Egypt on the line

A quick update on the situation of americans under travel ban in Egypt, subject of a recent post: at least two of them are being sheltered at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo for fear of being arrested. The current interpretation is that this is a new low in Egyptian-American relations, and even the annual US$ 1.3 billion in aid to the country is on the line. Would it go that far? Things are definitely worse this time, but it is certainly not the first case of American pro-democracy groups being investigated and threatened. I wonder if these events will have long lasting impacts in the work of such groups, and what they could be.

How far should we go?

The recent crackdown on international pro-democracy organizations in Egypt wasn’t only a cold reminder of the real dangers for those involved in the field. It also questions the limits of political action for foreigners in transitioning countries. Pushing those limits is in many cases the most important part of the job… but does it ever become too much?

Right now it seems members of at least three D.C. based organizations – IRI, NDI and Freedom House – are under investigation by the Egyptian military, alongside dozens of other foreign and local NGOs. Their offices in Cairo were raided and shut down on December 29th, and now part of the staff is under travel ban, including Sam LaHood, the son of Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood, who directs the Egyptian program of IRI.

After LaHood was prevented from leaving the country, the organizations probed and discovered that at least 40 foreigners (six Americans) are under the ban as a result of the investigation.

IRI said they have been questioned about funding and their legal status in Egypt, and that the investigation might lead to formal charges.

Neither inquiry is completely far-fetched: it is undeniable that there is foreign money coming to Egypt for purposes related to the political situation, and apparently the organizations still have problems in getting totally cleared to operate in the country.

Of course, authoritarian, semi-authoritarian, transitioning or in any way questionable governments will always have an interest in making life difficult for foreigners who try to get in any way involved in local politics. If that was reason enough to prevent the organizations from working, they might as well give up now and close their offices. The fact that there is work to be done in opening up, strengthening and democratizing the political scenario is exactly why they are needed. Not to mention it is a common scapegoat to blame foreigners for popular unrest.

On the other hand (and let me be clear: I am NOT talking about Egypt or any of the above mentioned organizations right now), I wonder if in some cases the involvement doesn’t turn into interference. Let’s face it, sometimes foreigners are indeed engaged in supporting uprisings. And with good reason. But where should it stop? Or shouldn’t it?

I personally would never side with, for example, the Kremlin in its attempts to circumvent the work of international NGOs, but I do think there is space to talk about how far they can or should go. With so many new countries joining the list of transitional ones right now, the situation in Egypt might provide a good opportunity to re-discuss the safety and boundaries, if any, of the activities of international pro-democracy groups.

Call for Papers – After the Revolution: Looking Forward

Democracy & Society, Volume 9, Issue 2

We are seeking well-written, interesting submissions of 1500-2000 words on the themes below, including summaries and/or excerpts of recently completed research, new publications, and works in progress. Submissions for the issue are due Monday, February 27th, 2012.

After the Revolution: Looking Forward

The wave of uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 set a precedent for political and social change. Starting with Tunisia, people began to publicly call into question the leadership of governments and individuals that hitherto they feared challenging or accepted as their political fate. However, shortly after the Arab Spring, the stark realities of political transitions have become clear. Some regimes, such as in Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria, sought to use force to crush nascent uprisings. Even in the successful revolutions, most notably Egypt and Tunisia, securing political leadership that acts in the interests of the people remains a challenge. More broadly, we are witnessing revolutions still in progress, where the prospects for successful democratic transitions seem uncertain. What challenges exist to these nascent democratic movements? A number of questions emerge, including:

Opportunities and Dangers: Political transitions present groups with opportunities influence the direction or nature of the change. Notably, in the context of the Middle East and North Africa, revolutions may present Islamic parties with an opening to advance their ideologies and gain support. On one hand, this may lead to a more peaceful redefinition of groups that were repressed by previous regimes. But on the other hand, the political vacuum revolutions create may encourage the rise of more extreme ideological parties.

State and Society: The revolutions and uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa have also called into question the fundamental basis upon which the state relates to society. To what extent have these political transformations altered peoples’ expectations about government accountability and notions of popular sovereignty?

The Role of the External Actors: To what extent has political change in the Middle East and North Africa called into question the capacity of external actors, such as the United States and Iran, to cultivate politically compliant regimes? Can democratic countries that were supporters of overthrown dictators, like the United States and France, play a constructive role in helping to foster democratic transitions?

The Role of the Media and Technology: There exist many untested hypotheses about the role of the media, notably Al Jazeera and technology like the Internet, added to the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. Can we state with any degree of specificity the role these media played in them?

The Challenges of Governance: Democratic transitions often place political groups previously in opposition to the regime with the challenges of actually having to govern. What are some of the problems they face, or impose on these transition?

Slow Pace of Change: Many lament the slow pace of political change in the region since the uprisings began one year ago. Is this pessimism justified? Or should we expect political transitions in much of the region to be lengthy processes that are prone to backsliding?

Resistance from Regimes in Power: In the case of Bahrain, Syria and Yemen the regimes in power resorted to harsh tactics to crush dissent. Whereas in Egypt and Tunisia, leaders stepped down without much of a fight. How can we account for these differences?

These are just a few of the questions that arise as the challenges of the Arab Spring become more prominent. This issue of Democracy and Society will take a broad, analytical perspective on determining what these issues are. We seek to understand it from both a US, global, regional, and country-specific perspective. Please email submissions to democracyandsociety@gmail.com by February 27th, 2011. For additional information, please contact Andrea Murta or Ayesha Chugh at democracyandsociety@gmail.com.

DC Event: The US-Turkey-Iran “Triangle” and the Arab Spring

The Center for Democracy and Civil Society at Georgetown is excited to host a panel discussion on how the United States, Turkey, and Iran played a role in the Arab Spring and how they may play in to future democratization attempts in the region.

The Triangle
United States-Turkey-Iran: A new role in the Arab Spring

Friday, January 27, 2012
3:00 – 5:00 PM

Mortara Building
3600 N Street, NW
Washington, DC 20057

Conference panel featuring
Colin H. Kahl – Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University
Erol A. Cebeci – Executive Director, The SETA Foundation
Geneive Abdo – Fellow and Iran Analyst, The Century Foundation

Moderated by
Joshua W. Walker – Transatlantic Fellow, The German Marshall Fund

RSVPs are requested to rsvpforas@gmail.com.

“Principled and Purposeful Engagement:” US Policy on Supporting Human Rights and Rule of Law in Russia

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Melia, co-chair of the Civil Society Working Group of the US-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission, today argued for “principled and purposeful engagement” with Russia in a Senate hearing on “The State of Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Russia: U.S. Policy Options.” DAS Melia and Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon outlined the Obama Administration’s position in regard to Russia. Their testimony can be downloaded and watched here. From a civil society perspective, Freedom House Executive David Kramer, Human Rights Watch Washington Director Tom Malinowski, and President and CEO of the US-Russia Business Council, Edward Verona, testified as well; while their testimony is not yet uploaded on the Foreign Relations website, it should be up within 24 hours of this posting.

Recognizing the backdrop of the Duma elections and dramatic citizen protests that have swept Russia, four US policy-specific issues emerged in the hearing:

The Obama Administration’s Policy of Dual-track Engagement: Bi-lateral Relations and Civil Society Support. ”We firmly believe that a credible dialogue about democracy and human rights should involve not only contacts between the American and Russian governments, but also direct communication and linkages between American and Russian non-governmental organizations, independent policy experts, and regular citizens to confront common challenges,” Melia’s written testimony stated. Further, in addition to the $160 million provided in civil society strengthening and civil society assistance since 2009, “the Obama Administration submitted Congressional Notification for the creation of a new $50 million fund to support Russian civil society” in October 2011. “The new fund would not require additional appropriations because the $50 million would come from liquidated proceeds of the U.S. Russia Investment Fund.” (also from Melia’s written testimony). Both Gordon and Melia provided statements that reflect the Administration’s new-found voice in support of democracy and human rights; while the voice had existed previously, it was arguably muffled to a whisper under the “reset” policy.

Trade: Terminate Jackson Vanik. Both Republican and Democratic Senators expressed support for the repeal, as did the Administration through Assistant Secretary Gordon and DAS Melia. The Jackson Vanik legislation, passed in 1974, has been a barrier to Russian membership in the World Trade Organization; Senator Corker provided a moment of levity by asking Gordon whether he agreed that Jackson Vanik is now causing us to “shoot ourselves in the foot” by restricting US trade with Russia with little to no benefit or human rights leverage in return. Gordon diplomatically repeated the Administration’s support for its termination. Kramer advocated for parallel legislation in support of human rights (in the form of the Sergei Magnitsky legislation or comparable legislation) to be passed if Jackson Vanik is terminated.

S. 1039: The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law and Accountability Act. A bi-partisan cadre of senators has supported this legislation, which would impose US visa bans on individual human rights abusers, most notably those involved in Sergei Magnitsky’s tragic death.  Melia noted that the Obama administration has and is “taking action to deny human rights abusers entry into the United States…Consistent with the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and President Obama’s “Proclamation on the Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Non-immigrants of Persons Who Participate in Serious Human Rights Abuses and Humanitarian Law Violations and Other Abuses.” Essentially, the position taken by the Administration is that this is already underway. The concern is perhaps that passing the legislation can open a Pandora’s Box of difficult questions: who in the US government maintains the list? What if a name is added by mistake? Is this duplicating the already successful Human Rights Reports produced by DRL? Is it going to bureaucratize issues that are too important to bureaucratize? Further, it has also been reported that the Russian government, in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with orders from the top, may respond with its own list of Americans blacklisted from Russia should that legislation pass. Sponsors of the legislation, its supporters (including Kramer), and those debating whether to support it must be wary of paving the foreign relations road with good intentions. That said, this policy difference between the congress, which is seeking to institutionalize support for human rights (as Senator Cardin articulated), and the executive branch, which is seeking to proceed with dual-track diplomacy to include human rights, should not be taken as a reflection of wavering US support for justice for the 37 year old lawyer –  Sergei Magnitsky - who died because he dared to investigate state corruption and because of acts of commission and omission perpetrated by the Russian authorities. Gordon, Melia, and Senators Cardin and Shaheen recognized this terrible truth, though they may differ on how the US should respond.

Appointment of Michael McFaul. McFaul was nominated to be US Ambassador to Russia and a confirmation hearing was held in the senate on October 12^th. Gordon, Melia, and Kramer agreed that the US needs a permanent Ambassador – our man in Moscow – now more than ever, and asked the Senate to confirm McFaul as soon as possible. The conservative right mobilized against McFaul after his hearing, mobilization that is arguably dangerous to foreign policy goals in the region at such a critical time.