Earlier in the week China Beat featured a script from a talk given by Ying Zhu, professor of Media Culture at CUNY Staten Island, at Google’s New York offices. The piece teases at themes to be covered in depth in her upcoming book on China Central Television co-authored with Bruce Robinson. Focusing on recent news stories, Zhu argues that the size of the internet community, an increased access to information and a better-educated citizenry have created what she terms a “critical mass”. This term has three parts: (1) the mass has grown to the point where the Chinese government’s ability to put down a popular rebellion is limited, (2) the mass is able to articulate preferences and force a government response, and (3) the mass forms passive online associations ready to be organized into “active participation” should they be provided a catalyst. Read the rest of this entry…

This week’s Economist has an outstanding article on Freedom House’s 2010 edition of Freedom in the World.

Freedom House…in its latest annual assessment that liberty and human rights had retreated globally for the fourth consecutive year. It said this marked the longest period of decline in freedom since the organisation began its reports nearly 40 years ago.

The author (I have no idea who because The Economist does not carry bylines), goes on to discuss the various causes of the latest democratic recession:

…the worrying thing is that the cause of liberal democracy is not merely suffering political reverses, it is also in intellectual retreat…

there are some obvious reasons why Western governments’ zeal to promote democracy, and the willingness of other countries to listen, have ebbed. In many quarters (including Western ones), the assault on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and its bloody aftermath, seemed to confirm people’s suspicion that promoting democracy as an American foreign-policy aim was ill-conceived or plain cynical.

In Afghanistan, the other country where an American-led coalition has been waging war in democracy’s name, the corruption and deviousness of the local political elite, and the flaws of last year’s election, have been an embarrassment. In the Middle East, America’s enthusiasm for promoting democracy took a dip after the Palestinian elections of 2006, which brought Hamas to office…

But perhaps the biggest reason why democracy’s magnetic power has waned is the rise of China – and the belief of its would-be imitators that they too can create a dynamic economy without easing their grip on political power.

The article then makes one of the most concise, clear, and convincing arguments the importance of supporting democracy I have read in a long time. It methodically addresses all of the criticisms leveled against democracy and shows why they are wrong.

So how does the case in defence of democracy stand up these days?…Democracy may not yield perfect policies, but it ought to guard against all manner of ills, ranging from outright tyranny (towards which a “mild” authoritarian can always slide) to larceny at the public expense.

… all but two of the 30 least corrupt countries in the world are democracies… Autocracies tend to occupy much higher rankings on the corruption scale…

What about the argument that economic development, at least in its early stages, is best pursued under a benign despot?…For every economically successful East Asian (former) autocracy like Taiwan or South Korea, there is an Egypt or a Cameroon (or indeed a North Korea or a Myanmar) which is both harsh and sluggish…

Believers in democracy as an engine of progress often make the point that a climate of freedom is most needed in a knowledge-based economy..It is surely no accident that every economy in the top 25 of the Global Innovation Index is a democracy, except semi-democratic Singapore and Hong Kong.

China, which comes 27th in this table, is often cited as a vast exception to this rule…The determination of China’s authorities to impose their own terms on the information revolution was highlighted this week when Google, the search engine, said it might pull out of China after a cyber-attack that targeted human-rights activists…

Admirers of China’s iron hand may conclude that it can manage well without the likes of Google…But in the medium term, the mentality that insists on hobbling search engines will surely act as a break on creative endeavour…

What about the argument that autocracy creates a modicum of stability without which growth is impossible?…On the State Fragility Index…democracies tend to do much better than autocracies…

At the very least, a culture of compromise – coupled with greater accountability and limits on state power – means that democracies are better able to avoid catastrophic mistakes, or criminal cruelty. Bloody nightmares that cost tens of millions of lives, like China’s Great Leap Forward or the Soviet Union’s forced collectivisation programme, were made possible by the concentration of power in a small group of people who faced no restraint.

Liberal democratic governments can make all manner of blunders, but they are less likely to commit mass murder autocracies may be faster and bolder. They are also more accident-prone.

For all its frustrations, open and accountable government tends in the long run to produce better policies…Above all, elections make the transfer of power legitimate and smooth. Tyrannies may look stable under one strongman; but they can slide into instability, even bloody chaos, if a transition goes awry. Free elections also mean that policy mistakes, even bad ones, are more quickly corrected…

I often describe democracy assistance as a harm reduction strategy. This is a crucially important point that the development first crowd does not seem to understand.

Freedom House today released its annual flagship publication, Freedom in the World. The results were discouraging:

In a year of intensified repression against human rights defenders and democratic activists by many of the world’s most powerful authoritarian regimes, Freedom House found a continued erosion of freedom worldwide, with setbacks in Latin America, Africa, the former Soviet Union, and the Middle East. For the fourth consecutive year, declines have trumped gains. This represents the longest continuous period of deterioration in the nearly 40-year history of Freedom in the World, Freedom House’s annual assessment of the state of political rights and civil liberties in every country in the world.

Democratic setbacks occurred  for a number of different reasons, such as authoritarian upgrading, coups, and threats from non-state actors, such as criminal organizations and terrorist groups. However, even if the setbacks to democracy have no common theme, they do show one lesson. The Wall Street Journal’s editorial on the report sums it up nicely:

The recent reversals coincide, however, with America’s own waning interest in democracy promotion. This didn’t start with the Obama ascendancy. Chastened by the 2006 midterm election debacle and sinking public support for his Mideast policies, President Bush took rhetorical and practical emphasis off his own flagship foreign-policy agenda.

The current Administration has changed the focus entirely. In its dealings with Russia and China, strategic issues trump any talk of democracy or human rights, which earlier this year in Beijing Secretary of State Hillary Clinton notably called a distraction to bilateral relations. Ditto in Iran.

If in the days of Jack Kennedy or Ronald Reagan, we worked to fashion the world into a better place guided by the belief that the urge to live in freedom is universal, today we act as if we are resigned to taking the world as it is. We used to nudge countries toward liberal democracy. Now we assume the price of nudging is too high.

Meanwhile, the enemies of democracy have set out to undo the gains of the post-Berlin Wall era, and many are succeeding.

Lilia Shevtsova is not happy about US and Western European policy towards Russia:

A consensus seems to be growing among Western policymakers and intellectuals that Russia is not ready for liberalism and that there are even certain advantages to dealing with the illiberal political order built by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. This may be why Western policy toward Russia has only served to shore up the Russian powers that are pursuing anti-Western interests…

So what would a more principled Russia policy entail? Western leaders must keep liberal and democratic principles in mind while dealing with the Russian elite. They must be wary of the latest fairy tales about “modernization,” avoid naively spreading the Kremlin’s ideas…

Democracy is Russia is a very dim prospect. In a Gallup public opinion poll in February 2009, only 18% of respondents thought that democracy was good for Russia, while close to 70% preferred some sort of dictatorship. This not surprising as Russia’s only experience with democracy was in the 1990s, during a time of deep economic crisis and embarrassing leadership of Boris Yeltsin, while growth exploded and the country regained status as a major power under Putin’s return to dictatorship. Nevertheless, the regime does not tolerate internal dissent and its discouraging to see democratic leaders fail to highlight this point.

Yeah, what he said.

The “China model” has garnered attention as an alternative for liberal development, but comparisons are largely drawn on the experiences of economic liberalization taking place under one-party dictatorships in Southeast Asia. Outside these regional comparisons, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seemed to have little applicability to political organization in the rest of the world. Now, according to this New York Times piece, Putin’s United Russia party believes the CCP deserving of study. The article describes a special meeting held earlier this month that featured senior Communist Party officials describing their ruling methodology and quotes from various United Russia leaders on the value and success of the CCP template.

China itself has a similar history of sending its officials abroad to learn techniques of governance they believed suitable for China’s future. Since the 1980s the CCP has demonstrated interest in the People’s Action Party (PAP) in Singapore. David Shambaugh’s book, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation, reveals that the CCP values the PAP model for “guided democracy” in which the PAP sustains itself through successful policies and co-optation of the opposition”.

Each of these cases is evidence of oft assumed authoritarian cooperation, but what the implications of this learning between authoritarians are for democracy advocates and practitioners is unclear. The ability of democracy assistance or democracy/reform advocates to exert any kind of pressure on authoritarian regimes is minimal. However, a regime’s selection and analysis of case studies is perhaps indicative of direction. In China, corruption could potentially undermine the ability of the CCP to claim itself an efficient manager and capable steward of economic expansion. Singapore is the logical choice for the CCP to study given its economic success and the PAP’s ability to retain control of the state during and after economic modernization. Shambaugh believes the interest of the CCP in semi-authoritarian regimes is one example of the CCP undergoing renovation in order to retain power. If similar direction can be assumed from United Russia’s choice of China as a model then the implications are less positive. That direction might best be summed up by Sergei Mitrokhin, leader of the liberal pro-Western Yabloko party, who is quoted in the NY Times article as saying “the China meeting demonstrated that United Russia wants to establish a single-party dictatorship in Russia, for all time”.

I attended a talk today by Andrew Green at the National Endowment for Democracy on US media assistance strategies.  Something about the talk bothered me, although I could not put my finger on it until the very end.  It then hit me: the talk was all about policies, but we never discussed their overall objective.  Talking about media development policies without discussing their goals strikes me as potentially dangerous for two reasons.

First, while media development is a standard part of D&G programs, it is not restricted to this sector.  For example, governments can very effectively use the media to broadcast public service programs in many sectors, such as in education and health, and US Government aid projects deliver this kind of assistance.  However, these governments can also use the same technologies for more nefarious purposes, such as broadcasting government propaganda.  To what extent should the US Government provide non-democratic governments with the means to enhance their capacity to use the media if they can use the tools to subvert democratic development?

Second, the talk took a worrying turn, at least for me, when we began to discuss dissemination of programs that could help people in authoritarian regimes get around internet censorship.  While this may seem innocuous on the surface, it troubles me slightly.  To see this, twist the question a bit.  Wouldn’t the US Government by angry if the governments China, Iran, or Russia installed software in the US that would block people in the US from accessing certain websites?  I think it would and I know I would find it a transgression of our sovereignty.  If the Government of China wants to block certain websites, should US D&G assistance attempt to subvert this?  It seems like a sound question.  I can see two objections to this argument, but neither stands as far as I am concerned.  One, the US Government employed these types of programs (although in a much more low-tech way) during the Cold War.  However, US policy, as far as I understand, does not seek to overthrow the current regimes in China, Iran, and Russia, unlike our policies towards the Soviet Union.  Two, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Voice of America (VOA) already broadcast to many of these countries (often against the wishes of their governments), so dissemination of software to circumvent internet censorship continues existing policy.  While this may be true, it doesn’t answer the question.  It seems reasonable to ask whether US Government D&G policies that explicitly advocate breaking the laws of other sovereign countries are a good idea, but perhaps I lack imagination.