This discussion of definition and meaning struck me as particularly relevant in relation to China’s approach to public information and discourse.  Visiting these varied museums across China and reading the depictions of modern Chinese history bluntly displayed the impact of controlling the political narrative.  Ultimately educating the populace on historic events from a single point of view makes that point of view a reality regardless of potential inaccuracies.

One of the things I’ve found myself most appreciative of on this journey is the way that exposure to China has made me question more of my own understandings of the world as an American.  These museum visits called me to question what I’ve been taught of modern history from the point of view of the United States, while at the same time casting recent issues in the United States in a different light.  The battles being waged over the material to be included in history books in a way are battles to determine the future of US public discourse, however unimportant they might seem these are some of the most critical current political conflicts.

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Meeting so many young engineers from the United States and Germany working in China was jarring in contrast with political rhetoric in the US regarding the need for more children to learn study math, science and engineering.  Each time I crossed paths with someone new to these fields, they bemoaned the same lack of opportunities in their field that young Americans seem to be plagued by across the nation. China, on the other hand, they hailed as a place overflowing with opportunity for people looking to build relevant work experience.  What purpose could there be in our developing education in this field if we aren’t interested in putting young engineers, mathematicians or scientists to any use domestically?  Proposals of mass transit or infrastructure development in the States are almost universally met with disdain or cries of government waste, particularly as our economy continues to flounder.

Whenever I’ve discussed these issues with people, the conversation has evolved into a broader exchange on the differences between democratic and authoritarian governance in regard to getting things done.  After expressing the differences between democratic systems rooted in plurality rather than proportional representation, these discussions lingered around the uncomfortable possibility of potentially positive impacts of authoritarianism where development was concerned.  Yet always, there was the question of precisely who is best served in these systems of governance.  In democratic systems, our winners and losers are (ideally) determined by elections, in China there are no such hang-ups.  Thus whenever I engaged in these conversations, there is always the reality of myself being a westerner visiting foreign nation and partaking of all the best that there is to offer.

This leads to another question on just what a democratic China might look like, and what if any development would occur under such a system.  Ultimately in a way, issues of governance simmer down into concerns over influence and interests.  Thus perhaps in China, at least for the moment, the question at hand is whose interests are being served by the state and who has influence over the decisions that are made.

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In part this question was answered for me after doing a mild bit of browsing on western news sources.  From the ongoing injustices in Tibet to growing discontent over social and economic inequity, western media very rarely has much to say in a positive light regarding China.  Of course the government’s standard of repression strikes me as unwise and counter-productive, but the underlying concerns over instability are fairly typical fears for non-democratic regimes, or for that matter regimes going through economic changes.  This is a volatile time for China, and there’s likely much truth to concerns that China has few allies on an international scale.

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Several of my closest peers in the Democracy & Governance program are students visiting from China and I hope that this trip also serves as an opportunity to learn about the homeland of those I study beside.  To that end I’d certainly appreciate any suggestions on places to visit or subjects to focus on while I wander.  For now that’s it, after flying around the planet I think some rest would be in order.

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Unfortunately there is plenty of merit to the arguments that we don’t stand on any moral high ground stable enough to advise other nations on human rights.  While the military actions taken against domestic civilians by rulers in the Middle East obviously strike us unacceptable, advising the more functional nations of the world such as China becomes difficult.  Per capita(1) we imprison more of our populace than any nation in the world, we’re one of the few countries continuing to accept execution as a means of punishment and our standard view prison is focused on punishment for negative actions rather than rehabilitation.  Coupled with these woes the United States government is a regular target of human rights activists given our popularized participation in extraordinary rendition and the difficult moral implications of our host of military actions and conflicts.  Ultimately I do believe our citizens are treated leagues better than those who live in many of the world’s authoritarian nations, the trouble is that human rights seems an exceptionally difficult subject to urge other nations “to do as I say, not as I do”.  At the same time, what real option is there?

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While there is no reason to expect that some of the universal principles of democracy will be accepted by China’s government any time in the near future, elections on a municipal level offer building blocks for future development of representative government.  It’s been the standard argument of the government that a rapid transition to “western style democracy” would lead rapidly to chaos and an unraveling of social order in China.  Though I’m hardly one to take for granted the party line of authoritarian regimes, perhaps there’s something to the government’s approach to gradual and controlled social change.

To a degree I tend to understand and agree with the late Samuel Huntington, and the sea of political “realists” before him in recognizing the value of stability.  There has been no shortage of examples of the harsh impacts of rapid political, social and economic change in the last two decades so perhaps there’s some value in this more managed transition.  Particularly in the area of economics, China’s managed transition has evaded some of the rather harsh impacts of a suddenly liberalized market that other areas have suffered, impacts which could have been devastating given the size of the state’s population.  Unfortunately in any discussion of “managed change” there’s always the difficulty of whether or not transition will ever occur so long as some benefit from the status quo.

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Readers may note I’m hardly the first to expect changes to the status quo, but particularly in China it seems an absurd conclusion to leap to at the moment.  Beyond the differences between China and the States of the Middle East, or the continued economic, social, strategic and political developments of the state, it’s hard to imagine how the rest of the world might react if demands for political change suddenly delegitimized China’s government.  Further the constant risk of these uprisings being labeled Western meddling, rather than a movement among the people of the region, might suggest this is a good time to work with China on issues of foreign affairs, instead of labeling this one more US vs. China battleground.

Counter to what some might think, the people of China have not been kept ignorant of events in the Middle East; however the information made available to them has been limited and manipulated in all the ways typical of the nation’s government.   Essentially the government’s approach has been to control access to, and sanitize presentation of, information which might be inflammatory or in some way negatively affect stability in the nation.  Here, if nowhere else, China does its people a great disservice.

Though quite effective in governing a nation through swift and effective transition toward convergence with the wealthiest nations of the world, the state has painted a picture of itself which seems at times even more heavy-handed than might be necessary.  Certainly the Chinese government is authoritarian in nature, yet often it seems intent on displaying its power and influence over its citizenry purely for the sake of reminding the populace of its dominance.

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Image courtesy of Boise Weekly & Getty Images

I was initially uncertain about writing more on the continuing crisis in Egypt.  Largely my purpose in blog writing tends toward discussing issues outside the spotlight of mainstream political news media, but the relevance of the current crisis to democracy promotion is such that it would be folly not to discuss the subject further.  The political change currently rolling through the Middle East has the potential to shape the region for the foreseeable future, and so I thought it would be worth taking a moment to discuss the reactions of other world powers to the current political change.  More specifically, the political reactions in the United States, European Union, China and Israel are vastly different and illuminating in regard to the nation’s issues with the Middle East and the ideological promotion of democracy.

In Israel, as in most nations, standards and opinions vary among the populace, the government and most obviously the media.  That being said the most regular sentiments expressed by Israel’s media have been of resistance to potential change and concern over “extremism”.  Of particular note has been the series of harsh critiques of President Obama’s approach to the crisis as naïve, ill informed and unaware of the region’s history.

Fortunately, and contrary to its news media, the Israeli government been rather cool headed about the situation, particularly in light of recent commentary from Egypt’s new VP regarding the continuation of peace with Israel.  However, as in America, the specter of the potential leadership by the Muslim Brotherhood has been one of many concerns among Israel’s conservative government.  Further given the division of the state and the issues with Palestine, there is obviously the added concern over protests in Israel. Israel’s stance on the situation might seem harsh to Americans, but the threats posed by political change in Egypt are much more tangible and immediate than they are to us across the sea.  Through all of this, the government of Israel has still voiced firm support for potential democracy within the state.

Though it is not exactly a subject of focus at the moment, China’s reaction to the current political crises in the Middle East has been telling.  Predictable in many ways, China’s activities have focused on controlling access to information on the crisis for fear of domestic uprisings.  While the differences between the governments of China and Egypt are- to put it bluntly- massive, China’s government has long been proactive on capping potential troubles before they have the opportunity to overflow.  We’ve discussed in the past the need for constant awareness among authoritarian regimes, and the ways they’ve risen to the challenge. In the current Middle East political crisis, China has provided a sterling example.

In Europe, despite all the tangible dangers and potential for problems presented by a transition from Mubarak’s authoritarian regime, the standard has been support for change and hopefully democratic growth.  As in the Unites States, European support has largely been limited for fear of meddling in the affairs of another state, particularly in a time of governmental transition.  This stance may have been expected to a degree, the EU as a body without a populace to be held accountable by has often been quite progressive in its assertions over human rights and the development of representative governance.  It is important to note however, that the EU is hardly the most representative of bodies, and that opinions throughout the governments and populace of member states vary greatly.

In the US, as mentioned in another of my posts, the government found itself in something of a difficult position.  Regionally our projects in democracy building have long been threatened by our support of Egypt’s authoritarian regime, and there was the small issue of Obama’s speech in Egypt in staunch support of democratic growth in the state.  On the other hand Mubarak was easily one of the United State’s most useful allies in the Middle East, thus I was quite pleasantly surprised at our government’s decision to voice support of regime change in the area.  At the same time, contrary to many I find that our reserved approach to the situation was precisely the right decision, rather than the perception that we were only hedging our bets. Few things are more important in the growth of potential democracy than the principle of self-determination.

In all, these last weeks have been quite a time for any student of governance or individual with an interest in international relations.  I consider myself rather fortunate to be alive during a period of such potential change, even if as always I have my pessimistic doubts.  Though certainly I can understand the desire to relate to the struggles for representation throughout the Middle East, I’d note that solidarity and self absorption are not one in the same, and that now certainly isn’t a time for self-centered news reporting.  The current protests aren’t a parallel for US Tea Partiers any more than they are for any other social movement or the 1979 revolution in Iran, and flawed analogies are seldom helpful to anyone.

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All too often criticisms of the US’ activities in China seem rooted in the idea that the US has the ability, through some form of influence, to make the government of China act as we wish.  And though the US is certainly a country used to negotiating from a position of power, China is neither a failed state nor a nation deeply subordinate to our own.  If anything, the nation is one we struggle constantly to ally ourselves with, despite constant roadblocks from the populace and governments of both nations.  Our relationship with China lays somewhere in the nebulous area between allies and competitors, but certainly there is no inkling of subservience on either side of the table.

The tricks typically up a nation’s sleeve in the field of foreign relations when influencing another nation are hardly limitless.  If military intervention isn’t an option (as it certainly should not be in China) and the threat of that intervention isn’t enough to influence a nation’s leadership, typically a nation falls back on economic influence, support of domestic opposition, public diplomacy or international pressure.  We seem nationally neither capable nor deeply interested in economic action against China and the nation is relatively impervious to international pressures for a number of reasons.  Thus we find the spheres of public diplomacy and support of domestic opposition remain.  The US has long made its stance clear regarding the state of human rights in China through official and public statements.  Further human rights and opposition groups are supported within China as much as might be expected given our non-hostile position with the nation.

Specifically in the field of business and economics, I find its best never to expect much in the way of cooperation or pursuit of national interests from US business or worse the financial sector without being forced by regulation.  However, there is the attitude of late that it is neither the responsibility nor the right of government to influence business or manipulate the market, and that somehow issues such as human rights will work themselves out so long as markets remain unrestrained. Unfortunately the market more and more frequently urges business to operate outside the United States in search of new sources of cheap labor, regardless of messy issues like human rights.

If not through economic influence, nor application of military power, how precisely should our government be expected to influence a nation as powerful as China? This question seldom seems addressed in the outcries over US impotence in supporting human rights.  Clearly in the area of public diplomacy (or political rhetoric as one prefers) the US hasn’t slackened its support of human rights in China.  What more should really be expected?

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Image courtesy of J.Anderson & The Tech Herald

James Glanz & John Markoff’s recent New York Times article on China’s discomfort with the internet is another in the recent string of articles discussing the WikiLeaks scandal and foreign policy.  I have to admit, on reading their article I found myself more than a little tickled at some of the issues brought up.  In light of the scandals, one could certainly argue that the government of China has been rather reasonable in fearing the dangers presented by the internet.  Given my appreciation of democracy as the preferred method of governance, of course I think China would be well served to loosen up, but in my own country the government’s reaction to the diplomatic cabletastrophy has been anything but forgiving.

I’m sure that there will be lots of news in the next few days regarding the accusation of Chinese “cyber attacks” on Google, but the issue I find interesting is one that seemed largely a side note.  On reading the article I was struck by the continued “misunderstanding” regarding China’s interpretation of the relationship between private organizations and the governments they exist in.  Earlier this year drama arose between the governments of China and Norway, over the Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to jailed Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo.  Along similar lines, in the recent diplomatic cable leak there are claims that Chinese officials put pressure on the United States government to censor Google Earth.

Warnings that the US would be responsible if terrorists used the information presented through Google to attack China, strike me as similar to the issues between China and Norway.  These incidents speak to a strange broader problem in China’s government either honestly or rhetorically failing to understand the separation between government and private institutions. In some ways I suspect WikiLeaks has a great deal more to fear from antagonizing the government of China, even collaterally, than it does the government of the United States.

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