Mentality for Justice

A thug riding a camel during protests in Tahrir Square on February 2, 2011 (from Al-Jazeera).

On Wednesday, the Appeals Court of Egypt confirmed the acquittal of 24 supporters of Hosni Mubarak who were charged with organizing a strike with camels and horses against protestors in  Tahrir Square on February 2, 2011, during the political turmoil that ended the Mubarak’s rule. The attack left 12 dead and tenths of wounded. The acquittal had been dictated by a court in October last year because, it was alleged, witnesses were unreliable due to political grievances against the defendants and evidence was thus was insufficient. Among the trialed was Fathi Sorour, former speaker of the Lower House along other members of the legislative power who, according to an investigation whose results were released in July 2011, hired thugs and ordered them to attack the crowds, killing demonstrators if necessary. Given that the Appeals Court is at the highest level in the Egyptian judiciary system, its decisions are final.

Hence, no sentences will be dictated for the repression of protestors. From a micro perspective, this amounts to the tragedy of the family’s victims, who not only saw their relatives killed or badly injured, but the perpetrators will not be punished. In addition to having lost the provider of income to the household, it could also be that the families live with fear of some kind of retaliation because the attackers are free in the streets. Justice failed them in providing some sense of security.

From a macro perspective, the Court’s decision further calls into question the scope of changes in Egypt towards democracy. Clearly, an effective and impartial administration of justice is one of the most compelling challenges for any country transiting from an authoritarian rule. Judges, prosecutors, and lawyers must interiorize new ways of understanding the law, and must also master new procedures that, if carried out incorrectly, might result in a whole process being annulled. These issues acquire more relevance when trials are about people related to the outgoing authoritarian regime. Seeing them in jail is a strong symbol for new times.

If the process failed because of incompetence of lawyers to present evidence or to follow all the rules of the process, the lack of a sentence may be more understandable, although a sense of impunity will emerge. But the situation in Egypt is even worse. The argument of the Court was that witnesses were unreliable, in spite of the attacks having been recorded in video and seen all around the world. The problem seems not to be only of justice officers being poorly trained, neither of the prevalence of corruption. The issue is something larger, the persistence of an authoritarian mentality in justice administration, implying that top-level officers cannot be sentenced because they might take revenge, because something is owed to them, or for any other reason. This is a major obstacle Egypt must surpass in order to continue its transition to democracy.

A fog of War: Redux

Rubble in Damascus after an air strike (from The New York Times).

The last days the international press has seen a flow of reports related to the alleged utilization of chemical weapons in Syria. However, the information has been contradictory, incomplete, or vague. Some sources say that Bashar Al-Assad’s government has used those weapons against the guerrilla. Others have suggested that it is the rebels who have recurred to them. There is no confirmation on any of those two sets of statements, but some people say that interviews with doctors in the field could be enough to sustain them. For the time being, the Obama administration has no incontrovertible evidence on the use of chemical weapons, and thus the red line that would propel some kind of action has not been yet crossed.

What has been mentioned in the news brings about the same questions that emerge in the prelude of what could become a foreign intervention to protect human rights of a threatened group or to prevent a government from becoming an international menace. Here are some of them: What kind of evidence is needed before a criminal or threatening situation can be confirmed? What kind of confirmation is needed before the option of foreign intervention can be brought to the table? When or why should U.S. interventions be backed by international support? In the case of Rwanda, the decision to act was taken until sufficient evidence had been accumulated to indicate that the massacre had occurred, once it was too late to do anything substantive. In the case of Iraq, photos shown as evidence of Saddam Hussein possessing nuclear weapons were misleading or plain lies. And in almost any single case in the last two decades when the U.S. has decided to act alone it has met the skepticism or disapproval from the international community.

The openness of those questions points out that when crises such as the current one in Syria appear bad decisions can be easily made. Decision-makers (from the analyst in a civilian intelligence agency up to the President) face a lot of uncertainty, hence risk, and are under severe stress. What they decide or suggest doing will have implications on the lives of many people in the country where the intervention might take place and on the lives of U.S. personnel who will participate in the operations. And there is always present the risk of failure, with its multi-faceted consequences: international embarrassment, loss of domestic popular support, attacks from the partisan opposition, or the deterioration of the crisis in the intervened country.

But maybe the most important question that also emerges in these contexts is what has been learned from previous experiences. An editorial in the New York Times urged the Obama administration not to be detained by past mistakes from taking decisive action in Syria. What could be added to that recommendation is that past mistakes should also inform current decision-making processes by teaching decision-makers how to work better under the somewhat normal uncertainty of war environments. In the following days we will see what, if any, are the lessons of U.S. interventions abroad over the last fifteen years.

The Return of the Prince?

Reza Pahlavi, son of the former Shah of Iran (from Le Monde).

This weekend Reza Pahlavi, son of the ousted Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, participated in Paris in the founding meeting of the National Council of Iran (NCI), comprising 18 organizations that have agreed on the necessity to change the regime of the country. In an interview offered to the French newspaper Le Monde, he explained that the short-term goal of the NCI is to have truly democratic elections in Iran, without the government approving the candidates neither controlling the press. With the presidential contest taking place this summer, Pahlavi said the NCI expects to pressure for change by means of “civil disobedience […] and massive strikes in the industrial sector that will bring a total paralysis to the country.”

Pahlavi mentions that he would eventually like to have the role of uniting the opposition and keeping it united. According to him, the NCI already represents a clear step into that direction, as it encompasses organizations from the whole spectrum of the opposition, including monarchists, social liberals, and members of the Green Movement. Under such diversity, he further acknowledges that the next iteration in the transition of the Iranian regime would necessarily be to promote dialogue and tolerance amongst all the factions of the opposition, a requirement for the full democratization of the country.

It is not possible to make a definite assessment on Pahlavi’s plan and on the future of the NCI, but it does not seem to be very optimistic. In his favor, Pahlavi has been an active figure of the opposition in the exile to the Islamic Republic. With relative frequency he participates in interviews to the press or as a keynote speaker in conferences about his country, mentioning the dislike of many Iranians with the current regime and the daily problems they endure, including the incapacity to always bring food to the table. Additionally, trying to win the support the international community, he stresses that a democratic Iran would cease in its ambitions to produce nuclear weapons or in continuously threatening the stability of the region.

However, more likely than not Pahlavi could face a very hard time trying to promote dialogue among all the factions of the opposition. Notwithstanding the support he could have inside Iran, the fact that he is the son of the ruler against which the revolution occurred (before becoming an Islamic regime) crucially plays against him. Furthermore, he is not the only high-profile figure of the opposition in the exile. For instance, Maryam Radjavi is the leader of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, which functions as a quasi-government in the exile and that was one of the key organizations that fought against the Shah. It is unclear what the relation between Pahlavi and Radjavi would be if they sat down in the negotiation table in a post-Ayatollah Iran.

And, even more, there is the little room for any kind of opposition in Iran. With a very tight control over candidate-approval procedures, the media, and practically all political processes, it is very doubtable if democratization is any closer to Iran than it was in the last presidential election of 2009. In any case, Reza Pahlavi will try to continue pushing forward his project. In the upcoming months it will be seen what he exactly does to build a democratic Iran.

Guantánamo Still

Protestors against Guantánamo in front of the White House (from El País).

Yesterday it was informed that a clash between inmates and security forces in the Guantánamo Bay prison occurred. This was a response to the prisoners’ attempts to block security cameras, windows, and other means by which they could be surveilled. “Non-lethal” rounds of ammunition were shot, provoking no “serious injuries” to anyone. Detainees were moved to individual cells, expecting to impede any effort to coordinate further collective actions.

This confrontation happens within the context of a hunger strike that began in February this year in which participate some number between 43 (the official figure) and “the vast majority” (according to the lawyers of some of the detainees) of the 166 prisoners. This began as a protest of the inmates against what they saw as a breach in their privacy when, allegedly, guards entered their cells and seized personal objects, mistreating copies of the Quran in the process. Some detainees have been fed with liquids by force. By individually confining prisoners after yesterday’s clash, it is expected that the hunger strike also loses coordination and can finally be stopped.

Additionally, the fight occurred the day after the Washington Post informed that e-mails used by the defense of detainees had been illegally accessed and used by prosecutors of the prison’s court. For that reason, the trials will be delayed for two months, until security in communications is restored. This builds on other accusations of the government monitoring over prisoners and their lawyers, questioning the legitimacy of the ongoing trials for the detainees.

Needless to say, Guantánamo is one of the heaviest loads of the current U.S. administration. Not only because President Obama has failed to close the prison, as he promised he would do, but also because the continuation of its operations keeps bringing about very serious problems which touch on the commitment of the U.S. to the defense of human rights, the due process, and the rule of law. This further raises the already high concerns on the legitimacy the U.S. has to promote those values abroad. The clash between guards and prisoners of Guantánamo says nothing new. It is just a reminder that the problem is still there, and that not attending it not only maintains it existence, but worsens it.

Israel’s Election, in Perspective

As regular D&S readers may know, Israel does not feature prominently on this blog. Without presuming to speak for my colleagues, past and present, I suspect that this is in part due to the tendency for most Israel debates to gravitate toward a single issue with an already exhaustive reservoir of literature. If the peace process has not produced the highest volume of commentary and analysis of any issue on earth, it is certainly in the top five.

Given this fixation, it is easy to lose track of other important political issues that affect Israeli society. Certainly, there are moments in time when regional political forces conspire to yield opportunities for movement on peace, and these moments warrant reflection. However, the recent Israeli elections, while not transformative in any sense, will have a much stronger chance to dramatically reshape domestic Israeli policy than to energize the listless peace negotiations.

First, let’s start with what the elections were not. They will not lead to a change in the premiership, an office occupied by Benjamin Netanyahu since 2009. Yes, his Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu coalition party suffered a significant loss in combined Knesset seats, dropping more than 25 percent from 42 in the previous government to 31 after January’s poll. However, Netanyahu still received plurality support from the Israeli public, and the larger coalition of conservative and religious parties managed to squeak out the slimmest of majorities (61 seats of 120), keeping Netanyahu safe for the time being.

Nor will the elections produce a change in rhetoric or policy toward Iran. The parties most likely to support such a shift — Labor, Meretz, Hatnuah, and Kadima — will likely be shut out of the governing coalition, a position which affords them limited influence under Israel’s parliamentary system. The primary coalition players will remain the same, including the nationalist Yisrael Beiteinu as well as settler and religious parties, all of whom support Netanyahu’s confrontational approach. If a change does occur, away from incessant saber rattling and toward tempered yet coercive diplomacy, it will result from U.S. pressure, should Obama choose to use his second term as an opportunity to push harder without fear of electoral repercussions.

So, if the previous government’s coalition partners are back, and Netanyahu still sits atop the government, what is different? Taking advantage of a perceptible decline in organized and popular centrist parties, Yesh Atid — a new party led by prominent TV personality, Yair Lapid — surged to a second place finish in the elections, securing 19 seats as well as a powerful negotiating position as Netanyahu forms his new coalition. Lapid wielded a unique brand of campaign politics, spurning issues of security or peace in favor of a populism derived from Israel’s social justice protests that erupted in 2011. Those demonstrations, which brought hundreds of thousands of Israelis out onto the streets of Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and other cities around the country, focused entirely on issues of economic opportunity, unaffordable housing, and the rising cost of living that has severely strained the Israeli middle class. Lapid tapped into those frustrations, crafting Yesh Atid as a party of middle class Israelis who need a government that understands their daily struggle; a party that would see Israel’s primary existential threat not as a belligerent foreign government, but as the suffocating economic conditions that threaten to sap Israel of its entrepreneurial initiative and send more of its young talent overseas.

However, Lapid’s agenda did not end with economic prescriptions. He sought out one of the more divisive domestic issues that has frustrated many Israelis for decades: mandatory military service. Historically, while most Israelis were conscripted into the military after high school, Orthodox Jewish youth received unofficial deferments from such service, a practice that was eventually codified in the Tal Law of 2001 and expanded a year later. In early 2012, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled the law unconstitutional, setting off a debate on how to proceed after the law reached its natural expiration date later that summer. Ultimately, the government allowed the Tal Law to expire without any action to implement a broader solution, opening up Orthodox communities for potential enlistment, but still allowing the military to determine its needs before recruiting large numbers of young religious men.

The importance of military service, and its exemptions, extends into other sensitive areas of Israeli domestic policy. The military provides young Israelis with an extensive and durable social network that facilitates economic opportunities and business relationships later in life. In effect, service creates social and economic cache. This is important, since another area of increasing contention involves state welfare support for Orthodox communities. Most individuals in these communities do not work, choosing instead to study at Yeshivas and focus exclusively on religious pursuits — a lifestyle made possible by extensive government welfare. Many Israelis resent this policy. Yet, if it were revoked, Orthodox communities would have a difficult time pursuing productive employment, primarily because most have never secured entry into the powerful network that emerges from military service. If Israelis want to change state welfare policy toward Orthodox communities in the long run, the thinking goes, requiring universal conscription must be the first step. And as the social justice protests from 2011 point out, there are many Israelis who fault the government for what they believe is an unjust distribution of state resources, particularly with regard to state welfare.

Lapid campaigned on these issues. But now, the question is how his strong electoral showing might affect government behavior. Most believe that Yesh Atid will join the governing coalition, which would significantly strengthen what would otherwise be a precariously thin one-seat majority. Netanyahu would certainly prefer a stronger coalition, yet what he would gain in personal job security might be countered by a loss in absolute control over the agenda. Lapid will reportedly demand the Foreign Ministry for himself, as well as the education, justice, and housing ministries for Yesh Atid. He may also seek to chair the finance committee in the Knesset, a powerful position that would grant him significant influence over welfare policy, among other sensitive issues. Lapid has thus far secured a verbal agreement on universal military service from Habayit Hayehudi, a nationalist party led by Netanyahu’s former chief of staff and staunch settler supporter, Naftali Bennett. If other reports are true that Lapid and Bennett will present a united front for participation in the coalition, it could significantly lower Netanyahu’s leverage in negotiations. Without Bennett — whose party secured a fourth place finish with 12 seats — Netanyahu’s right-leaning coalition shrinks to 49 seats, well below the majority threshold. His options at that point would be quite limited, and might even lead to a greater loss of agenda control if he needs to buy the support from left-leaning parties like Labor, Hatnuah, or Kadima.

So, Lapid is in a strong position to extract concessions and fulfill his campaign promises, should he choose to do so. However, much remains unknown about Lapid, the politician. By most accounts, he is a free-market capitalist who leans to the right on economic issues. Yet, those instincts did not prevent him from striking populist tones during the campaign. Further, his party list consists of individuals from all over the ideological spectrum. Yesh Atid’s number two candidate, Shai Piron, is a leader in the settler movement. Yael German, the third candidate on the list, was a long-standing member of the liberal Meretz party. Meir Cohen, the number four, served as a small-town mayor under the Yisrael Beiteinu banner, before switching his allegiance to Yesh Atid. Yisrael Beiteinu, of course, was the creation of far-right nationalist Avigdor Lieberman, whose bombastic and anti-Arab rhetoric led to international condemnation when Netanyahu appointed him as foreign minister in 2009.

In short, it’s an eclectic party, led by a man with a strong reputation for building coalitions regardless of ideology. It’s also the sort of party that seems to be built to win political battles more than significant policy changes in a given ideological direction. What sort of battles might these be? Well, the premiership of the Israeli government, for one. Lapid is a rising star, and his personality is not one that will likely be content serving under Netanyahu. But it would be difficult to make a run at Netanyahu’s job while serving within the coalition government. That sort of political maneuvering is typically conducted from the opposition, and should Lapid set his ultimate goal as the premiership rather than fulfilling his immediate campaign promises, he may step away from the coalition and let Netanyahu flounder with an unstable majority. Some reports indicate that he has already hinted at this possibility, confidently telling aids that he could replace Netanyahu in 18 short months.

This election’s significance, therefore, has little to do with security or peace, nor with any supposed resurgence of center-left Israeli politics. Rather, it has created a powerful new political actor, whose ideological disposition runs second in importance to his ability to forge disparate coalitions and generate popular support. Lapid now has the opportunity to use his significant political capital. Whether or not he joins the coalition government will not only signal how he intends to do so, but will also speak to the prospects for real change in domestic policy on some of Israel’s most sensitive issues.