The President Processed

Carlos Menem, former President of Argentina.

On Friday, an Argentinian Court revoked the absolution in favor of former Argentinian President Carlos Menem and his Defense Minister, Oscar Camillón, for arms trafficking to Croatia and Ecuador between 1991 and 1995. According to the accusation, they sold 6,500 tons of rifles, cannons, and ammunition, hence violating a United Nations prohibition to provide military equipment to those countries because at that time there were undergoing conflicts (the supplies were registered as being shipped to Venezuela and Panama). Now, a Court will decide the sentence for Menem and Camillón, which could range from 4 to 12 years. Given Menem’s age (82 years), he could spend his time in house arrest.

There are a number of reasons for which the decision of the Court against Menem and Camillón is a novelty. To begin with, it is the first time that a democratically elected president faces a tribunal and is found guilty. Even more, the crimes are related to foreign affairs, rather than internal issues. In addition, the story of the trial has unveiled the failures and successes that the Argentinian judicial system can produce. In 2001 Menem was originally processed for this crime, and, again, arguing his advanced age, he served his sentence in his luxurious mansion. Six months later, he was exonerated. The judges that made the latter decision were investigated for having received bribes, the case was revised, it was resolved that there were sufficient elements to process Menem, and the trial was re-started. Again, in 2011 the defendants were absolved, the prosecutor contested this decision, and last Friday he got what he wanted. Finally, the case originated in an investigation conducted in 1995 by the newspaper Clarín, the one with the largest distribution in Latin America.

As in other cases in which the head of state or government is processed by a court, the story does not end until they set a foot in prison. For this to happen with Menem, there is still some time to go. He cannot be officially detained until there is a concrete sentence against him; even more, the court must ask the Senate to be removed from his position of Senator and thus lose all his privileges. At the same time, the relevance is the precedent it sets, not only domestically but even regionally and world-wide: democratically elected Presidents can be put to trial and found guilty. Of course, the conditions for this to happen are not easily met; at least, there must be a sufficiently strong case, and someone with the necessary interest to keep pushing the case in spite of all its reversals. But in the long run it shows that justice can be effectively applied to everyone in the new Latin American democracies.

Venezuela and Democracy

Citizens line up in Caracas to see Hugo Chávez´s coffin (from Agence France Presse).

Last October, the question in Venezuela after the election that gave him a fourth term in office as President was whether Hugo Chávez, in the face of an increasing opposition, would allow more plurality and, maybe, political liberalization. Now, the question re-emerges, with the difference that the President has passed away.

Chavismo had two main features: an intensive social spending and state enlargement, which relied on expected substantial revenues from oil, and the centralization of the political system around the figure of the President, a charismatic leader. As most political projects, Chavismo has left a positive and a negative legacy. On the one hand, to a large extent, his popularity derives from the perception of large sectors of the population that he has contributed to reduce the poverty, inequality, and marginalization that economic liberalization reforms brought about in the 90s. On the other hand, the incomplete implementation of many social programs because of corruption, the inability to control inflation and the exchange rate, or the limits set to the opposition are some of the most pressing problems for Venezuela.

Without Chávez, will his project survive? His charismatic authority neutralized the contrasts of his administration. Once he went behind the curtains to receive medical treatment, Vice President Maduro took the lead after being appointed by Chávez as chargé d’affaires and later, on his deathbed, as Acting President. This source of authority (which can be labeled traditional, as the charismatic leader gave it) is so strong that any critiques to it have been called an “offense”, in spite of going against the constitutional provision that in the case of a definite absence of the President, the leader of the National Assembly will be in charge. So far, Chávez´s legacy continues.

It is expected that Maduro respects the calling for elections within the thirty days after the passing of Chávez. There comes the real challenge for Chávez’s supporters: the institutionalization of Chavismo without Chávez. His charisma must be turned into a set of formal or informal rules, regulations, and behaviors that preserve his goals. Trademark policies might not be the most pressing worry; even in a worst-case scenario, the economy can be managed to continue providing funds for them. The problem is what to do with opposition and plurality, which Chávez did not face as a real challenge until his last presidential election some months ago.

Again, it was Chávez’s persona that served as a counterweight to his opponents and to the internal contradictions of Chavismo. Even invested with traditional authority, it is doubtable if Maduro will be able to continue that role. A strategy for the continuation of Chávez’s legacy is already at place: the capitalization of his image. T-shirts, pins, parachutist berets, mugs, baseball caps, posters, and all sorts of articles with the legend “I am Chávez” are sold. Arguably, people who proudly show those items to the cameras filming them while making the six-hours lines to pass in front of Chávez’s coffin must not be convinced to vote for Maduro. Instead, it is a token to show the opposition that Chávez and Maduro’s supporters are not divided and are backed by citizens. It has been confirmed that Henrique Capriles will return as the alternative candidate to Chavismo in the upcoming elections. Does he still stand as a popular and viable alternative to Chávez? Was his popularity contingent to the first signs of Chávez’s charisma wearing out, or did his programs were really attractive to some Venezuelans? Will he have any real chance of winning within the context of the media flooded with the life, achievements, and image of Chávez? Chávez supporters are doing as much as possible to answer “no” to all those questions. Capriles will have a chance to speak his mind in some weeks.

Democracy of the Commons

Representatives from 5-SM during a press conference (from El País).

Due to financing or cooperation, among other things, it is not easy to draw a clear-cut line, even less an opposition, between the state and civil society. However, one essential feature of the latter is that it is not interested in reaching power. But Italy’s Five-Star Movement (5-SM), under the leadership of comedian Beppe Grillo, won 26% of the vote and 165 seats in the lower chamber in the elections last week. Thus, it has become the third political force in Parliament, behind the Democratic Party, led by Pierluigi Bersani, and the People of Freedom, of Silvio Berlusconi. Has 5-SM lost its identity by having reached the legislative power?

During the campaign period, 5-SM insisted in presenting itself not as a political party, because parties and politicians were corrupt, inefficient, and did not represent citizens’ real interests. Even more, its members have always said that they are not going to formally support any cabinet or government; they will just do what citizens want.

On Monday, 5-SM held its first national coordination meeting, which the Spanish newspaper El País labeled as “chaotic”. Many of its winning candidates did not know each other. There is no platform or set of principles, but each future representative will defend what he or she thinks is the most pressing concern for his or her community. They refuse to talk about constituencies, or a left or right position, but rather say they will offer the more just answers for citizens. And, somewhat strangely, before the meeting began they said there would not be a press conference because as the event would be streamed in 5-SM website “there will be no need for questions”. In the end, they organized a Q&A exchange with journalists. New legislators asked to be called “citizens” instead of “representatives”, as a further way to underscore that they remain a social movement, as opposed to a political party.

In the discourse, to some extent 5-SM has managed to maintain its image as a movement. Another question is whether or not this will serve the long-term goal of political viability and, even, survival. Pre-election interviews with Italian electors suggest that the success in the polls of 5-SM can be explained due to the disenchantment against the existing parties; 5-SM offered an alternative. How long can such alternative last? 5-SM claims to represent the interests of all citizens, but elections show that in fact they represent just those of a quarter of electors. They need to be partial, and to build an identity around which citizens can rally, making the organization sustainable. By trying to maintain the image of a comprehensive social movement 5-SM might be losing all viability as political party. Its legislative activities will give the evidence for or against this perspective.

Political Economy Analysis of Tanzania

Check out Barak Hoffman’s most recent Special Report, Political Economy Analysis of Tanzania, to better understand, from a political economy perspective, the capacity of development partners to support demand for good governance activities in Tanzania.

Kenyans Head to the Polls

Supporters of the Jubilee Alliance at a pre-election rally / (Reuters/Noor Khamis)

Happy election day! That is, election day in Kenya. The long-anticipated contest began earlier this morning (with polls closing as I write), amid growing anxiety over sporadic episodes of violence in recent weeks. Thus far, today’s reports indicate that violence has been isolated to a few incidents in the coastal town of Mombasa and regions near the Somalia border. We will know much more, of course, after the electoral committee begins the important work of counting the votes.

The election is important for a number of reasons. Some are quite obvious. It is a chance for Kenya to demonstrate that the horrendous post-election violence in 2007-2008 was an aberration, and not a trend. The poll pits Uhuru Kenyatta — son of Kenya’s first president (Jomo Kenyatta), and a defendant in an ongoing ICC trial for his role in the 2007 violence — against Raila Odinga, whose unexpected defeat by Mwai Kibaki in 2007 amid allegations of widespread fraud set the country aflame. Odinga’s late father was also an erstwhile ally of Jomo Kenyatta, before Odinga joined an opposition movement and Kenyatta imprisoned him for two years. This election therefore provides Raila Odinga with a chance at redemption — the opportunity to settle a decades-long familial rivalry, and a final shot to win a position that many believe was stolen from him five years ago. It also holds tribal implications, since Odinga would be the first Luo to occupy the State House. Kenyatta, of course, is a Kikuyu, one of only two groups (along with the Kalenjin) to hold the presidency in Kenya’s half century of independence. In a plural society like Kenya where power and resources often flow vertically along ethnic lines, an Odinga win may hold significant domestic implications.

These storylines certainly provide drama and layers of sub-text. But they also draw attention away from the other important elements of this election. It is the first chance for Kenya to select lower-level leaders to fill new positions created in Kenya’s 2010 constitution, a document that devolved considerable power to county-level governments across the country. This could have a significant impact on future incentives for political candidates as well as citizen-state relations, particularly in a country with a history of centralized power. This election also marks the introduction of a few new technologies to prevent fraud, such as biometric voter registration and electronic submission of results. Many were concerned that the government would not provide the election commission with sufficient resources to procure and deploy these new tools, and today will provide a preliminary look at their capacity to mitigate the problems that emerged in 2007.

For a much more thorough look at these issues, and more, check out this great election primer from IFES. Lots of useful information on both a political and technical level.

I’m sure we’ll be covering the election results, and political implications, in the days and weeks to come. On the presidential level, neither Odinga nor Kenyatta will likely win after today. The new constitution lays out a threshold system, whereby a candidate needs over 50 percent of the national vote as well as at least 25 percent in over half of all counties. Failing that, there will be a second round run-off between the top-two vote winners. Stay tuned…