Boycotting a Useless Government

Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai announced Friday that he and the MDC would be boycotting the unity government, meaning they will not attend Cabinet meetings, council of Ministers meetings, and the weekly meetings among the parties to the unity government. This does not represent an official pullout, however; the MDC is retaining its positions. The party is protesting continued ill treatment by Mugabe’s dominant ZANU-PF, culminating in the re-arrest (and subsequent release on bail) of the MDC nominated deputy minister for agriculture, Roy Bennett, who faces charges of terrorism, insurgency, sabotage and banditry. These accusations are generally understood to be fabrications.

This boycott is unlikely to have much effect on how things are run in Zimbabwe. ZANU-PF officials have failed to consult with their MDC counterparts in most serious decisions, and the prime minister has been ineffective in most of his duties (beyond attracting a small amount of new international aid and interest). He has not made any headway on getting the military out of the diamond mines, and despite repeated pleas he has not been able to stop farm invasions. ZANU-PF has been undermining MDC authority whenever it can, particularly through its mouthpiece the state Herald. A recent teachers’ strike against the policies of the MDC-controlled Ministry of Education was violently enforced by ZANU-PF militia, who beat teachers who tried to return to work. The MDC has certainly not been a real partner in the government.

Tsvangirai hopes that this boycott will lead to fruitful negotiations over several outstanding issues, including Mugabe’s refusal to appoint several MDC governors. This is not overly likely to work. ZANU-PF seems undisturbed by the pullout, saying “If MDC wants to disengage … we don’t have a problem with that… We were having problems with MDC, working together.” There are strong elements in ZANU-PF that want to end the unity government, and this may be the opportunity they have been looking for. The party can simply refuse to negotiate terms with the MDC.

By pulling out, Tsvangirai has at least proven to his doubters that he has not been bought by ZANU-PF and that he is willing to put action behind his pronouncements that the government is not working. Unfortunately, circumstances in Zimbabwe are not conducive to MDC’s gaining real state power in the near future. Just about any compromise that brings the MDC back into this government is going to be unacceptable or unimplemented.

This is not to say that they should not return. The slight improvement in economy and stability that has come from being less of an international pariah has certainly been worthwhile. But we should not kid ourselves that Zimbabwe is anywhere near the verge of political change; no elite pact is going to lead to democracy in this case.

Guinea, China, and the Utility of Sanctions

Following the attack by the military on demonstrators who had gathered to protest in a soccer stadium in the capital, Guinea’s coup leaders face increasing international pressure. The AU, EU, the regional organization Ecowas, and the UN united to call for targeted sanctions against the military.  It is unclear what impact sanctions can have on the conflict. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, Guinea’s economy is dominated primarily by subsistence farming and mining. Bauxite and aluminum constitute around 60% of exports annually and a further 25-40% come from gold and diamonds. This suggests few avenues for effective sanctions and even fewer opportunities for targeted sanctions that punish only the military.

Further undermining the ability of sanctions to produce desired outcomes are $7bn from Beijing. Chinese interest in Guinea is surprising. Earlier in the year the New York Times reported that Chinese investors were becoming weary of pumping resources into the more politically unstable countries in Africa. This suggests that the Chinese government is convinced  the military can provide enough stability to protect its sizable investment, which greatly exceeds Guinea’s annual GDP of $4.6bn

The growth of Chinese aid to Africa is well-documented elsewhere, but it remains unclear what the consequences of Chinese aid will be. The initial popularity of Chinese investment is dwindling in many parts of Africa. Headaches caused by anti-Chinese sentiment in these countries combined with international pressure for Beijing to act responsibly in its role as a global power have forced Beijing to confront the limits of “no-strings attached”.

For example, fecklessness by the government in Burma and strong international support have dampened China’s unconditional support for the military regime in Naypyidaw. The ability of China to influence its more unsavory allies should not be overstated, but China has shown an interest in moderating these regimes both for its own investors and its credibility as a rising power. It remains to be seen if China can exert similar influence in Africa or if it will be interested in doing so. However, in Guinea the international community has little leverage to force compliance. If China can develop that leverage on Camara and his cronies in Conakry, then the strategy of international outrage combined with ineffective sanctions should be reconsidered as the preferred response to human rights crises.

Good point

Matt Yglesias makes a good point about Afghanistan.

Time for some new ideas in Pakistan

Theory: India is a threat to Pakistan.

Hypothesis: Creating an Islamic identity in Pakistan will facilitate mobilization against the threat India poses.

Result: Islamic group blows up military headquarters in Pakistan because the Pakistani government is not sufficiently Islamic.

Conclusion: Next time think harder about unintended consequences.

A Snub from One Nobel Prize Winner to Another?

The Nobel Committee said in its press release that it was awarding the Prize to Obama because he promotes a world in which “Dialogue and negotiations are preferred as instruments for resolving even the most difficult international conflicts.” Apparently this does not extend to engaging in dialogue with dissidents of an economically powerful country with which the United States wishes to maintain “a very robust bilateral agenda” that includes trade and security.

Obama has received a lot of flack already over the decision not to meet with the Dalai Lama while the Tibetan leader is in DC this week to receive a human rights prize from Congress on Capitol Hill, which was awarded Tuesday. But the decision to award him the Nobel Peace Prize makes the situation almost comedic – the most recent prize winner is refusing to meet with the laureate from 20 years ago over issues regarding peace and human rights because he is afraid of disturbing an increasingly warm relationship with the oppressor.

When South Africa refused a visa to the Dalai Lama in March 2009, the United States did not quite condemn the move, but it did reaffirm that “the Dalai Lama… is a regular visitor to the United States and we do not miss an opportunity to try and have discussions with him.” Except, it would seem, when doing so might put a shadow on upcoming trade talks with China. This is certainly not the first time this administration has played down concerns over human rights violations in China; Secretary Clinton started off the relationship in February by saying she was not going to push the human rights button. So in many ways this represents continuity with the current administration’s stance. But while the Obama government might think that they’re giving up the issue because it will not go anywhere, it is obvious this is not the case. If human rights pressure really was not affecting Chinese policy, why should that country be so touchy about it? Without a watchful and concerned international community, the state of rights inside China could be much worse.

The Dalai Lama has said that he is not offended and does “not want to create inconvenience to anybody,” which is ultimately self-defeating. Leaders not meeting with him may soon become a trend: Australia’s Kevin Rudd decided not to meet with the Dalai Lama in December for similar reasons of not wanting to rock the boat with China. Freedom House has more examples of Chinese pressure winning out over human rights concerns. With declining outside pressure, the Chinese will be free to repress its dissidents, confident that it is too important to be attacked on such trivial matters as domestic human rights concerns. The same is true in other parts of the world, like Egypt, where the United States has failed to show support to advocates of democracy and justice.

While Obama’s policy might be understandable from the standpoint of US economic interests, it is certainly not befitting of the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. I hope that this award gives him a reality check to see just that.