Not long ago I noticed two headlines that appeared in the national newspapers here within a week or so of each other: one of them was “China Doubles Aid to Africa,”(1) and the other was “U.S Slams Uganda’s New Anti-Gay Bill.”(2) These headlines raise some important concerns and contrasts. That the Anti-Homosexuality Bill now in Uganda’s parliament –which calls for the death penalty in “aggravated” cases and makes the failure to report a suspected homosexual a crime- enjoys significant support among Ugandans raises concerns about the levels of tolerance and protection of minority rights that is essential to a functioning liberal democracy. It also raises the question: To what extent will the democracies of the world – several of whom are significant donors to Uganda – care to or be able to prevent the bill’s passage? Uganda’s Ethics Minister, James Nsaba Buturo, has recently confirmed that, “…Western countries were threatening to withdraw aid if the current Anti-Homosexuality Bill was not revoked.”(3)

Then there’s China. The New Vision article relates that both Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and Sudanese President Omar el Bashir attended the China-Africa Summit in Egypt on November 8th, 2009, during which China announced its intentions to dramatically increase loans to several African countries and to step up initiatives ranging from food security to research scholarships. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao also took the opportunity to deny that China’s interest in Africa is based solely on its need for natural resources. According to the article, he also “[R]epeated that China would not interfere in the internal politics of any African country.”

Foreign aid represents 30% of Uganda’s operating budget, and while this is down from 50% three years ago (due largely to the global recession)(4), Uganda surely does not take alienating the donor community lightly. Carl Gershman and Michael Allen noted as recently as 2006 that, “Uganda appear[s] to be refraining from certain restraints on NGOs in no small part out of fear that foreign aid will be cut off.” (5)

Then again, Mr. Buturo has repeatedly asserted that, “…The integrity of our country and our values are more important than their aid.”(6) I cannot help but wonder if this statement is mere political rhetoric, or if there is (beginning to be) something to it. That is, I wonder if Uganda is better positioned to ignore the West’s moral outcries and monetary threats over illiberal practices due to the rise of China as a significant donor. After all, as Robert Kagan notes, “[China] will [not] impose conditions on aid to African nations to demand political and institutional reforms they have no intention of carrying out in China.”(7) While homosexuality has been de-criminalized in China, the government has essentially ignored campaigns to extend protections and rights to the gay community (8). And China’s human rights record in other respects requires no further comment here.

Uganda may very well pass this draconian measure, and if it does, what does this signify? Does it mean that Uganda has taken a step “backward” on the path towards becoming a democratic regime that respects human rights and protects citizens who are minorities? Does it mean that Western influence is being trumped by the aid and the attitude of the Chinese?

Until very recently the West – and the U.S. in particular – considered Uganda to be, as Larry Diamond puts it, “[O]ne of the brightest stars of African development.” (9) In my next blog post I will explore some of the reasons why this was case, and some of the reasons why it is the case no longer. Changing assumptions about the democratization process seem to have as much to do with this as developments within Uganda itself.

Sources:

(1) Josephine Maseruka and Agencies. 2009. China Doubles Aid to Africa. The New Vision. 09NOV.

(2) AFP. US Slams Uganda’s New Anti-Gay Bill. 29OCT2009. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jEEJXoeBrTi17hexzYZqvmPgpPxg

(3) Moses Mulondo. 2009. Pray for Replacement of Corrupt Officials. Sunday Vision. 29NOV.

(4) Liz Kobusinge. 2008. Let Us Examine the Role of Foreign Aid. The New Vision. 17NOV. http://allafrica.com/stories/200811180049.html

(5) Carl Gershman and Michael Allen. 2006. The Assault on Democracy Assistance. Journal of Democracy. Vol. 17, No. 2. April. P.46.

(6) Mulondo. Pray for Replacement.

(7) Robert Kagan 2008. The End of Dreams and the Return of History. Knopf. April 28. P.70

(8) The Economist. 2009. Comrades-In-Arms. 20JUN. Vol. 392 Issue 8636, p43-43

(9) Larry Diamond. 2008. The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World. Times Books. P.250.

Last year, I started Georgetown University’s Democracy and Governance graduate program; this year, I’m in Uganda on a mission (or two). My primary mission is a military one: I’m deployed here as a civil affairs specialist with the U.S. Army Reserves. My team’s job is to assist the Ugandan army with the civil-military relations aspect of their disarmament campaign in a remote region of the country called Karamoja. As you may have guessed, it’s not your typical deployment – unlike in Iraq or Afghanistan, the U.S. military’s footprint in Africa is very small, and the only battles being fought here are in the “hearts and minds” of the African people. So you’re probably not going to hear much about this mission on the news, but as much as my time and my job permits, you’re going to hear about it here. Read the rest of this entry…

It comes as a surprise to me that the Ibrahim Prize was not awarded this year, but what was really curious was the lack of explanation for taking this action.

The Prize goes to African leaders who leave office voluntarily at the end of their term and “rise above [significant] constraints to develop their countries, lift people out of poverty, and pave the way for future prosperity and success.” It is intended to provide an incentive for African leaders to behave well and leave office on time, which is not an attractive option for most leaders who have no prospects for income or work after they leave office. Western leaders can usually make considerable money in the lecture circuit and as consultants, but African leaders rarely have such opportunities. It also provides an incentive for leaders not to grab as many resources as they can from the state on their way out.

This prize could be a useful incentive, even though some people contend (for example here) that the prize targets money at elites who do not need it and whose time is up, and a better investment would be in training future leaders. But the decision not to award it this year and not to offer an explanation takes away the value of the endeavor. If the point of this prize is to encourage and incentivize future leaders rather than simply reward former ones, the Ibrahim Foundation has a responsibility to provide feedback about what it believes constitutes good African leadership.

Several likely candidates failed to win the prize. Two favorites, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Olesegun Obasanjo, certainly had some obvious issues. Mbeki’s infamous policies on AIDS resulted in an exacerbation of that problem, his “softly softly” approach to dealing with Mugabe was nothing less than appeasement, and while I am no fan of Jacob Zuma, it was wrong of Mbeki to try to manipulate allegations of corruption against him to coincide with the election cycle. Obasanjo, for his part, might have been an invaluable statesman on the continent, but his often undemocratic actions at home make him a less than ideal candidate for the prize.

Other possibilities were Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone, who helped his country transition from civil war, and John Kufuor of Ghana, who increased democratic practices, pushed his country down a development path, and helped prevent conflict over an extremely close election. While both of these men were in governments that had problems with corruption, neither was obviously implicated in it.

Perhaps the Ibrahim Prize committee should not single out these leaders to denigrate – they certainly are all better than the average African heads of state. But offering some generic explanations of the criteria that were considered in evaluating the candidates would make the failure to award the prize more of a statement and a call to action for future leaders. If the point is to help leaders reform, the prize needs to explain what kinds of reform it wants.

Following the attack by the military on demonstrators who had gathered to protest in a soccer stadium in the capital, Guinea’s coup leaders face increasing international pressure. The AU, EU, the regional organization Ecowas, and the UN united to call for targeted sanctions against the military.  It is unclear what impact sanctions can have on the conflict. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, Guinea’s economy is dominated primarily by subsistence farming and mining. Bauxite and aluminum constitute around 60% of exports annually and a further 25-40% come from gold and diamonds. This suggests few avenues for effective sanctions and even fewer opportunities for targeted sanctions that punish only the military.

Further undermining the ability of sanctions to produce desired outcomes are $7bn from Beijing. Chinese interest in Guinea is surprising. Earlier in the year the New York Times reported that Chinese investors were becoming weary of pumping resources into the more politically unstable countries in Africa. This suggests that the Chinese government is convinced  the military can provide enough stability to protect its sizable investment, which greatly exceeds Guinea’s annual GDP of $4.6bn

The growth of Chinese aid to Africa is well-documented elsewhere, but it remains unclear what the consequences of Chinese aid will be. The initial popularity of Chinese investment is dwindling in many parts of Africa. Headaches caused by anti-Chinese sentiment in these countries combined with international pressure for Beijing to act responsibly in its role as a global power have forced Beijing to confront the limits of “no-strings attached”.

For example, fecklessness by the government in Burma and strong international support have dampened China’s unconditional support for the military regime in Naypyidaw. The ability of China to influence its more unsavory allies should not be overstated, but China has shown an interest in moderating these regimes both for its own investors and its credibility as a rising power. It remains to be seen if China can exert similar influence in Africa or if it will be interested in doing so. However, in Guinea the international community has little leverage to force compliance. If China can develop that leverage on Camara and his cronies in Conakry, then the strategy of international outrage combined with ineffective sanctions should be reconsidered as the preferred response to human rights crises.

On Friday and Saturday, the European Union held its first talks with the Zimbabwean government in seven years. The EU delegation’s reaction was cautiously optimistic over the future prospects of the power sharing agreement (the GPA, or Global Political Agreement), euphemistically describing the deadlock over the GPA as “They do not have the same reading of the same document. They have a different reading on how this should be done and at what speed.” While the delegation was quick to say that because of significant humanitarian problems, no sanctions will be lifted just yet, their willingness to reengage with the government was enough to give hope to President Robert Mugabe.

Zimbabwe has been making international headlines recently not for harassing opposition leaders and stealing elections, but for its attempts to reengage with the international community and solicit funds. Headlines on major papers are debating the questions of whether to lift sanctions and provide aid (with moderate amounts of aid and loans from the US, UK, EU, China, Germany, and now the IMF). While most countries’ responses are negative on sanctions and tepid on aid, few papers these days are carrying the specific and ongoing reasons why we should not be helping out the regional basket case. This absence of bad news from the headlines (beyond the cholera epidemic a few months ago) might lead one to believe that the situation in Zimbabwe has improved, which is not the case.

The “different reading” of the GPA is that the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) saw it as a way to form a unity government and transform the country democratically, while ZANU-PF saw it as a way to get the international community off its back; it seems unlikely the party ever really intended to cede any meaningful powers.

While economic conditions have certainly improved, the state of democracy in Zimbabwe has not advanced much further than where it was when ZANU-PF and the MDC agreed upon the GPA a little over a year ago. Mugabe and his party ZANU-PF have subverted the agreement and the “partnership” at every turn. Beyond the most egregious act, the “accidental” killing of MDC leader Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai’s wife in a car crash that easily could have killed the PM himself,  ZANU-PF agents continue to kill, abuse, harass, arrest, abduct, and detain MDC supporters. Mugabe and his party undermine the power and legitimacy of the MDC whenever possible, through propaganda (recent examples in the state paper here and here), unilaterally reassigning ministerial duties counter to the GPA, failing to consult the MDC on important decisions, refusing to swear in key MDC appointees, and delaying work on a new constitution.

For whatever reason, whether it is inability or unwillingness, Morgan Tsvangirai has failed to push the MDC successfully into a meaningful partnership with the government to achieve democratic reform. The economic improvements are certainly welcome, but it would have been difficult for the situation to decline further than last year’s worthless currency and lack of goods. Lasting improvements and attracting international investment are unlikely in the current uncertain political climate.

The EU delegation’s talk of “progress” is misplaced, unless one can count as progress making fewer international headlines for blatant attacks on the opposition. Mugabe has certainly made some progress in his approach to public relations – instead of saying the opposition will come to power over his dead body, he now claims to have given it substantial power without really having done so and while more quietly subverting it. The international community, particularly the Southern African Development Community (SADC, a regional organization that has repeatedly failed to denounce Mugabe), should be much more critical of the sham government in Zimbabwe.

Although this is a few days old, I think it is very worthwhile to take a detailed look at Hillary Clinton’s remarks from her “Townterview” at the University of Nairobi on August 6.  You can find the entire transcript of the event from the State Department’s website.  The most interesting part of the program from my perspective was how Secretary Clinton discussed the much-disputed Kenyan 2007 Presidential election.  I won’t go into the details; you can read about them here and here.  The basic point is that there is a significant amount of evidence to suggest that the US Embassy in Nairobi deliberately suppressed evidence that the election was not free and fair.  Rather than countenance that the US had any role in helping Kibaki prevail in the election, Secretary Clinton blamed the Kenyan people for the outcome.  Consider the following remarks:

…no one can reform a government from the outside. It takes the people of the country and particularly the role that civil society and the private sector played in trying to deal with the aftermath of the election. So yes, I mean, we can encourage, we can lecture, we can offer assistance, we can try to highlight good practices. But it has to be done by the people of Kenya.

…it is not only our policy, but it is our intent to do everything we can to ensure as free and fair elections as possible.

…it is not up to the United States…we cannot dictate to you who you have in your government. You have to determine how to influence and change this government, and do not be deterred by the difficulty of it.

…So it is my hope that those of you who are pushing for reform, keep thinking about ways of putting the right kinds of pressure to bear on those in power.

Now, to be clear, I do not hold Secretary Clinton responsible for the role of the US in allowing President Kibaki to prevail in the flawed election.  It took place when the Bush administration was in power and before Hillary Clinton became Secretary of State.  But to blame the Kenyan people for not doing their part to ensure the election was free and fair while the US Government has never come clean with it’s own role in suppressing evidence of rigging seems a bit much to stomach.

Daniel Kaufmann sums up the situation nicely from my perspective:

it is no secret that the US embassy in Nairobi, alongside some key international donor agencies, committed major mis-steps around the time of the ill-fated elections in late 2007.   In spite of their glaring biases and policy mishaps, the US, UK and the World Bank have largely been ’silent witnesses’ regarding what transpired on their own roles and actions at the time.

Indeed.