A fog of War: Redux

Rubble in Damascus after an air strike (from The New York Times).

The last days the international press has seen a flow of reports related to the alleged utilization of chemical weapons in Syria. However, the information has been contradictory, incomplete, or vague. Some sources say that Bashar Al-Assad’s government has used those weapons against the guerrilla. Others have suggested that it is the rebels who have recurred to them. There is no confirmation on any of those two sets of statements, but some people say that interviews with doctors in the field could be enough to sustain them. For the time being, the Obama administration has no incontrovertible evidence on the use of chemical weapons, and thus the red line that would propel some kind of action has not been yet crossed.

What has been mentioned in the news brings about the same questions that emerge in the prelude of what could become a foreign intervention to protect human rights of a threatened group or to prevent a government from becoming an international menace. Here are some of them: What kind of evidence is needed before a criminal or threatening situation can be confirmed? What kind of confirmation is needed before the option of foreign intervention can be brought to the table? When or why should U.S. interventions be backed by international support? In the case of Rwanda, the decision to act was taken until sufficient evidence had been accumulated to indicate that the massacre had occurred, once it was too late to do anything substantive. In the case of Iraq, photos shown as evidence of Saddam Hussein possessing nuclear weapons were misleading or plain lies. And in almost any single case in the last two decades when the U.S. has decided to act alone it has met the skepticism or disapproval from the international community.

The openness of those questions points out that when crises such as the current one in Syria appear bad decisions can be easily made. Decision-makers (from the analyst in a civilian intelligence agency up to the President) face a lot of uncertainty, hence risk, and are under severe stress. What they decide or suggest doing will have implications on the lives of many people in the country where the intervention might take place and on the lives of U.S. personnel who will participate in the operations. And there is always present the risk of failure, with its multi-faceted consequences: international embarrassment, loss of domestic popular support, attacks from the partisan opposition, or the deterioration of the crisis in the intervened country.

But maybe the most important question that also emerges in these contexts is what has been learned from previous experiences. An editorial in the New York Times urged the Obama administration not to be detained by past mistakes from taking decisive action in Syria. What could be added to that recommendation is that past mistakes should also inform current decision-making processes by teaching decision-makers how to work better under the somewhat normal uncertainty of war environments. In the following days we will see what, if any, are the lessons of U.S. interventions abroad over the last fifteen years.

Is There an Emerging Military Drone Complex?

MQ-9 Reaper in Afghanistan (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Brian Ferguson)

We often think about approaches toward security as a matter of government policy, set by those in executive or appointed positions and implemented by career civil servants at the Department of State, Department of Defense, or the many intelligence agencies. And to a certain extent, this is true. Look no further than Iraq, or Afghanistan, or Iran. Military engagements, by law, are initiated and led under executive authority. Strategic and diplomatic goals often change with administrations. Choices about resources — particularly funding priorities within the various bureaucracies for the military, intelligence, and foreign aid — all carry consequences and must be approved by the president, even if the budgets themselves are first passed by Congress. Policy, in a bureaucratic sense, begins at the top and flows downward.

Yet, it is equally true that policy choices are constrained, even manipulated, by forces that flow upward. This is most visible (and self-evident) in the world of domestic policy, where powerful lobbies combine with regular elections and grassroots mobilization to shape government behavior. But is the same true in foreign affairs? When Barak Obama entered office in 2009, and immediately recalibrated U.S. policy toward Iraq, Afghanistan, terrorism, Iran, Israel, Russia, and a host of other issues, how many viewed those choices as anything other than a reflection of party ideology, or perhaps — cynically — derived from a reading of public opinion?

This frame adds to the intrigue surrounding Obama’s policy on military drones. Unlike every other significant area of security or diplomacy, Obama has not only continued his predecessor’s practice on targeted killings using unmanned aerial vehicles, he has escalated it in stunning fashion. For Democrats and liberals, the practice betrays the fundamental principles that they applaud elsewhere in Obama’s foreign policy approach. The New America Foundation keeps a running database of drone activity from 2004 to the present, with figures on strikes and casualties in Pakistan and Yemen. In a comprehensive report released last month, the Council on Foreign Relations also provided a detailed account of the evolution of drone policy and practice. The trend is clear. In only half the time, President Obama has approved seven times as many drone strikes in non-battlefield environments than President George W. Bush.

Much of the recent debate over Obama’s drone policy has centered around two primary issues: their tactical and strategic value in the field, and the concerns over accountability, oversight, and abuse. Do drones provide better operational flexibility and responsiveness? Do they achieve a strategic security objective? Does the combination of negligible risk to U.S. operators and distance from the destruction on the ground create a moral hazard? These are all worthy of exploration. But they each start from the basic premise that drone policy is, in fact, set at the highest levels of government for reasons that emerge from a traditional security calculus.

Here is a different question. Have the drone wars of recent years given birth to a drone lobby? And if so, is it possible that its influence has been magnified by domestic political events? There is little doubt that drone design and development has emerged as a lucrative niche within the broader industry of military contractors. Like any industry that survives off of government resources, it has a vested interest in advocating vigorously for continued funding and long-term commitments. Yet, unlike producers of other military hardware — tanks, planes, ships — drone manufacturers offer something that the military desperately needs: a highly efficient, comparatively inexpensive weapon in an era of shrinking budgets and force reductions. With the political environment as it is, DOD officials cannot rely upon typical funding or procurement strategies of the past. This, combined with what many assume will be an aversion to large-scale interventions for quite some time, has likely created a situation where the quintessential light-footprint weapon serves an even more useful budgetary purpose. Deficit politics, and the subsequent dysfunction we’ve seen with artificial crises and looming sequestration, have made drones an even more seductive weapon of choice, and perhaps emboldened the growing industry of producers to push for more contracts. For better or worse, the assumed benefits of drone warfare have hardened into conventional wisdom, fueled in part by economic and political considerations that begin far below executive-level decision-making.

I don’t mean to undersell the relevance of strategic debates over how to best address our evolving security challenges. In fact, that is exactly the topic of our upcoming issue in Democracy & Society (shameless plug…don’t miss the chance to submit a piece!). But it is important to remember that domestic political forces can influence foreign policymaking in unexpected ways, far beyond public opinion. As much as we like to think that policies on issues as vital as security begin and end with professional assessments from the experts, incentives matter. On a purely economic and political level, drones provide numerous benefits for a wide array of actors. That, unfortunately, can carry much more weight than the moral or strategic arguments that have thus far failed to gain much traction during Obama’s tenure in office.

Reminder — Call for Papers: Reassessing Security Threats and the Future of Intervention

Interested in international security, terrorism, failed states, or the evolving policies toward all three? If so, check out Democracy & Society’s latest call for papers. We’re looking for creative and well-argued submissions on all of these topics. Much more info below. Don’t miss this chance to get involved!

Democracy & Society, Volume 10, Issue 2

We are seeking well-written, interesting submissions of 1500-2000 words on the themes below, including new publications, summaries and/or excerpts of recently completed research, and works in progress. Submissions for the issue are due Friday, March 1st. Please email all papers to democracyandsociety@gmail.com. Click here for a PDF version of this page.

Reassessing Security Threats and the Future of Intervention

World powers are reassessing exigent threats to international security. After a decade of aggressive approaches to terrorism and state-building, we are now debating the circumstances that demand external intervention. The form of intervention is changing as well, with new methods emerging for military engagement, development, and diplomacy. Are we moving toward a new consensus on what constitutes a security threat and how international actors respond to them, or are we in a period of uncertainty around these issues? What problems may emerge from “light footprint” approaches that use advanced technology and quick, targeted actions? Under what conditions are failed states security concerns that require external intervention? What are the implications for development efforts?

-       Shifting Tactics, or Priorities? The U.S. has taken a more restrained approach toward recent conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Mali, despite the presence of al-Qaeda-linked militants and other Islamist extremists. What does this say about the threat that these and similar groups still pose to the U.S. and its allies? Is terrorism still the highest security priority for Western powers, and if not, what is taking its place? How do we define security threats going forward, and what sort of policies or interventions do they demand?

-       Technology. As seen in Libya, Pakistan, and Yemen, targeted attacks using advanced technologies, such as drones, are a new option to address security threats. Are these isolated cases, or do they represent a new paradigm for the use of force? Do the potential costs associated with the use of drones and other advanced weapons outweigh the potential benefits from a “light footprint” approach? What are the dangers of waging war by remote control?

-       The Impact of State Failure on International Security. In 2003, former President George W. Bush said: “Failed states spread instability and terror that threatens us all.” Is that assessment still true today? If so, should intervening countries pursue political and economic goals of state-building or should they focus more narrowly on security? Which of these options would lead to better security outcomes, both for the intervening actors and the countries in question?

-       Civilians at War. What practical and moral questions arise from the expanded role of civilian actors in military engagements, such as the CIA and private contractors, who often conduct targeted killings without significant oversight and accountability? Is military outsourcing a wise policy, or are there negative consequences that we have failed to consider?

-       The Decentralization of Intervention? As the balance of power shifts throughout the international community, is there a vacuum of responsibility in responding to security threats? Is this leading to regional responses that are ad hoc, disorganized, or less effective? What are the implications for future interventions and development efforts?

Please email submissions to democracyandsociety@gmail.com. For additional information, please visit www.democracyandsociety.com or contact Andrea Murta, Josh Linden, or Kate Krueger at democracyandsociety@gmail.com.

Reminder — Call for Papers: Reassessing Security Threats and the Future of Intervention

A brief reminder about our upcoming issue for Democracy & Society. We are exploring an ongoing debate within the security community, one that has surged onto national headlines as President Obama nominates new members of his foreign policy team. Are international security threats changing, or has there simply been a shift in perception? What methods of intervention do they demand in response? We hope that you will participate in the issue!

Democracy & Society, Volume 10, Issue 2

We are seeking well-written, interesting submissions of 1500-2000 words on the themes below, including new publications, summaries and/or excerpts of recently completed research, and works in progress. Submissions for the issue are due Friday, March 1st. Please email all papers to democracyandsociety@gmail.com. Click here for a PDF version of this page.

Reassessing Security Threats and the Future of Intervention

World powers are reassessing exigent threats to international security. After a decade of aggressive approaches to terrorism and state-building, we are now debating the circumstances that demand external intervention. The form of intervention is changing as well, with new methods emerging for military engagement, development, and diplomacy. Are we moving toward a new consensus on what constitutes a security threat and how international actors respond to them, or are we in a period of uncertainty around these issues? What problems may emerge from “light footprint” approaches that use advanced technology and quick, targeted actions? Under what conditions are failed states security concerns that require external intervention? What are the implications for development efforts?

-       Shifting Tactics, or Priorities? The U.S. has taken a more restrained approach toward recent conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Mali, despite the presence of al-Qaeda-linked militants and other Islamist extremists. What does this say about the threat that these and similar groups still pose to the U.S. and its allies? Is terrorism still the highest security priority for Western powers, and if not, what is taking its place? How do we define security threats going forward, and what sort of policies or interventions do they demand?

-       Technology. As seen in Libya, Pakistan, and Yemen, targeted attacks using advanced technologies, such as drones, are a new option to address security threats. Are these isolated cases, or do they represent a new paradigm for the use of force? Do the potential costs associated with the use of drones and other advanced weapons outweigh the potential benefits from a “light footprint” approach? What are the dangers of waging war by remote control?

-       The Impact of State Failure on International Security. In 2003, former President George W. Bush said: “Failed states spread instability and terror that threatens us all.” Is that assessment still true today? If so, should intervening countries pursue political and economic goals of state-building or should they focus more narrowly on security? Which of these options would lead to better security outcomes, both for the intervening actors and the countries in question?

-       Civilians at War. What practical and moral questions arise from the expanded role of civilian actors in military engagements, such as the CIA and private contractors, who often conduct targeted killings without significant oversight and accountability? Is military outsourcing a wise policy, or are there negative consequences that we have failed to consider?

-       The Decentralization of Intervention? As the balance of power shifts throughout the international community, is there a vacuum of responsibility in responding to security threats? Is this leading to regional responses that are ad hoc, disorganized, or less effective? What are the implications for future interventions and development efforts?

Please email submissions to democracyandsociety@gmail.com. For additional information, please visit www.democracyandsociety.com or contact Andrea Murta, Josh Linden, or Kate Krueger at democracyandsociety@gmail.com.

Hot Spot: North Africa

In an interview with USIP, our director Daniel Brumberg “considers the potential for al-Qaida’s growth in  North Africa, and the challenge this poses to U.S. relationships with  the new, post-conflict governments in the region”. Check it out below:

How do you assess the regional implications of the January 16 seizure by radical Islamists of a gas field along the border area of  Algeria and Libya—as well as the resulting (and horrific) casualties?  And what are the implications for the “Arab Spring” uprisings, which are now in their third season?

Well, let’s take those one at a time. Mokhtar Belmokhtar — the  Jihadist whose forces led the attack on the Algerian gas facility — declared that his actions were meant as a rebuke to France for its  military intervention in Mali. But Belmokhtar’s assault was surely  planned well before Mali’s acting government invited France to  intervene. So, this much is clear: in a strategic sense, the attack on  the Algerian gas facility represents an effort by a regional off-shoot  of al-Qaida to use the northern Mali conflict as a lever to amplify  al-Qaida’s violent message throughout the Maghreb.

Would the makeup of the group that led the assault in Algeria illustrate your point?

Yes, for sure. The attackers hailed from the wider region: only three were Algerian, and the rest came from Mali, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya,  Niger, and Mauritania—as well as other countries. Their goal is to  exploit the political upheavals to expand and solidify their bases of  operations, and in so doing, put the U.S. and its Western allies on  notice that regardless of the particular governments that have emerged  via the Arab Spring uprisings, the future lies with al-Qaida and its  allies. It is very likely that these groups want to derail the  transition tracks of democracy, while at the same time signaling that  they are ready to revive attacks against the government of Algeria – an  autocratic regime that has thus far survived the tremors of political  change in the region.

Some experts have argued that the French decision to  intervene in Mali needlessly internationalized a conflict. What are your thoughts?

I am not sure I would put it like that. The rise and expanding threat of Jihadist forces in Mali created a dilemma for Western states and  those African states that felt threatened by this development. If you  failed to act, Mali could become a permanent base for an  African/Maghrebi al-Qaida branch. But at the same time, intervention  carried the risk that Jihadists would leverage the situation to their  advantage by decrying it as an example of Western imperialism. The  French decided that the potential cost of waiting outweighed the risks  of moving now.

You have asserted that one probable goal of the Algeria  attack was to interfere with—even derail—the Arab Spring, or democratic  transition efforts. This seems interesting, especially since, in the  case of Egypt and Tunisia, elections have put Islamists into power,  and/or magnified conflicts between Islamists and secularists, a trend  that radical Islamist forces would welcome.

Well, first keep in mind that from the vantage point of al-Qaida  affiliates, both in terms of ideology and strategic orientation, the  Islamist leaders whose political fortunes have benefited from democratic change are hardly “authentic” representatives of their vision of Islam. The relatively moderate form of Islamism advocated by the Nahda Party  in Tunisia, and even the sterner Islamist vision propounded by the  Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, represents –in the eyes of al-Qaida’s  allies– a much watered down Islamist agenda.

Moreover, the continued strategic cooperation between Washington,  Tunis and even Cairo –despite all the ups and down of the last few  months—represents a strategic challenge for al-Qaida, since from its  perspective, these governments remain close allies of Washington.

Are you suggesting that al-Qaida plans to take on or even attack these governments?

No, not in a direct or immediate sense. Whatever the ideological and  strategic differences with the Islamist leaders who have come to the  political fore in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, al-Qaida affiliates have no  incentive to directly challenge or attack these new governments, or even more so, their security forces. But, they are probably trying to  establish local cells or affiliates where they can, and these cells  could certainly be seen, from the perspective of these new Arab  governments – or certainly their security forces—as a threat.

Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, al-Qaida affiliates are keen  to exploit the capacity of these new and governments to secure control  over their vast territories, be it in Egypt’s Sinai, in the southern  areas of Algeria, or the border regions of Libya, Tunisia, Libya, and  Algeria. Such efforts not only raise the troubling prospect of  geographic fragmentation and state weakening, they can deeply embarrass  democratically elected governments, whose Islamist leaders control  movements, many of whose young adherents find the radical Islamism of  al-Qaida in North Africa and that of Mokhtar Belmokhtar deeply alluring.

How have the governments of Tunisia and Egypt reacted? Is this strategy working?

I wouldn’t say that the above strategy is working, but the new  governments in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt are surely worried. They are  seeking to secure their legitimacy in the midst of ongoing political  battles between secular and Islamist forces, struggles that have  intensified as a result of the growing influence of radical Salafist  groups, some of which openly advocate violence. The challenge facing the region’s new governments, especially those that contain and/or are  dominated by mainstream Islamist parties, is to distance themselves from the extremists, while maintaining their Islamic or populist  credentials. That is something of a balancing act.

For example, Tunisia’s leaders –and interim President Moncef Marzouki in particular –have praised Algeria’s rescue effort. Particularly after the violent attack on the U.S. embassy in October 2012,  the Tunisians  are keen to demonstrate that they are clamping down on radical  Islamists. Moreover the country’s Interior Minister announced on  December 21 that the security forces had just discovered and dismantled  an al-Qaida outside Tunis. But Nahda, which is the leading political  party in the increasingly fragile ruling coalition, would also like to  integrate non-violent Islamists into the political process, and thus  wants to avoid being seen as simply carrying out the wishes of  Washington. This not easy to do when the party finds itself compelled to rely on the very security forces that were once aligned with the  previous regime to maintain order.

I assume that Egypt’s leaders are also walking a similarly fine line?

Even more so. Morsi has proclaimed his support for the Algerian  government and its assault on the gas compound, but he has also  denounced France’s military intervention in Mali. The very idea of  Western military intervention in a Muslim or Arab country is something  that Morsi and many of his allies in the Muslim Brethren reject on  principle. At the same time however, they are striving to rebuild  relations with Washington and to reassure the U.S. that Egypt is not  rocking the strategic boat.

Your response raises the tricky question of Libya and its role in the wider region.

Indeed. I suppose you can make an argument that full and complete  control of one’s national territory is not absolutely required in order  to advance a democratic transition. But in the long run, the survival of militias in Libya constitutes a threat to any chances for serious  democratic progress. After the September 11, 2012 attack on the U.S.  compound in Benghazi — and the tragic killing of our ambassador and  other Americans — there was some hope that the government could reign  in the militias, but this has not happened. Indeed, the continuing  activity of radical Islamist groups in Western Libya, aided by access  the arms seized after the fall of Qaddafi, has been a huge regional boon to al-Qaida affiliates.  This represents, as one of my colleagues put  it, the “dark side” of the Arab Spring.

Finally, what of Algeria, a country about which we have heard very little since the Arab Uprisings began in early 2009?

We have to remember that Algeria experienced a long and bloody  internal conflict following the military’s intervention which in late  1991 put an end to process of democratic elections that would have put  the country “Islamic Salvation Front” into power. In the ensuing eight  years, some 200,000 Algerian died. But by 2000, through a mix of  repression and cooptation, the regime succeeded in restoring some degree of political stability. Thus when the Arab Spring erupted in 2009, the  political class –such as it is—and the wider population evinced little  interest in emulating its Tunisian neighbors, since the prospect of  democratic reform also seemed to raised the prospect of internal  political strife and even violence.  The key to this strategy, of  course, was not only to keep a lid on radical Islamists, but also to  make sure that they did not pose a threat to domestic oil production,  which is, quite literally, the life line of the regime.

So it seems that the attacks on the gas installation represented a powerful threat to this strategy, no?

Precisely. Algeria’s leaders have been waging a low intensity  conflict with al-Qaida’s affiliates in North Africa, managing to keep  them at bay. But the attack on the gas installation represents an  assault Algiers’ strategy both regionally and domestically.  It not only raises the prospect of instability in its oil producing region, it also raises the prospect that Algerian territory will once again become an  organizing ground for radical Islamist assaults throughout the region.  This concern helps to account for the determination of the Algeria  military to draw a literal and figurative line in the sand by assaulting Belmokhtar’s forces at the gas installation and refusing any negotiated outcome. Algeria’s leaders look at the Arab Spring and see a recipe for regional disorder and violence. Events in Mali, Algeria and Libya will  only reinforce their determination to hold on to power, and to resist  what they see as a black hole of political upheaval in the region.