The Rules of Engagement

On Sunday it was reported that the Tunisian government faced a serious crisis, threatening its existence. In the Constituent Assembly election of October 2011, the Islamist party Ennahda won 89 (41%) of the 217 seats. Under this scenario of relative majority, it decided to form a coalition government with the other organizations that won the largest share of the votes and that were willing to collaborate with it, both with a center-left secular orientation: Congress for the Republic, the second party with the most seats (29, 13% of all the legislators), and Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties, fourth place (with 26 representatives, 12% of the total). The base for this tripartite deal was the distribution of positions within the Assembly and the cabinet.

Congress for the Republic made the move. Its Secretary General, Mohammed Abbou, gave one week to the Ennahda government to remove the Foreign Affairs and the Justice Ministers from their positions due to their bad performances (in addition, the Foreign Affairs Minister is son-in-law of a top Ennahda figure) and to have them replaced by independent ministers. If the party fails to do so, Abbou threatened to withdraw the three Congress for the Republic Ministers from the cabinet (headed by the Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali, Secretary General of Ennahda) and suggested that the President, Moncef Marzouki, also member of the party, could resign.

So far, there is no clue on whether Prime Minister Jebali will shuffle his cabinet. However, on Monday, Marzouki offered a speech denying that he would quit (although the press reported that one of his advisors had left his office). In addition, he asked for patience in trying to bring order back into the economy, in reference to the violence that has erupted because of price increases.

On the one hand, the call of Congress for the Republic can be read as a signal of the incapacity of Prime Minister Jebali and Ennahda to finish drafting the constitution and implement the policies needed. On a gloomy vision, the Tunisian case adds up to the cumbersome post-Arab Spring environments that other countries have met. An implication is that, as in those nations, the initial optimism faded away in the face of reality just two years after the ousting of Ben Ali. On the other hand, but building on the previous point of view, Tunisia is encountering problems not so different to those of, for instance, Belgium, where the parties were not able to agree on the composition of the government and effectively no one ruled the country for more than a year.

“Threats” to the Prime Minister, cabinet reshuffling, and distribution of positions in the cabinet are normal features of parliamentarian regimes with a plurality of parties. Of course, it can be argued that the Belgian state is far more capable and consolidated than the Tunisian. But it must be also acknowledged that inter-party negotiations are common, even desirable, in a democratic political system. Clearly there are still many issues pending for Tunisia. Learning the practices of democracy is a lengthy process, with no guaranty of success. As long as rules of the game are respected, making cabinet positions instead of the streets the place for political struggles, democracy seems not to be the issue in dispute.

Between the Past and the Future

Yesterday, two countries decided to look back to their respective pasts and make a revision of them. First, the French President, François Hollande, acknowledged during an official visit to Algiers the “sufferings” of the Algerian people during the colonial rule (that ended with the Independence War from 1954 to 1962), which he characterized as “deeply unfair and brutal”. Second, the Argentinian judiciary sentenced the first civilian officer for crimes against humanity during the military rule between 1976 and 1983. Jaime Smart, Minister of Government of the Buenos Aires Province, was found guilty of ordering 57 illegal detentions and a murder.

When these kind of statements are made one question that pops into the mind is what purpose they might serve. Firstly, they are not an exaggeration, but most certainly justified. Indeed the French rule over Algeria as a colony and the behavior of French troops during the Independence War were heinous (especially on the War, Franz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth offers a clear account of the oppression on the Algerians). As well, it seems to be true that when judging military rules, not only in Argentina, the collaboration of civilians is many times overlooked, tending to focus on the abuses committed just by members of the Army.

Secondly, this kind of revisionist exercises has the goal to help societies coming to terms with themselves, particularly after a divisive and confrontationist context. In France, no President had spoken like that of the colonial rule. Now, Hollande even promised to improve the issuing of visas to Algerians who seek job opportunities in France. In Argentina, some people could feel that the change of regime would not be complete and that democracy had not taken root until the people who committed abuses have faced the justice system.

But why until now? When there is an implicit risk of awakening old grievances, it is not easy to confront the past. Perhaps that cost is erased with the symbolic and pragmatic gains that those statements or actions can bring about. It is not possible to change the interpretation of history with a speech, or to condemn a regime with one more imprisonment, especially when people who suffered are still alive. However, victims can feel there is some positive change underway or justice being arbitrated. And if that represents the maintenance of support for a government or prevents some problem from arising, for the time being no one gets harmed and a win-win situation appears to emerge: “we are sorry for the past, and the future will be better.” The Algerians and Argentinians will say if that was ultimately true.

The Opposition and the Desert

Last Saturday, December 1, Kuwait had Parliamentary elections for the second time this year. The previous exercise was in February, but the Court ruled it invalid because the original move of Emir Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah of dissolving the Parliament (the fourth time since 2006; the main reason for dismissing the chamber is deadlocks and contestation to the Emir’s propositions and actions) was unconstitutional in the first place. As well, the Court ordered the previous Parliament, less confrontational to the government, to be reinstated. In protest, members of the opposition resigned their seats, arguing that the decision of the Court was unacceptable and that the country should adopt a new Parliamentary system. Now, the Emir appoints the government; opposition groups want the legislature to be the origin of the government. In the end, the Emir dissolved the Parliament again two months ago and elections were called for.

The opposition put itself at a crossroads. The day before the election in Kuwait people, mainly youngs, went to the streets under the banner “National Dignity”. The goal was to protest against the electoral system, which was modified with little anticipation before the polls reducing from four to one the number of votes for each person. This was expected to reduce the chances of both the opposition being represented and of parliamentary deadlocks persisting. One way in which the protestors asked to demand changes in the electoral system was by boycotting it. Implicitly, the government acknowledged their success by saying that the turnout was 43% (in the February election it had been over 60%). The organizers of the demonstration said the figure was in reality 28%. In addition, they argue that the Parliament is illegal, because (following their numbers) as just above one quarter of the electorate voted it does not represent the majority of the people.

Former opposition members of Parliament and local analysts agreed that the Parliament, regardless of its electoral or constitutional legality, is effectively going to be under control of the government because just its supporters won seats. Under this scenario, the Emir might have achieved his goal of reducing confrontations in the legislative. The crossroads for the opposition comes from the fact that it has made its point clear: the system is seriously flawed (it can be criticized that they achieved this pushing the flaws to the extreme, so they could show themselves better). However, this gain now means that they have lost an at least symbolic position from which to make themselves represented in government. I am not arguing against the strategy they followed; from their assessment it might have been the only option available. The question that appears is: how can they push for changes from the outside of the system? Nonviolent resistance strategies can be at hand. But their use under a repressing government has the risk of generating more friction within the political system, gradually increasing the level of confrontation. As other countries in the region have demonstrated, where that path ends is anything but certain.

The Return of the King?

Yesterday Mohammed Morsi became the man of the hour thanks to his role in brokering a cease-fire between Israel and Gaza after more than 150 fatal victims. Foreign policy usually is a good asset for a new government (Morsi took office five months ago), even more if it substantially contributes to peace efforts in neighboring countries. Some theories suggest that foreign policy is a reflection of domestic policy: coherent, strategic (with clear means and objectives) and successful actions towards the exterior imply that the government has the capacity to create internal consensus around them and to effectively rally the resources to implement them. Otherwise said, if you can do things for the outside it means the inside is under control. Notwithstanding the circumstances which actually led Morsi’s brokering to succeed (like the international and media pressure on Israel), it just does not seem that everything is under control at home. Rather, Egyptians are calling for a massive demonstration against the way Morsi is trying to keep things at bay.

Some months ago, Morsi acquired de facto legislative powers after the Supreme Court dissolved the Parliament and he, who had just taken office, sent back to the barracks the Council of Generals who tried to take over budget planning and legislative authority.  And yesterday, he issued a decree by means of which he sacked the Attorney General, ordered the retrial of those who were acquitted by the Court for the murder and murder attempts of protestors (including Hosni Mubarak) during the protests last year in January and February. The decree also prohibits the Court from challenging any decision taken by Morsi since he took office. One of those decisions was also made yesterday: the Constitutional Assembly will not be dissolved in two months’ time if it does not complete the draft of the new Constitution within that period.

On the one hand, there is Morsi’s and the official interpretation of this decree. As expected, all the moves are said to protect the revolution. The officials who repressed the Egyptians during the Tahrir Square protests last year will not go unpunished. The task of writing a new Constitution is arduous, and the rhythm of work of the Assembly does not necessary match deadlines. And, in the end, many members of the Court were in a close relationship with Mubarak, reason for which its impartiality is not guaranteed. Without going through the details of any of those assumptions, it can be granted that Morsi has some points. However, the protestors have a larger counter-argument: with his decree, Morsi is overriding the Supreme Court, having no checks or balances on his own power and actually acquiring executive, legislative and judiciary authorities. To put it differently, the rule of law is in a hiatus. Not surprisingly, many protestors have begun to call him “the new Pharaoh”.

It is not new to witness leaders assuming legislative and even judiciary powers during times of turmoil. In one of her first actions as President of the Philippines, Corazón Aquino assumed executive and legislative powers until the new Constitution was drafted and approved and a new Congress was elected. Her centralized rule lasted around a year, after which all the conditions set to return to Constitutional order were met. During that year Aquino used her powers to reorganize power structure in the country, correcting Marcos’ legacy of centralization. With the new Constitution a democratic system was in place. Just after the end of the war against Pakistan, accusations against her for fraud in the election that took place four years before, and episodes of violence backing the Court’s highly controversial ruling that she was guilty of fraud and must step down, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi asked the President to approve a state of emergency. This period lasted 21 months, during which political opponents were harassed and put in jail, freedom of speech and civil liberties were suspended. The emergency ended with elections which Gandhi’s party and she herself lost; democratically, she stepped down.

Of course, the conditions under which the suppression of the separation of powers in the Philippines and India are different between themselves and in comparison to Egypt. The point of those examples was to illustrate that a severe centralization of power does not necessarily represent the definite dismissal of democracy. However, the reference to those cases does not necessarily mean that the same thing will happen in Egypt. It is not possible at this moment to even try to outline outcome scenarios in the short term for that country. Now even more than in other moments, the political developments of Egypt are stochastic. There are too many variables involved and several unanswered questions.

For instance, one of the most important ones refers to the democratic attitude of the Muslim Brotherhood. By means of its party, Freedom and Justice, it has the majority of the Constitutional Assembly (members of the other parties which got relatively few seats in the Assembly acknowledged that the Muslim Brotherhood had more political experience and thus campaigned better, reasons for which they got the largest share of the vote). Furthermore, Morsi is one of its members. The partial draft of the Constitution released in early October did not touch on questions of the separation of powers or the role of the military in the new government. In addition, it was stipulated that Islam is the state religion, that the Sharia is the principal source of legislation, and that gender equality would be limited because of its interference with the religious law. Thus, in reaction to Morsi’s decree, protestors set fire to the Freedom and Justice offices. For the time being, it is not possible to assert that the Pharaoh is actually back. However, his shadow is becoming visible.

Don’t be quiet on the Eastern Front

Though I have never witnessed first-hand an armed conflict, I guess one of the most accurate accounts of war is George Orwell’s Homage to Catalonia. This is for the simple reason that the author clearly depicts two elements that very well may be present in this kind of confrontation: the persistence of a sensation of the absurd and total confusion. Young teenagers, who did not take seriously the situation they were in, were sent to the Republican front without any training in the use of weapons. On a street in Barcelona, a shooting from a building prompted other shootings, until someone almost miraculously realized that everyone was on the same side. I missed a third element: any moral justification for the armed conflict tends to dissipate in the midst of all the killings and abuses committed by all parties involved.

It is more or less clear what is needed to win a civil war: maintain unity among the groups fighting on your side, secure a source of income, keep a good relation with international contacts, exercise your authority in the controlled territories, and if your goal is to establish a democracy, try to behave democratically, especially with the population and POW. Yesterday, the international press reported that the opposition to Bashar Al-Assad has signed an agreement to form a united group called the Syrian National Coalition (SNC). In principle, this is a good signal. According to the checklist, this will contribute to preventing splits among the opposition actors and can be accounted for as democratic behavior. Does this mean that President Al-Assad’s regime is close to its end and democracy is paving its way into Syria? Given the confusion and absurdity in general, along with the abuses committed by the opposition, the former might be a little closer and the latter rather not. Or, being more realistic, we just cannot tell.

First, the SNC will have to settle with the Syrian National Council, which claims to be the head of the opposition, who will be the head of the rebel forces. A key difference is that the SNC seems to be backed by the United States, a kind of support that the National Council did not receive. In any case, some very important questions still must be addressed: Will the Council be granted representation at the SNC? Will the SNC take any action in relation to the Council (absorb it, erase it, ignore it)? Are the grassroots members of the Council, the people using their weapons, expected to recognize the authority of the SNC?

Second, the newly elected member of the SNC, George Sabra, mentioned in an interview that the idea to form the Coalition was “older […] than any other initiative”. Next, he added that “no opposition group should be placed under the banner of another”. If the words of Mr. Sabra are taken literally, it can be speculated that one of the reasons for which the SNC took so long to form after the confrontations began in September last year was that the opposition groups were trying to identify some line along which they could unite. However, as history has shown over and over again, to rally against a government is a different thing from coming together to form a government. Issues pending: What will the relation of an eventual after-Al-Assad government will be with Islam? What kind of electoral system will they establish? What will the role of combatants be after the current President falls?

Thirdly, next to trying to unify the political and presumably military faces of the opposition, it is not yet clear what will the internal objectives of the SNC be and how they plan to achieve them. Some weeks ago, bases of the Syrian National Council began an effort to organize the population of a village that had been seriously affected by bombings. The purpose was to try to clean up the debris and determine which buildings could be used as shelters during an attack. This is a good sign as it shows that the Council was getting in touch with the population of affected zones and helping them to recover from the damage of the battles. In other words, they were demonstrating themselves as an authority. Another way in which they created it was by carrying out prisoner summary executions in another village. One reading of these events is that the Council is hypocritical and double-faced. Another is that it is too diverse and that its central figures are just unable to control all of its members. The SNC must also be prepared to deal with its internal contradictions. Has an organizational structure been designed so that the orders of the top reach the people on the bottom? What does it expect to do in the areas it controls? Will some kind of policy (like house reconstruction or food and water provision) be implemented in their territories? What are, even if rudimentary, the mechanisms to keep track and record of the execution of instructions and ensure some form of accountability? How will the civilian and military command of the SNC be shared?

The most likely outcome of keeping silence in respect to some of those questions is that, in the case of the fall of Al-Assad, the strife continues at increased levels (remember, for example, what happened to the Russian interim government after the Czar was sacked out of the Palace). Tragically, to openly discuss them can lead to underscoring differences among all the members of the opposition and bringing about the coexistence of two conflicts: against Al-Assad and among his opponents. But it can also be the contrary: that a frank deliberation of those points contributes to saying farewell to arms after Al-Assad and to giving more chances to democracy. Hopefully, we will see that soon.