2010 IRF Report

Last week the State Department released its 2010 Report on International Religious Freedom (IRF Report), our government’s annual assessment of the state of religious freedom around the world.  The release of a new IRF report has never been a particularly grand media event, typically receiving limited coverage and going largely ignored domestically outside the limited sphere of human rights organizations.

Perhaps in part these reports go ignored due to an issue we’ve tangled with in the past, the difficulty of impacting change through public diplomacy without the support of policy change (or words without actions).  In many ways this appears to be a typical difficulty faced by the State Department, particularly in the area of human rights there’s little intention to take action beyond the status quo of economic sanctions.  Sanctions, which are pretty widely recognized as being ineffective or counterproductive and further seem to contrast the words of Secretary Clinton and past officials, asserting that the report is not an attempt by the US to judge other nations.

Internationally the reports earn little more press than they do domestically, save among those nations criticized in the report.  Largely in nations like Iran and China, which can be expected to remain in the report for the foreseeable future, these reports either go ignored or elicit responses which revolve around the assertion that we’ve neither the right nor the moral high ground to criticize other nations on issues of human rights.  In either case the reports seem only to illustrate the mutual hostility we have with these nations refracted through the lens of human rights.  Among our allies and those nations with tenuous US relations however, responses can be more pointed and useful. Nations like Egypt, Israel and Russia might be valuable in assessing whether or not these reports have any worth or tangible effect on future religious freedom policy.  Here as in other areas, public diplomacy only seems effective in nations where some manner of positive relationship already exists, if even there.

Norms and external sanctions

Elster posits that “norms do not need external sanctions to be effective,” because when “norms are internalized, they are followed even when violation would be unobserved and not exposed to sanctions.” Further, he cites that “shame” or “anticipation of it” are sufficient internal sanctions. The way in which social scientists understand norms has direct bearing on the functioning of institutions. The way in which societies utilize institutions and their “rules” either by law or custom, is largely dependent on the norms of the players who play or do not play by the “rules.”

Guinea, China, and the Utility of Sanctions

Following the attack by the military on demonstrators who had gathered to protest in a soccer stadium in the capital, Guinea’s coup leaders face increasing international pressure. The AU, EU, the regional organization Ecowas, and the UN united to call for targeted sanctions against the military.  It is unclear what impact sanctions can have on the conflict. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, Guinea’s economy is dominated primarily by subsistence farming and mining. Bauxite and aluminum constitute around 60% of exports annually and a further 25-40% come from gold and diamonds. This suggests few avenues for effective sanctions and even fewer opportunities for targeted sanctions that punish only the military.

Further undermining the ability of sanctions to produce desired outcomes are $7bn from Beijing. Chinese interest in Guinea is surprising. Earlier in the year the New York Times reported that Chinese investors were becoming weary of pumping resources into the more politically unstable countries in Africa. This suggests that the Chinese government is convinced  the military can provide enough stability to protect its sizable investment, which greatly exceeds Guinea’s annual GDP of $4.6bn

The growth of Chinese aid to Africa is well-documented elsewhere, but it remains unclear what the consequences of Chinese aid will be. The initial popularity of Chinese investment is dwindling in many parts of Africa. Headaches caused by anti-Chinese sentiment in these countries combined with international pressure for Beijing to act responsibly in its role as a global power have forced Beijing to confront the limits of “no-strings attached”.

For example, fecklessness by the government in Burma and strong international support have dampened China’s unconditional support for the military regime in Naypyidaw. The ability of China to influence its more unsavory allies should not be overstated, but China has shown an interest in moderating these regimes both for its own investors and its credibility as a rising power. It remains to be seen if China can exert similar influence in Africa or if it will be interested in doing so. However, in Guinea the international community has little leverage to force compliance. If China can develop that leverage on Camara and his cronies in Conakry, then the strategy of international outrage combined with ineffective sanctions should be reconsidered as the preferred response to human rights crises.