Cameroon’s election wasn’t exactly fair, but what I found interesting was the assessment of what I would have thought to be a legitimate Election Observation Mission (EOM):

But France, which was Cameroon’s former colonial power and played a significant part in Biya’s rise to the helm in 1982, saw no egregious violation in the poll.

“According to the International Organisation of the Francophonie and the Commonwealth, who followed the development of these elections, we can consider that they took place in acceptable conditions,” Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said.

If you haven’t already, read Judith Kelley’s great paper, Election Observers and their Biases. It does a great job of exploring the behavior and incentives of EOMs based on a number of criteria.  Her main argument is that the assessment of elections is influenced by the mission’s organization, the source of funding, and the host country.

She also discusses the problem that occurs when observers want to reward progress made in a country, but the environment does not warrant a positive assessment.   It is in addressing this phenomenon that Kelley notices certain peculiarities in her data.  The most striking is the fact that the more violent a pre-election environment is, the more likely observation missions will endorse an otherwise flawed poll.  Kelley also touches upon some issues that have been addressed in previous writings, such as the phenomenon where pre-election irregularities are more likely to be ignored by an assessment team than those that occur during the polling process.

I really don’t know Cameroon, or France’s current interest in it, so I’m unsure of if any of these particular findings would explain this strange assessment.  But this does fit Susan Hyde’s theory, which concludes that regimes have made the calculation that the presence of election observers has become a signal of democratizing, while the risks of a negative election observation report outweighs the benefits of not inviting any foreign observers.  I would say that Paul Biya benefited from allowing an election observation mission, especially one from France.

Cross posted from Ahwa Talk.

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Uganda's Districts, 2010

In Patronage, District Creation and Reform in Uganda, Elliot Green argues that Ugandan Yoweri President Museveni has used the creation of new subnational district boundaries as a way of consolidating power through traditional patronage means. Looking at several African nations, Green notices that new boundary creation tends to increase as presidents’ margin of electoral victory diminishes.  By creating new districts, he argues, regimes are able to offer better services to targeted segments of the population.

I think the main takeaway from this paper is that like the structural adjustment programs before them, autocrats have managed to manipulate decentralization efforts in an effort to maintain traditional vertical power relationships.  It’s just sort of a given in development that decentralization is a good thing. The theory behind this is sound but there is lots of evidence that it doesn’t really work.  To be fair, this isn’t the most egregious form of corruption; new boundaries don’t have the deleterious effect of useless ministries.  Still, it’s worth keeping in mind the next time somebody you here somebody spouse the unchallenged benefits of decentralization.

Cross Posted at Ahwa Talk.

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