personal gains? Is it possible to dig into the true and deep motives of the M23 or its relationship with foreign governments in the region?

First, the genealogy. In 1994, Tutsi rebels took power in Rwanda days after the genocide against this group. Hutus, fearing repression, fled into then Zaire (now DRC). Three years later, Laurent Kabila took power in Zaire by overthrowing Mobutu Sese Seko, who had ruled the country since 1967. Rwanda, whose security forces entered the country to raid Hutus, backed Kabila. However, the next year after taking office Kabila was accused by Rwanda of not acting against Hutus, thus threatening to overthrow him. This provoked a five-year war which involved the DRC (Kabila thus renamed the country), Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe and in which more than three million people may have died. The conflict formally ended in 2003, but clashes between Hutus and Tutsis continued in the east DRC, just next to Rwanda. In 2006 the first elections were held in DRC; Kabila’s son, Joseph, won. Later that year the DRC army officer Laurent Nkunda formed the rebel group National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). This group took over Goma in 2008. The next year an agreement was signed on March 23 between CNDP and DRC to stop the fighting; CNDP members were reintegrated into the army and Nkunda was imprisoned. To some extent this was possible because Bosco Ntaganda rebelled against Nkunda and said he would help Rwanda fight against the Hutu. In April 2012 Ntaganda and some of the soldiers under his command rebelled against the government of the DRC, backed again by Rwanda. The most recent installment in this rebellion is the take over of Goma.

It is very tempting to say that this series of rebellions was guided by a greed for power of their leaders. Nkunda and Ntaganda are sought by the International Criminal Court for crimes committed during the five year war and for recruiting children for their militias. Indeed, the reincorporation of the CNDP to the DRC army served as a kind of insurance that their crimes would not be further investigated and that participants of these rebellions would have jobs in the government in the region of North Kivu, which borders Rwanda and where Goma is. Allegedly, the DRC did not respect this latter part of the agreement as the salaries and positions received by former CNDP members did not correspond to their military ranks. In an interview with Al Jazeera, former UN official Jason Stearns (http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/11/20121126936588395.html) suggests that the reason for the April rebellion was that the government wanted to reduce the benefits received by former CNDP members, most importantly the free accumulation of wealth by means of bribes and smuggling, all protected with patronage networks. The DRC, Stearns continues, expected to apply the strategy of “divide and conquer”: some of the former CNDP members would not be fired, but redeployed to other parts of the country. So, it do seems to be the same old story of a government facing opposition from the group whose privileges are being affected.

Neither group appears to have the sufficient strength or legitimacy as to reach an outcome other than a military gridlock. In their communiqué expressing the motives for the takeover on Goma, the M23 accuses the government of not respecting the truces brokered throughout the year, attacking them by night. Without a question, Kabila’s rule is corrupt and unpopular, and the very same networks which benefited former CNDP members could restrain an effective military move against the rebels. On the other hand, inhabitants of Goma and the surrounding towns are blatantly afraid of the M23 and his leader, nicknamed “Terminator”. In contrast with other insurrections which in one way or another garner the support of the local population, giving them some additional strength or legitimacy, this seems not to be the case of M23. A group feels threatened in its privileges, but apparently cannot do much to defend them after its first move.

A factor that could be decisive is the help Rwanda could give to M23. This country’s Tutsi government has been very close to the rebels in DRC as long as they have collaborated on the attacks against Hutus. It is also tempting to think of a larger involvement of Rwanda in the development of the series of rebellions in DRC, but this conspiracy-theory perspective does not seems to hold for long. In any case, far from harassing the Hutu the question remains of what are the expected gains for Rwanda with it involvement in DRC.

In their communiqué, the M23 has asked the government for the cease of attacks against them, the demilitarization of the airport of Goma, the opening of borders so displaced people can collect their first-need belongings, and an open declaration informing the start of negotiations with them. Authorities have said no. Rebels have said they will not leave their positions until the government accepts their demands. Whatever adjective is used to describe this situation, prospects do not look good for the region.

The Rule of Law in Uganda

This week the international press informed that the Speaker of the Ugandan National Assembly, Rebecca Kadaga, mentioned that as a Christmas gift for all its supporters by the end of the year that chamber was going to pass a law against homosexuality. This is not yet certain, as part of the legislation is still pending; but that can be accelerated. Uganda already prohibits homosexual intercourse. In its original version, the new legislation punished it with the death penalty (apparently this hardening of the sanction is not included in the current version of the law), it will be illegal to promote homosexuals’ rights or to sponsor or abet homosexuality.

There are three possible interpretations, not necessarily exclusive, for the haste in wanting this new law approved. First, that it is a project of Mrs. Kadaga. Some weeks ago she attended the Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting in Quebec City. There, she was confronted by the Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, John Baird, who in a hallway conversation mentioned (the Ugandan newspaper Daily Monitor writes “accused”) the violation of human rights in Uganda, especially against homosexuals. Mrs. Kadaga’s reaction, which earned her to be received with a crowd upon her return at Kampala, was to say that Uganda was no protectorate of Canada, that Uganda was not going to be intimidated by any foreign government on issues of homosexuality, and that she spoke “for the whole of Africa, for the Arab world and Asians”, whose delegates at the Quebec meeting allegedly thanked her for her retort to Mr. Baird, when she defended an anti-homosexuality stance.

Unfortunately, as suggested by Mr. Baird, the move against homosexuality is not restricted to Mrs. Kadaga’s recent commentaries nor it is a fad of the last weeks. The second view on the revival of the anti-homosexual law is that it demonstrates a years-long trend of attacks upon the community in Uganda that promotes sexual liberty, diversity and rights. A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report on the obstacles to civil society development in Uganda (published last August: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/uganda0812ForUpload.pdf) mentions that the pressure on the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) community in the country has been going on for years. A climatic moment was reached in 2009 when the original anti-homosexuality bill was introduced for discussion in Parliament. Ever since then the bill had not been on the legislative debate agenda; this situation could change after what Mrs. Kadaga has been saying. Furthermore, she is supported by Simon Lokodo, a former Catholic priest and now Minister of State for Ethics and Integrity. In an interview with HRW, Mr. Lokodo said that, although the Ministry’s mandate was to fight corruption, he, “empowered to uphold human moral values”, must also fight homosexuality, given that LGBT rights supporters were “on a mission to destroy” Uganda. The HRW document includes an account of harassment against LGBT organizations throughout this entire year.

Allegedly (a third view on the problem), the fight against organizations defending homosexuals’ rights is a tactic of the government to regain some support or to distract attention from other more pressing issues. Its current President, Yoweri Museveni, has been in power for 26 years and faces no limit on the number of terms he can remain in office. Afrobarometer found that his popularity had fallen from 64% in January to 26% in March 2011, after a violently contested reelection and a poorly performing economy. In addition, the Ugandan government failed to promptly respond during the summer this year to an Ebola outbreak, arguing no traditional symptoms like coughing blood were shown by the infected people, which led to at least 16 deaths. The malady has persisted: this week’s news informs of a new Ebola presence in the country, killing three people in the last days.

Notwithstanding which interpretation is used to view the passing of homosexuality laws, it is not difficult to assert that this kind of legislation does little for the Ugandans. Given the governmental environment, there seems to be the sentiment that the discussion, if any, and voting on the anti-homosexuality bill will not face much organized or effective opposition. Bleakly, this might become another case in which the international community was unable to stop such an attack on human rights.

The Trail of your Blood in the Jungle

One of the constant features in Gabriel García Márquez’s fiction set in Colombia is violence. Usually there are two rogue groups, or a guerrilla and the government, harassing the country and provoking fear or resignation in the characters. This is just to put in a long-term context the announcement made two days ago by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia) that, after 50 years of struggle, they would sit down with the government and have peace talks.

John Bailey considers that the fight between the Colombian government and the FARC is a “profound internal war”. In its origins, back in the 1960s, the group was an openly Marxist-Leninist army of peasants that claimed to represent the poor in a class struggle against the rich and powerful of Colombia. It was formed out of a rally of guerrilla organizations that did not accept the amnesty proposed by President General Gustavo Rojas. With its clearly Communist speech, and in the midst of the Cold War, the FARC became a constant target of the Colombian Government. The greater challenge it posed to the state came from the fact that the FARC effectively controlled the rural south of the country, imposing its own law and obtaining revenues from criminal activities, mainly kidnapping and drug trafficking (though they were and are not the only drug trafficking organizations in Colombia). The problem grew when some landowners in the region where the FARC exercised its authority, tired of the government not being able to protect their properties or lives from the attacks of the guerrilla, decided to form a paramilitary group, the Self-Defenses (Autodefensas).

In the long-run, there has not been a unique strategy of the Colombian government against the armed groups in its territory. It can be argued that official actions have frequently oscillated between fierce and decisive military confrontations and attempts of amnesty and integration of those actors into the formal political life. In 1978, President Julio Turbay began an intense fight against drug cartels. Four years later, his successor Belisario Betancourt offered amnesty and freed political prisoners. In 1984, after the Justice Minister was assassinated, the government retook its offensive campaign. A critical point of the fight against the armed groups arrived when Pablo Escobar, leader of the Medellín cartel, was shot when resisting detention. It was expected that this event could diminish the power of the guerrilla and narcos, but in 1993 the President-Elect Ernesto Samper was charged and cleared of receiving money for his campaign from drug cartels.

Evidently, the story so far suggests that the government has not had the necessary capacities to constitute as a serious threat, even less an enemy, of the armed groups. Furthermore, what began as relatively clear distinctions between the FARC, the Self-Defenses and drug cartels began blurring over time as their criminal activities overlapped more and more.

Yet another apparent turning point arrived in the late nineties, with the strategy championed by President Andrés Pastrana. He offered a safe haven in the south of the country for the guerrillas, out of the Army’s reach, and even met FARC’s leader, Manuel Marluanda. And, with the help of the US government, providing military capacity against drug trafficking organizations, Pastrana launched the Plan Colombia in 2000. However, as in previous occasions, the process was truncated. The FARC and drug cartels continued to resort to violence, in spite of the concessions of the government, and public authorities were not yet able to construct the necessary capacities to meet the challenge.

During the first decade of the 21^st century, another dimension was added to the conflict: relations of Colombia with its neighbors. Many times Hugo Chávez, president of Venezuela, has been pointed out as a financer of the FARC activities; even more, in 2009 he urged the Venezuelan army to stand ready in case of an armed conflict with Colombia. A bomb strike by the Colombian government against a FARC border camp also hit a part of Ecuador, estranging the relations. And the extradition to the US of many drug leaders detained in Colombia has raised concerns among the countries in the area about the level of presence, even interference, the United States has there.

Why would the peace talks announced recently be any different? Previous ceasefire calls have been broken. Furthermore, former president Andrés Pastrana mentioned that “Even if the FARC stops fighting today it won’t be the end of violence in Colombia”. A key point is that disarmament or peace are not in the agenda; its topics are drug trade, victims rights, land ownership, FARC participation in politics and how to end the war. It can be alleged that the point is to create a favorable environment for peace, a more modest objective. But antecedents to any negotiations are pessimistic, even gloomy. Perhaps a point in favor of the conflicting parts is that they acknowledge that neither they nor their country can continue to live like that.

Miss Dalloway

Two days ago, Malala Yousufzai, a 14-year old Pakistani schoolgirl, was shot in the head while she was waiting for the bus home after finishing her classes. Two other girls were injured in the incident. The Taliban claimed the authorship of the attack. In their view, Yousufzai had engaged in “obscene” activities. Back in 2008, the group had ordered to close all girls’ schools in the Pakistani district of Swat, close to the border with Afghanistan. Of course, the order was accompanied with violence, and over 100 schools in the area were destroyed. From anonymity, at the age of 11, Yousufzai began writing a blog published by the Urdu-language edition of the BBC website (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19899540). There she tells of the fear that permeated her, her family and her friends because of the Taliban presence in the area and her disappointment since because maybe she would not be able to go back to school. Later in 2009 she began to appear in Pakistani media advocating for female, more precisely for girl, education. In 2011 her government awarded her the National Peace Award, an acknowledgement for people under 18 years of age who made efforts to construct a harmonic society. She even considered eventually forming her own political party, of course dedicated to impulse education. All that exposure (very possibly the fact of the exposure and its substance) was what the Taliban labeled as “obscene” activities which, according to them, deserved the summary death penalty. As of Thursday noon, Yousufzai’s status is reported as critical.

And today it is the first celebration of the International Girls Day. Some information, perhaps not entirely new but striking to see it corroborated, has been shared on this occasion (my main source is the organization Girls not Brides: http://www.girlsnotbrides.org/). Problem number one of girls not being girls is that they are forced to become wives and mothers. Every year, an estimated 10 million girls are married before they turn 18. And every day more than 25,000 girls are robbed from their families. With “luck”, the family can be restituted with poultry or some money in exchange for their daughter. In developing countries, a married teenager is very unlikely to continue studying; very possibly she will have to stay home to nourish her children, to take care of the house or to dedicate her time to household agriculture, while the husband goes someplace else to work. So, it can be argued that a married girl is subtracted from the whole of the society.

But this can put her life at risk: childbirth is the leading cause of death for girls between 15 and 19 years old in the developing world, and babies from mothers under 18 are more likely to die in their first year of life. Moreover, there is a high risk that uneducated married girls become infected with HIV/AIDS or that they suffer domestic violence.

Not all is bleak: girls with secondary education are up to six times less likely to marry as children than uneducated girls. Thus, the link is apparently direct, as more education leads to less marriage, to less risk of losing life at an early age, and to a strengthening of the society. Having this in mind, the United Nations urges governments, civil society organizations, the private sectors, religious groups, and the international community to: enact legislation prohibiting girls to marry under 18 years of age, improve access to primary and secondary education, mobilize the society to change discriminatory gender norms, support married girls with opportunities to pursue their education and to access health and sexual information and services, and “address the root causes of child marriage, including violence against girls and women”.

However, as exemplified by the case of Yousufzai, in some regions the simple mention of wanting more education can prompt violence. A collaborator of the Pakistani paper The Dawn described the situation of Yousufzai as being left “at the mercy” of the Taliban, indirectly accusing the government for her fate. What is more, to “address the root causes of child marriage” goes far beyond enacting legislation, as there are deeper situations related to children marriage, like profound poverty, making some families appreciate some hens and pigs more than their daughter, or the limited scope of some states, which are unable to implement laws already existing. But that is what this celebration aims at: debating how to improve girls’ lives and to let them enjoy their childhood and adolescence.

The Great Dictator

Yesterday, Freedom House published its third annual report on Freedom on the Net (http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2012). The general conclusion is that sophistication is at hand for everyone: for citizens, who try to find more inventive ways to go around obstacles for freedom of speech in the internet, and for governments, who are as well subtly increasing their predatory presence in the virtual world. An additional element: in some countries non-state actors such as organized crime or extremist religious groups are consolidating as censors on the internet.

I cannot say that always, but at least since the French Revolution with Joseph Fouché, Napoleon’s Police Minister, governments have tried to control or at least survey the political opinions and attitudes of its people in order to prevent the emergence of challengers to the established power. When talking about this kind of government task, it is easy to think of Joseph Goebbels, whose great lesson for oppressive rulers was not only to have censorship organs, but to have them systematically working to block the free flow of information, find and punish its producers, and say something to construct a new social reality (or, to speak plainly, to lie).

That is exactly what many governments around the world have been trying to do. In the Freedom House report, four global trends in addition to simply restricting access to information on the internet are identified. First, legislation. Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka require that websites register with the government for accreditation if they are publishing video or audio content (former case) or any information related to the country (latter case). Of course, legislation implies punishment and, in some cases, it has meant years-long prison terms. An extreme case occurred in Pakistan, where one person was detained and sentenced to death for sending “blasphemous” text messages.

The second trend is paid commentators and the intentional spreading of misinformation. One of the most striking issues here is that governments not only pay individual persons, but also public relations companies (as Iran, Bahrain, Russia or Malaysia are doing). Notwithstanding ethical issues, these organizations re-orient anti-government discussions in blogs towards a positive stance to the regime (even altering published posts or impersonating its authors), discredit bloggers or political elite opponents (in a sex-scandal fashion if necessary), or hack anti-government websites.

The third trend is the intensification of physical attacks against government critics. Illegal detentions and tortures in isolated custody are described in China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Vietnam, and Kazakhstan. But authorities are not the sole authors of violence against critics, nor detentions the only method of attack. People can get fired from their jobs, banned from international travel, expelled from universities, beaten by religious extremists, have their families harassed, or killed by the organized crime.

Finally, governments are increasing their technological capacities to intensify internet surveillance. Intelligence agencies have acquired access to details on personal communications, frequently in real time. Of course, this can easily lead to prosecution; in Belarus, Bahrain, and Ethiopia communications records have been used as evidence in interrogations or trials. Moreover, some democratic countries like the United States, the United Kingdom or Mexico have cited national security concerns to increase their surveillance capacities.

The best graded countries (0 points is the best grade, 100 is the worst): Estonia (10), USA (12), Germany (15), Australia (18), and Hungary (19). The worst graded countries: Uzbekistan (77), Syria (83), China (85), Cuba (86), and Iran (90).

As a corollary, there were two events that coincided with the day the review of freedom of speech on the internet was published. First, three Vietnamese bloggers and journalists received an average of 10-year long prison sentences for writing against their national and Chinese governments’ actions. Second, 72 years ago, in 1940, the Look magazine made the first advertisement for Charlie Chaplin’s film The Great Dictator. Governments struggle in trying to block freedom. But people always find their way.