Rouhani’s supporters celebrate in Tehran his election as the new President of Iran (from BBC).

On Friday Iran held presidential elections. According to the vote tally, Hassan Rouhani won the contest with a little over 50% of the vote necessary to prevent a runoff from taking place. Rouhani is the only clergyman among all the candidates (originally eight; two of them dropped out), and from 1989 to 2005 he was the Secretary of the Supreme National Council, one of whose most important tasks is dealing with Iran’s nuclear policy. In a distant second place was Tehran Mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, with around 16% of the vote for him.

When commenting on the election, the international press has focused on the conciliatory tone of Rouhani. Some sources label him moderate, while others reformist (no one calls him conservative). Usually, in Iran those grades are used in reference to the degree of sympathy politicians have to opening the economy and the country to the rest of the world, particularly the West, as opposed to continue having a strict implementation of the goals of the Revolution and the teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. In any case, Rouhani is trying to make an appealing discourse. In an interview to the state television he said his victory was that of “wisdom, […] moderation, […] growth and awareness and a victory of commitment over extremism and ill-temper”. Furthermore, he reiterated he had his hand extended to politicians of the whole spectrum.

Under this environment, in which Rouhani is presented as a catch-all president, so to speak, there is a question that has not been fully answered: what happened to the political turmoil that occurred in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections, when some observers even said that the regime would be forced to open itself? There is no apathy: official estimations of the turnout place the figure somewhere between 70 and 80%, high even for consolidated democracies. There have been no reports about coercion to take voters to the polling stations or votes being altered. Not that such actions have not happened (there are always some problems, marginal or overwhelming, in elections), just that they are not found in major Western media reports.  This clearly contrasts with the situation four years earlier, in which large protests erupted after what many citizens qualified as an open fraud, which were later hardly repressed. Did Rouhani fairly won? Are Iranians sincerely satisfied with the result?

A point of comparison could be drawn with one of the most famous election riggers in recent history, Mexico’s PRI. Just as in Iran in 2009, in 1988 the PRI candidate was declared winner in spite of the enormous popularity of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the candidate of a newly formed party (who is thought to have won in reality), and the well-documented fraud orchestrated by the PRI. In the next contest, in 1994, Cárdenas competed again and fell to a distant third place, with the PRI winning in what were labeled the cleanest elections in Mexico’s history. Between 1988 and 1994 a major devaluation of the currency occurred, the Zapatistas begun their rebellion, and the PRI candidate was assassinated.

Analysts have discussed that one of the most important factors in explaining the apparent paradox of the PRI cleanly winning after dirtily winning is the fear provoked by the unstable environment of economic uncertainty and political violence. In such a case, it is better to have the guys who now how to do the stuff than to have a new group in power. Possibly that is what happened in Iran. Inflation, scarcity, fear of the consequences of growing nuclear tensions could have made Iranians vote for a candidate who did not seem to take risks lightly, who prefers to settle things down before directly confronting the enemies of the nation. Furthermore, some people could have learned the lesson from 2009: not to demand more democracy and liberalism (or at least not through protests on the street).

In Rouhani’s victory rally, some of his supporters said that they felt the grievances of the 2009 election were erased, that having him instead of a hardliner was a step forward for Iran. It will be up to Iranians in the following months and in the 2017 elections, when Rouhani will be able to run again, to judge if it was indeed a correct step.

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ETA “exiled” during their meeting in Biarritz (from ABC).

On Saturday (coinciding, as the newspaper El País reminded, with the International Day of the Political Refugee) ETA announced in Biarritz, community in the French part of the Basque Country, its updated strategy for the return to Spain of some of its current and former collaborators and members whom the group called its “exiled”. Earlier in the week ETA presented a group of 14 people who would participate in the Biarritz meeting, becoming the spokespeople and the representatives of all ETA “exiled”. Furthermore, the group of 14 demanded a direct dialogue with Spanish and French authorities to solve as soon as possible their desire to return to Spain and thus contribute to the peace process and the final armed de-mobilization of ETA, announced in fall 2011.

Many Spanish citizens associated with ETA have left the country throughout the years because of accusations against them related to the terrorist activities of the group. Not necessarily all those citizens face charges of terrorism, but of assisting the organization in perpetrating it, directly or indirectly (for instance, by handling its bank accounts or providing material support). However, now that many of those accusations are expiring because they date from decades ago, those citizens want to return to Spain provided that there are guaranties that the possibility of trial will not be revived and that they will not be asked to collaborate in further investigations about ETA’s activities.

In Biarritz, the spokespeople said that ETA “exiled” in France and in other countries will return to Spain if three conditions are met. First, eliminate all judicial sentences and European detention orders obtained under torture (one of ETA’s main arguments to call its supporters and members “exiled” or “refugees” is that detainees were tortured to provide details about the activities of ETA; hence, prosecution orders would not be valid because they were obtained violating the human rights of those who gave out the information). Second, offer dignified life conditions to the “exiled”, mainly those old and sick, and procure their return to Spain. Third, tell the truth about ETA, meaning speaking of the abuses committed against detained members and the way in investigations about the group were carried out.

Unsurprisingly, those conditions have not generated wide support among the Spanish. The main reason for that, unanimously collected by the usually divided press, is that ETA has not said one word of the deaths it caused, 300 of which remain unpunished. The fact that ETA presents itself as the victim of the abuses of the Spanish justice is plainly abhorrent to Spanish citizens. Furthermore, the group has lost any appeal as the defendant of the Basque cause, mainly because of the existence and electoral success of the Nationalist Basque Party and, more recently, the Bildu coalition, which was allowed to participate in the 2011 municipal elections after intense debates on its links with ETA. The emergence and sustainability of political alternatives to the terrorist group, plus its own announcement in 2011 of its definite rejection to use violence to defend its causes, have arguably wiped out any raison d’être of the group.

The Spanish government has not made direct commentaries about the meeting in Biarritz. Days earlier, Interior Minister Jorge Fernández stated that all members of ETA accused of crimes will be dully processed. Of course, he could not have said anything substantially different to that. Contrary to ETA’s efforts to maintain itself in the public light, the government has always ensured that ETA has been defeated in every possible way; it is not only that they will not negotiate with terrorists, but that terrorists now have nothing to negotiate with. Spanish authorities, and maybe more importantly the relatives of ETA’s victims, want justice to be made. However, this kind of trials always face the challenge of meeting such a politicization that instead of judging individual actions the focus of the process becomes in reality the historical justification of ETA’s actions. Not that ETA’s actions can be in any way justified, but this could distract the debates from discussing the facts on who did what to provoke the death of a person. At the same time, to be reliable any accusation of abuses in human rights must be thoroughly investigated.

The claims of the Spanish government and ETA’s victims are understandable. As the affected parties they want to know what happened and who did it. The problem seems that this objective could be seen as incompatible with that of ETA’s associates, their reintegration to the Spanish society. Unless there is justice of the victims, their relatives will not easily accept them back. Unless there is a wide reconciliation program, ETA collaborators or supporters will not be able to truly return to Spain.

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Protestors rally in front of ERT headquarters in Athens (from BBC).

On Tuesday the Greek government closed the state-owned TV and radio broadcaster ERT. The reason given was that it was a major source of corruption and administrative obscurity, for which it had become an unbearable load to the already weak public finances. In matter of hours, its three TV channels, seven radio stations, and internet website suspended transmissions. The government said that by the end of August a new public broadcaster will be launched.

The most visible reaction to the announcement has been a general strike, the third so far this year. Two kinds of discontented actors participate in the demonstration. First, workers, who back their suddenly unemployed ERT colleagues. The situation of the employees of the broadcaster is still uncertain. They will not receive compensation until the finances of ERT are more or less cleaned. At the same time, the government mentioned that in due time they would be able to apply for positions in the new network, although its personnel will be substantially less than that of its predecessor. Furthermore, some people complain that salaries were not paid at least since November last year, and that the closing of the network casts more shadows on the doubtful eventual payment of those wages. In sum, the situation is not different to that of the workers of many other sectors who have been affected by austerity measures, seeing their wages or social benefits reduced, if not their jobs suddenly cut.

The second group of actors participating in the protest are citizens, enraged with what they see as a government becoming more authoritarian. They do not necessarily argue that the network should not have been closed. With a fee included in their electricity bill, citizens contributed to the financial maintenance of the network. Hence, some of them have sided with workers pointing out that the money to run the network was misused in paying the high salaries of top executives. In this they coincide with the authorities’ perception of corruption in ERT (which, however, was created by government officials). But some people have pointed out that ERT being the oldest broadcasting group in Greece (private networks appeared just at the end of the 20^th century) it had become a quasi-national symbol, now overnight erased by the government. More importantly, citizens critique that with the closing of ERT the most relevant independent source of information has ceased to operate, labeling the reminder of the media as responding to private interests. Even more, the Secretary General of Reporters Without Borders, Christophe Deloire, met with Greek journalists to discuss what is seen as an attack to the freedom of expression.

Unsurprisingly, the closing of Greece’s most important broadcaster, a space open for public debates, has underscored two of the most negative aspects of the economic crisis in Europe: the vulnerability of workers and the incapacity of citizens to contest public decisions. Reportedly Prime Minister Antonis Samaras said that he was surprised that no such opposition emerged when other public enterprises were shut down. As well, when being confronted by opposition parties, he threatened to call for a vote of confidence in Parliament, opening the door to elections and, giving the immediate antecedents of 2012, to major uncertainty about who will govern the country if citizens went to the polls. As if it were necessary, this further underscores the point that the measures implemented to solve the crisis are just deepening dissatisfaction in the political, social, and economic areas of life. As if it were necessary to be reminded, it is time for some kind of alternatives to be presented in the table.

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Poster for the “candidate” Morris in Xalapa, Veracruz (from @CandiGatoMorris).

Several states in Mexico are celebrating local elections on July 7. Until last week, the electoral cycle went as usual: members from the three most important parties attacked each other of being corrupt, accused the incumbent for failing to meet the promises made to voters three years ago, and swore they will bring stability and development to the communities for which they expect to be elected. It was last week that a set of new “candidates” entered the scene. A cat called Morris received publicity in his favor to become mayor of Xalapa, in Veracruz. Similarly, the St. Bernard dog Titan is being supported to become the municipal president of Oaxaca. And in Ciudad Juárez the donkey Chon is “campaigning” for the municipal presidency.

This is nothing more and nothing less than another token of the apathy shown by citizens for the candidates presented to electoral contests, a fact constantly present in other times and places. Although the publicity for each of those “candidates” has slogans takes advantages of word-games in Spanish related to the characteristics of each animal (for instance, the motto of the dog is, in English, “yes we CAN”, as “can” is a Spanish word for “dog”), there are similarities in the publicity of these candidates. It is said that the real candidates have been de-humanized in their embezzlement,  that these animals have proven through history to be more loyal to humans than politicians, or that having animals as candidates just adds up to the already existing farce of electoral processes due to their unreliability.

In the end, those “campaigns” call for writing down the name of the mascot in the box of the ballot which says “vote for non-registered candidate”. This takes to the question: how to vote when no candidate is appealing? Or, to put it differently: what is the best way to vote for no one?

Other than abstaining (meaning just not showing up at the polling station) there have been three ways in which Mexicans (and very possibly elsewhere) have voted for no one. First, leaving the ballot unmarked. Second, annulling it by marking the boxes of two different parties, or writing or drawing something on it. Third, by writing a name in the “vote for non-registered candidate” cell. These methods have been used in elections both during the authoritarian (popular actors and comedians seem to have benefitted from the third alternative) and the democratic (in the 2009 legislative election a group of PRI legislators, estranged from their party, promoted in the media the blank vote under the slogan “not like this”) times.

The best way to vote for no one depends on the message the voter wants to give. If it is just of apathy, not showing up to the polling station or leaving the ballot in blank are options. Maybe a step further is to ironically say that an actor (or, in the case of the upcoming elections) an animal is better option than any of the real candidates. Whether or not the messages are substantially different, or what are the reasons that lead voters to chose either of them, can be debated. In the end, those votes are separated from the real count and have no lasting effect. Although they are reported in the final tally, they are small in percentage, never being close to the votes received by a winning or second-place candidate, and at most they are used to keep track of the evolution of abstention or apathy through time.

In a democratic regime the option to vote for a non-registered candidate contributes to maintaining the level of plurality in the elections, and to reduce, at least symbolically, the overwhelming role of parties as opposed to that of unorganized citizens in the political life. But at least in Mexico, when some people vote for outsiders but not in such a volume that he or she can seriously compete for office, more frequently than not swinger voters are dispersed and the hard vote for the major parties ends up defining the election. And due to the patronage system that it has established in many rural and poor areas of the country the PRI, usually associated with authoritarianism and corruption, wins.

Permitting citizens to cast a vote beyond the limits posed by the party-backed candidates is a way to prevent the system from being hermetic and, in the case of the animal “candidates” presented above, could even be funny. But this can also open a space for the return or the maintenance, even if little by little, of authoritarianism. Although electors are not obliged to take this into account in their strategic considerations when deciding their vote, electoral authorities could think deeper about the negative effects for democracy of this kind of vote alternatives.

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Iranian Presidential candidates during the last debate last Friday (from the Christian Science Monitor).

On May 31, June 5, and June 7 Iran had its three presidential debates for the upcoming elections scheduled for the 14^th this month. The topics were, respectively, the economy, social and cultural affairs, and domestic and foreign policy. Most analysts coincide in saying that the series went in crescendo, beginning with a very stiff format in which few exchanges took place among the eight participants, but ending with relatively intense discussions among them. However, maybe expectedly, practically no policy propositions or substantive arguments were presented by the candidates.

All the presidential candidates have governmental experience. Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref is the highest officeholder running in this contest. There is one Minister, Mohammad Gharazi, of Post, and one former Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, of Foreign Affairs. Two candidates are familiar with the very important nuclear affairs, Saeed Jalili, current Secretary of the Supreme National Council and who is widely perceived as the Ayatollah’s favorite, and Hassan Rouhani, the only clergyman in the ballot, who had that position between 1989 and 2005. Other candidates have experience in collective bodies: Gholam Ali Haddad Adel was Speaker of the Parliament between 2004 and 2008. Mohsen Rezaee is Secretary General of the Expediency Discernment Council, which advises the Supreme Leader and has a de facto function of supervising all branches of government. Finally, there is the Mayor of Tehran, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (Ahmadinejad held that position before being elected President in 2005).

According to the electoral law, all candidates were approved by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and the Guardian Council, the organism which oversees that no deviation from the principles of the Islamic Revolution takes place. Similarly, although parties do exist in Iran they have a marginal role in the election; instead of defining a platform to which candidates and voters adhere themselves because it represents their interests, parties restrict their functions to providing logistic support for the organization of campaigns, with little, if any, substantive contribution. The accepted cleavages among politicians are along the degree of openness they are willing to permit in the country, ranging from the so-called principlists, who demand a strict observance of the Islamic principles of the Revolution, to the reformists, who in general prefer more political, cultural, and economic contacts with the West.

In the surface the presidential debates had some characteristics of those exercises organized in democratic regimes: some support and others attack the government, and some are more radical and others more conservative. All candidates coincided in their assessment of the very bad shape of the economy, most evident by the high inflation rates. Contention points appeared in the interpretation of cultural issues, with some candidates supporting and others criticizing government intervention in them, topic closely related to the range of liberties in the country. Possibly the most controversial issue was the nuclear program: while Rouhani argued that negotiating the suspension of uranium enrichment prevented the country from being invaded by the US along with Iraq and Afghanistan, Jalili insisted that Western countries were taking advantage from a softening of Iran’s position to destabilize the regime. But of course there was no discussion of opening participation to secular groups or of reducing the large power enjoyed by the Ayatollah.

This political compliance with the theocratic regime is not shared by all Iranians. However, there are not many indicators suggesting that something similar to the 2009 reformist Green Movement (which organized protests demanding liberalization which were severely repressed; their leader Mir Hossein Mousavi is under house arrest) will happen again. In this occasion there have been some small protests, such as the funeral of a cleric three days ago in which anti-Khamenei slogans were chanted, but which are less than a shadow of what happened in 2009. As always, this does not mean nothing is going to happen. Still to be seen are all the developments that can take place in the days immediately preceding the election, or in its aftermath. As well, a low the turnout rate could indicate Iranians are not very interested in participating in a system that, as was demonstrated four years ago, will not tolerate plurality. This Friday some answers will begin to appear.

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Roadblocks in the Kaesong industrial area (from The Guardian).

On Tuesday, the state news agency of North Korea issued a communiqué informing of the proposition made to South Korea of having bilateral meetings to normalize commercial projects. Of particular relevance to the North is its industrial complex of Kaesong, which hosts around 120 companies from the South in an area very close to the border. Kaesong suspended operations in April, when the North threated to attack the South and the United States, alleging among other things that naval exercises between those two countries were the prelude for a military intervention. The Sough has accepted the North’s proposition and has suggested June 12 to be the first day of the encounters.

It should not be surprising that less than two months after its very aggressive rhetoric against the U.S. and the South now North Korea seeks to approach its neighbors and rebuild the basic bilateral collaboration mechanisms. To begin with, it is almost a certainty that any eventual agreement to be produced in the meetings will refer mostly to very tangible issues, particularly the mentioned restart of activities in Kaesong or allowing visits of families that have been separated because of the border, which are frequently referred to as “humanitarian issues”. Furthermore, the celebration of this encounter would be a success in and of itself, as it would mean the reestablishment of bilateral communications at relatively high levels. Some analysts have argued that the halting of activities in Kaesong in particular, and the substantial diminution of border exchanges between the North and the South in general, has represented a blow to the North’s revenues, economic performance, and productivity. Thus, having the talks means not only that they want to recuperate formal contacts with the South, but that they actually need to do so.

Furthermore, there is another domestic and political element in the approaching proposed by the North: the obligation to maintain a positive image of the regime. Leaving aside the real capacity the North had to attack the South and the U.S. with nuclear weapons two months ago, the mere pronunciation of the threats, which coincided with the first year of Kim Jon Un as the leader of the Workers’ Party, served propaganda purposes. The official news agency published bulletins informing of the congratulations sent to Kim from leaders all around the world for his anniversary and for standing as a leader against the West. Now that on June 15 it will be the 13^th anniversary of the meeting between the then leaders of both countries and in which they agreed to work towards a reunification, the North might use the event for their propaganda purposes, depicting Kim Jong Un following the steps of Kim Jong Il towards bringing the two countries together again. The South is aware of this possibility, and initially was somewhat reluctant to accepting to hold the conferences in a date close to June 15, but in the end they yielded. Thus, the North will expectedly have its share of propaganda with this encounter, just as it did with the threats two months ago.

The needs of preventing the economy from suffering damage due to the stopped production in Kaesong and of fostering Kim’s positive image are related to the deeper need of providing some kind of safety net or smoke screen for the other much more serious problems of the country, such as the famine and lack of provisioning in practically all the territory except for Pyongyang. If there is no food is because Kim was very busy putting everything back into order with the South, the argument would go. The North Korean government might think this vision could contribute to maintain stability in the country in times of scarcity. It might have worked before, according to them, and that is why they are using it now.

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Turkish media reports protests in 67 of Turkey’s 81 provinces, including those regions traditionally lending overwhelming support to the AKP. The protests now reflect diverse and varied grievances, including the strong police response resulting in thousands of injured civilians. Turkish unions, including the 240,000-member KESK confederation of public-sector workers, have joined the fray in support of the protests calling for an end to AKP “fascism.”

A difference in approach between AKP leaders has emerged as protests continue to spread. Erdoğan’s defiant statements followed by his dismissive decision to depart Turkey on a scheduled trip to Morocco are juxtaposed by President Abdullah Gül’s conciliatory nod to the protestors in his publicized statement on Monday that democracy is more than elections. Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç, in an effort to quell resentment and placate protestors issued a public apology yesterday for police use of excessive force.

Within a matter of days, the protests have facilitated a noticeable – if easily reconcilable – divide within the AKP. Erdoğan’s defiance is being put in check by others with a more enlightened understanding of what these protests could mean for the country at a time of uncertainty. The ongoing conflict in Syria already has the regime on its toes. To boot, Turkey’s noteworthy economic trajectory has had much to do with its identity as an oasis of stability in an region of extreme volatility. Widespread protests are calling to question the wisdom of investing in Turkey for the time being, and analysts posit that the booming tourism industry will take a severe hit.

According to one author, Erdoğan longs to be the modern-day Atatürk (revered father of modern Turkey). Erdoğan’s confidence and bellicosity may reflect his denial at the deteriorating political situation and the sentiments echoed by thousands upon thousands of Turks that any love for his leadership has been lost. As the protests expand and further ignite, Erdoğan must learn from his party brethren, act democratically, and engage protestors over their legitimate political concerns. Further defiant action may teach this supposed pro-democratic leader a painful lesson in electoral politics.

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Bradley Manning walking to the court on the first day of the trial (from El País).

Yesterday began in the Fort Meade base in Maryland the military trial against Bradley Manning for accessing classified documents of the Army and sharing them while being deployed in Iraq as an intelligence analyst, which ultimately led to their publication in the Wikileaks website. He faces 22 charges, which are mostly related to wrongfully accessing computers and to misusing their information, government-owned and sensitive. The most relevant one, as foreseen in the pre-trial hearings, is that of aiding the enemy (namely, Al-Qaeda) for which he faces a life-long sentence. He has pleaded guilty of 10 of those charges, not including the latter.

The process and the charges must be considered in two stages. First, Manning’s direct actions. He has mentioned that he decided to share the documents for wide publication expecting to increase awareness about some of the failures of the U.S. military campaigns in Iraq. Otherwise said, Bradley wanted to promotion of transparency in governmental information.

Clearly, it was a very dumb way to do it. To begin with, he broke the ethics of any public servant, which is that the information with which one works belongs to the government and must be handled with the utmost care. In addition, the nature of the data he shared could have put his and his teammates’ integrities at risk. Next, he did put the U.S. in a very shameful situation as diplomatic communications, containing judgments sometimes not so favorable about other countries’ politicians which are publicly called friends but are privately criticized. And finally, he did not need to expose his military career in such a way for the world to know the severe problems in the U.S. foreign policy and armed interventions. Manning’s lawyer statement that he was “young and naïve but well-intentioned” is maybe a correct but too soft description of his actions.

The second stage of the process and the charges is helping the enemy. Once Manning has accepted his culpability in the first stage, the trial will move to demonstrating that Osama bin Laden asked for and received information that was available in Wikileaks. Whether or not this happened was out of control of Manning or, at least, he shares responsibility with Julian Assange, the manager of the Wikileaks site, and its webmaster, who are not wanted by justice for those charges. In the second stage of the process Manning will not be trialed for what he did, but for what happened after he acted. Can he be processed for something over which he did not (or not solely) have control?

Manning’s process is a court martial, thus having a special set of assumptions and rules. It is not a “normal” case of disclosed governmental information; its most disastrous use will lead not the destruction of a political career benefitting the adversary political party, but to endangering the lives of soldiers, the nullification of any progress made in the campaign, and, ultimately, putting at risk the national security. In any democratic regime government transparency must be enhanced, and the public must be made aware of the failures of government actions. Similarly, public officers who abuse of the access they have to privileged information must be punished. That is out of the question here, and Manning seems to understand it. What is pending of decision is whether he can be held accountable for what other people did with the information he released. That might be an unjustified burden on a single person, given the openness and plurality expected in a democratic regime. But, again, this is a military environment, and it is not only a judge, but his superiors, who will have the last word.

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The unbridled success of Erdoğan and the AK Parti has contributed to the emergence of a dominant single-party system, however the party’s egoism resulting from steadily growing electoral support through the 2000s may end up hurting them. AKP confidence has manifest in their recent challenges to secular norms many Turks tout as the foundation of the secular Republic. Additionally, the AKP has become increasingly devoted to quieting the opposition, throwing ex-military members, Kurds, and journalists in jail under a hazy, ill-defined definition of terrorism.

What the ongoing protests prove, however, is that Erdoğan and the AKP cannot seamlessly implement single-party rule. Despite a largely successful modernization project and Turkey’s renewed international recognition as a regional power, the party is increasingly revealing itself as the power-hungry Islamists rivals forewarned against. Moreover, Turkey’s much-publicized economic machine has not been kind to everyone. Privatization has accelerated inequality and the youth unemployment rate remains high. The AK Parti is starting to have difficulty promoting its economic successes amongst the electorate. The ruthless crackdown on political rivals in recent years, as well as a zealous campaign in service of conservative social goals, including the abrogation of women’s reproductive rights, and last month’s hastily passed restrictions on alcohol, have effectively rid the AKP of any liberal support accrued over the past decade.

The AKP’s tremendous success has been a boon to Turkey’s ongoing democratization, however the conditions originally allowing for their successes are deteriorating and the ongoing protests demonstrate potential seeds of change. The primary opposition party CHP, traditionally viewed as a stagnant, elitist club of older politicians, must redefine its brand and find ways to leverage the outpouring of anger directed at the ruling regime. If the protests do represent a larger movement for change, the potential reward for channeling that anger into votes for the opposition would result in a far more balanced democratic system. On the other hand, if the CHP fails to shake its elitist reputation, and to translate the fervent anti-Erdoğan sentiments gripping city centers across the country into political pressure and votes, perhaps a renewed campaign to weaken dissent in Turkey emerges.

The protests reflect a diverse array of grievances aimed at Erdoğan and the AKP. While the original demonstrations aimed to protect Istanbul’s Gezi Park from a planned development project, they have grown to encompass much more than that. The pro-democracy and human rights discourse that contributed to the AKPs prolific rise to power is coming back to haunt them, particularly as Erdoğan and his party adopt more authoritarian behaviors. Though the AKP has achieved much in the last decade, social conditions combined with greater levels of repression have compelled citizens to take to the streets. The opposition has an opportunity to translate this anger into electoral success in the next elections scheduled to take place in 2014, though a failure to do so could hurt chances for Turkish democratic consolidation in the foreseeable future.

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Protestors in Istanbul receiving tear gas from the police (from BBC).

Three days ago protests began in Istambul’s Taksim Square. Demonstrators were against an urban development plan for the area, which included the razing of hundreds of trees in a nearby park (constantly cited as being one of the last green spaces in a commercial district) and the restoration of an Ottoman barracks to apparently turn it into a shopping mall. What began as peaceful sit-ins quickly became a street fight between police forces using tear gas and water cannons and executing massive detentions (some figures say up to 1,000 people were arrested), with cars being burnt and stones being thrown by protestors.

The protest acquired not only an anti-government tone, but specifically anti-Erdogan, the country’s Prime Minister. Demonstrators in Istanbul and in other cities accused Erdogan of attempting to become a dictator by curtailing freedom of expression (police reaction to protests has been interpreted as a form of repression), by attacking secularism (in reference to the suspension of any limits on the utilization of the Islamic veil for women), by limiting individual liberties (after a restriction on alcohol sale, consumption, and advertising), and by trying to stay in power (after three consecutive terms as Prime Minister Erdogan is expected to run for President next year, position which he wishes to reform to grant it more real power). Chants were heard calling for his resignation. In response, Erdogan acknowledged that police had overreacted in the use of force, but also called protestors to calm themselves down and accused some of them of trying to attack the Turkish democracy.

From an external point of view it is not easy to explain the relation between the opposition to an urban development project and anti-government protests, which implies making the jump from contesting a very specific policy to contesting the chief of government. One of the strongest critiques made to elections is that they are usually the only moment in which citizens can actually participate in decision making; following the argument, it is assumed in years between each summoning to the polls elected officers make decisions on their own, without any kind of consultation with other political actors.

In some countries with weak institutions this might very well be the case; there, the media is controlled by the government, the legislative power has no resources to check actions of the executive, and opposition is repressed. This is not the situation in Turkey; people who have different opinions to those of the government have places where to express themselves. But on the other hand, protestors have pointed out some of the most controversial aspects of Erdogan’s government, and indeed those are not the first time he hears them. The weakening of secularism and his permanence for more than ten years in the political system have cast some doubts on the strength of democracy in Turkey, many times seen as a model country in the Middle East in terms of political order.

The question is to what extent can the current protests affect the stability of Erdogan’s government? Although demonstrations have occurred in Istanbul, Ankara, and other cities, his party and himself remain popular in other regions of the country. Using the force against protestors is never a good image for any government. In this case, it has not only enraged even more demonstrators, giving them some arguments to call him a repressor, but international organizations such as Amnesty International have condemned the actions. But, again, Erdogan recognized that excesses had been committed. As in most countries in the world, there is some degree of disaffection between citizens and public authorities in Turkey, and protests occur because of that. After three days of clashes between the police and citizens and with sound institutions to process political conflicts it is too early to think that an uprising such as that in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere is beginning in Turkey. But indeed the protests can play against the support for Erdogan in large urban areas, which is of the utmost importance if he will actually run for president next year. The electoral cycle might have just begun.

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