As pragmatic politicians who know that it usually takes compromises to get things done in Washington, Obama and Clinton want to preserve their ability to maneuver through human rights minefields on the world stage without being held hostage to inflated rhetoric that could expose them to charges of hypocrisy. At the same time, they have laid down an important marker that they will treat these issues not as isolated causes but as part of an integrated, interdependent whole.

…solutions to the inevitable conflicts between human rights principles and hard national security interests will be hatched on a case-by-case basis, with an open willingness to try new approaches when old tactics fall short. This is wise, given that the political context in each country is unique and requires tailored strategies. This means our diplomats in embassies around the world really need to do their homework and get out of their secure compounds and cocktail receptions. It also means a much more well-resourced development policy with a fortified battery of analysts, practitioners and aid experts who can sustain the long-term work of investing in legal reforms and strengthening civil society.

David Shorr at Democracy Arsenal pithily calls this “the walk-and-chew-gum problem” because it requires the US government to secure contradictory objectives at once in many countries: pushing for political reform without sacrificing cooperation in important areas. I think the more difficult challenge is reversing the Fortress America mentality at the State Department. The Fortress America mentality prioritizes security above all other objectives. In dangerous countries, it often means that embassy officials have very little contact with the society in which they are living.

I was in Ghana a few years ago, a very safe country. I drove by the recently-completed Fortress America in Accra with two Ghanians.  It looked like a prison: high walls, lots of security. We had a pretty interesting discussion about the embassy. One said it projected arrogance because of its size and menacing architecture. The other Ghanian said it projected fear because the embassy was walled off from the rest of the city. Both points seem accurate to me: in my opinion, arrogance and fear is a good way of describing US foreign policy since 9/11. It’s hard to have “tailored strategies” when you are walled off from the country where you are working. Can Obama tear down the embassy walls?

…supporting democracy and fostering development are cornerstones of our 21st century human rights agenda.

This administration, like others before us, will promote, support, and defend democracy.  We will relinquish neither the word nor the idea to those who have used it too narrowly, or to justify unwise policies.  We stand for democracy not because we want other countries to be like us, but because we want all people to enjoy consistent protection of the rights that are naturally theirs, whether they were born in Tallahassee or Tehran.  Democracy has proven the best political system for making human rights a human reality over the long term…

With China, Russia, and others, we are engaging on issues of mutual interest while also engaging societal actors in these same countries who are working to advance human rights and democracy. The assumption that we must either pursue human rights or our “national interests” is wrong.

…conscience demands that we are not cowed by the overwhelming difficulty of making inroads against misery in the hard places  like Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, North Korea, and Zimbabwe, or on the hard issues like ending gender inequality and discrimination against gays and lesbians—from the Middle East to Latin America, Africa to Asia…

A change has taken place fairly rapidly within the Obama administration.  Even as short as a few weeks ago, many were claiming democracy would not be a priority.  Yet, in the span of three weeks, we have seen three big foreign policy speeches that suggest this is not true, Obama at West Point and in Oslo for the Nobel Prize, and Clinton today.  While I predicted the administration would eventually embrace democracy, I did not expect it this quickly.  I am very pleased.

Michael Allen at Democracy Digest and the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) has more.

Further undermining the ability of sanctions to produce desired outcomes are $7bn from Beijing. Chinese interest in Guinea is surprising. Earlier in the year the New York Times reported that Chinese investors were becoming weary of pumping resources into the more politically unstable countries in Africa. This suggests that the Chinese government is convinced  the military can provide enough stability to protect its sizable investment, which greatly exceeds Guinea’s annual GDP of $4.6bn

The growth of Chinese aid to Africa is well-documented elsewhere, but it remains unclear what the consequences of Chinese aid will be. The initial popularity of Chinese investment is dwindling in many parts of Africa. Headaches caused by anti-Chinese sentiment in these countries combined with international pressure for Beijing to act responsibly in its role as a global power have forced Beijing to confront the limits of “no-strings attached”.

For example, fecklessness by the government in Burma and strong international support have dampened China’s unconditional support for the military regime in Naypyidaw. The ability of China to influence its more unsavory allies should not be overstated, but China has shown an interest in moderating these regimes both for its own investors and its credibility as a rising power. It remains to be seen if China can exert similar influence in Africa or if it will be interested in doing so. However, in Guinea the international community has little leverage to force compliance. If China can develop that leverage on Camara and his cronies in Conakry, then the strategy of international outrage combined with ineffective sanctions should be reconsidered as the preferred response to human rights crises.