The prez spoke at me tonight on Afghanistan, Iraq, and the economy. His comments on Afghanistan were less than edifying:

…next August, we will begin a transition to Afghan responsibility.  The pace of our troop reductions will be determined by conditions on the ground…

Clear. As. Mud.

Some in the US government are furious at Hamid Karzai because he is blocking attempts to investigate corruption. Others in the US government are the counter-parties to many of these bribes. These guys say the mugwumps don’t understand that bribes are the only way we can get the intel we need. We tend to call these no win situations. From now on, I think I will refer to them as Karzai’s Paradox.

A cynical take on why the Obama administration is so focused on fighting corruption in Afghanistan:

Insofar as the Afghan government refuses to deliver on the promises our [US government] money has purchased, it has to be challenged. It has to be made to understand that a failure to take at least some steps toward reform will eventually produce unpleasant consequences, as American support, already wavering, dwindles down to a few hardcore neocons gathered together in a single room. All of which is to say, Washington’s current fight against corruption is mainly about American, not Afghan, hearts and minds.

Representative Nita Lowey’s recent circus hearings on corruption in Afghanistan lend some credibility to this argument.

According to the Afghan Analysts Network, campaigning during a war is dangerous and hard.

Captain’s Journal and At War have in-depth analyses of whether the Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan are forwarding or undermining US military efforts there. (Answer for the impatient: the latter).

I usually ignore them, but Safi Airways’s in-flight magazine looks pretty interesting. For those who can’t want for DXB-KBL to check it out, it’s on their website.

Matt Yglesias points out a blindingly obvious flaw in our Afghanistan policy:

As I understand it, our policy there [Afghanistan] puts economic development at the core of our strategy. But if the US government knew how to produce development in foreign countries just because we want to see it happen, the world would be a very different place. The fact of the matter, however, is that promoting development is really hard.

I am embarrassed to admit that despite my extensive rants on Afghanistan and years of working on economic development, this point never occurred to me.