In my early twenties, I spent two years traveling around Latin America and the Middle East. I lived on a shoestring budget, slept in horrible hotels, and worked the most menial jobs. I thought it was great.

In my late twenties, I worked on foreign aid for the US Department of the Treasury. I went to Africa often and stayed at the nicest hotels. It was a big step up from the days of hostels with cold showers, broken locks on doors, and putrid bathrooms. I appreciated my good fortune.

These days, I consult on aid policy to Africa from time to time. I still stay at the nicest hotels on the continent. The big difference is that I no longer appreciate the hotels, but moan whenever the wireless internet or satellite TV isn’t working.

Take it from me, aid corrupts.

Michael Allen at Democracy Digest picks up on a emerging wave of grass-roots protest against corruption: the zero currency note. The idea behind it is when officials ask for bribes, people should offer zero-currency notes. In particular, it’s having a lot of success in India. Why does it work?

…a number of factors contribute to the success of the zero rupee notes in fighting corruption in India. First, bribery is a crime in India punishable with jail time. Corrupt officials seldom encounter resistance by ordinary people that they become scared when people have the courage to show their zero rupee notes, effectively making a strong statement condemning bribery. In addition, officials want to keep their jobs and are fearful about setting off disciplinary proceedings, not to mention risking going to jail. More importantly…the success of the notes lies in the willingness of the people to use them. People are willing to stand up against the practice that has become so commonplace because they are no longer afraid: first, they have nothing to lose, and secondly, they know that this initiative is being backed up by an organization—that is, they are not alone in this fight.

This last point—people knowing that they are not alone in the fight—seems to be the biggest hurdle when it comes to transforming norms vis-à-vis corruption. For people to speak up against corruption that has become institutionalized within society, they must know that there are others who are just as fed up and frustrated with the system. Once they realize that they are not alone, they also realize that this battle is not unbeatable. Then, a path opens up—a path that can pave the way for relatively simple ideas like the zero rupee notes to turn into a powerful social statement against petty corruption.

This is a great way to solve the collective action problem in fighting corruption. Since it’s typically easier and cheaper for a person to pay a bribe then spending the time and money to fight the practice, self-interest deters people from fighting corruption even though most people hate it. Zero currency has notes for every country in the world.

Transparency International has just released it’s 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index.  When looking at the index, what immediately struck me was how much the US Government concentrates its democracy and governance funding in the most corrupt countries in the world.  The five most corrupt countries (starting with the most corrupt) are Somalia, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Sudan, and Iraq. According to Freedom House, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan had the three largest US D&G programs in 2009, accounting for approximately one-half of total US Government D&G programs.  I am not arguing that the US Government is funding corruption in these countries (although this recent New York Times article on Blackwater’s bribes to the Iraqi Government made me wince). Rather, my point is that worthwhile as these programs may be, they are unlikely to be effective as I described in a recent post.

The resource course, that countries possessing large quantities of oil or other valuable natural resources, tend to have poor governance is well known.  We know far less about whether the curse is contagious.  Ian Urbina’s article in the New York Times about Equatorial Guinea, a paradigmatic example of how oil wealth leads to corruption and repression, suggests the curse can be contagious and is infecting the United States.  US law forbids foreign officials from visiting the US if there is credible evidence they are involved in corrupt activities.  This apparently does not apply to Equatorial Guinea, the 9th most corrupt country in the world, according to Transparency International.  The government official in question is Teodoro Nguema Obiang, son of the country’s long-serving dictator and Minister of Agriculture and Forestry.

The evidence against the minister is quite strong.  The Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and the US Senate have produced numerous reports documenting that Minister Obiang has illegally funneled at least $73 million into the US. Yet, he is still allowed to visit the US.

Why the special treatment?

State Department officials said that Equatorial Guinea’s close ties to the American oil industry were the reason for the lax enforcement of the law…“Of course it’s because of oil,” said John Bennett, the United States ambassador to Equatorial Guinea from 1991 to 1994, adding that Washington has always turned a blind eye to the Obiangs’ corruption and repression because of its dependence on the country for natural resources.

The US imports a lot of oil from Equatorial Guinea, a country run by a corrupt dictator.  As a result, the US Government fails to enforce laws forbidding the country’s corrupt government officials from visiting the US.  Looks like the resource curse can apply not only to countries that produce a lot of oil, but those that rely heavily on it as well.  Yet another good reason to get off the fossil fuel.

In a recent post, I noted how witnessing a bribe at an army checkpoint in Afghanistan made clear to me the link between corruption and insecurity.  Recent events in Iraq make the point even evident.  According to the AP,

…attackers paid $10,000 to a facilitator who knew the Iraqi security forces manning the checkpoints on the roads…to the Finance Ministry.

The attackers detonated two truck bombs.  The bombs severely damaged the Finance and Foreign Ministries, killed at least 100 people, and wounded between 500 and 1000.  One need not be a genius to understand that a government will have a difficult time providing security when soldiers are accepting bribes from terrorists.

I have recently returned from Afghanistan where I was an election observer with Democracy International (DI).  I am not an expert on Afghanistan, so I will refrain from commenting extensively on it.  For good analyses, see DI’s Afghanistan blog, Democracy Arsenal, fellow election observer Brian Katulis, and Michael Allen.

From what I have read and seen in Afghanistan, the problem boils down to three basic points:

1. Afghanistan is suffering from a security gap and a services gap.  International forces are essential for filling the former while the latter is largely the responsibility of the Afghan government (through supported by foreign aid).
2. US public opinion is firmly against sending more troops to Afghanistan and it is not clear that US foreign policy interests dictate a lengthy and expensive commitment to Afghanistan (see numerous posts from Democracy Arsenal).
3. The services gap is in large measure a result of the rampant corruption in the Afghan government.

By examining these three points together, I think we can get a sense of where US policy towards Afghanistan is heading.  Given the skepticism among the public and an increasing number of foreign policy experts towards the war in Afghanistan, the Obama administration is unlikely to be able to convince Congress to allocate greater resources to defeating the Taliban.  Rather, the Government of Afghanistan will first need to demonstrate its commitment to this objective.  This is as it should be, since we cannot beat the Taliban without strong cooperation from the government and people of Afghanistan.  At a minimum this would seem to require that the Government of Afghanistan get serious about curbing corruption and improving services at the local level.  Unfortunately, President Karzai’s tolerance for massive corruption suggests that if he wins the election, this commitment is unlikely to materialize.  Whether Abdullah Abdullah can implement these reforms should he prevail is not clear.

Until recently, the link between security and good governance existed more in theory for me than in practice.  My experience in Afghanistan made the link quite vivid.

I was in Afghanistan as an election observer with Democracy International.  On election day, soldiers at a security checkpoint demanded that we get out of our vehicle so they could check it for explosives and weapons.  Clearly, we were not the Taliban.  Rather, they pulled us over so they could extract a bribe.  Since Afghan soldiers are not paid well (about $120 per month) and since they see high-ranking government officials making enormous sums of money, I don’t necessarily have a problem with paying bribes to low-ranking government officials, especially soldiers who are risking their lives.  However, what occurred at the checkpoint went far beyond the typical bribe request.  There were about 20 soldiers at the checkpoint and once word spread that westerners had been pulled over, every soldier stopped manning the checkpoint and gathered around us.  At this point, each soldier had abandoned his post and no one was paying any attention to the scores of cars driving through the checkpoint into the city.  Luckily, nothing happened.  (As far as I know.  There were bombings in Kabul on election day and it is possible that one of the bombers slipped through the checkpoint while the soldiers were engaged in their extortion.) I could deal with soldiers taking the weapons and the bribe.  The scary part was how quickly the soldiers dispensed with their duty to secure the city in order to take part in the bribery.  That corruption can be a serious cause of insecurity is now seared into my mind.