Captain’s Journal and At War have in-depth analyses of whether the Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan are forwarding or undermining US military efforts there. (Answer for the impatient: the latter).

In a recent issue of Democracy and Society, MA in Democracy and Governance alum Jack Santucci made the astute observation that climate change is likely to cause severe governance and security challenges in some of the world’s weakest and most fragile states. The floods in Pakistan are a good example of his point.

Ahmed Rashid argues that Pakistan’s natural disaster could lead to a major governance and security crisis.

In just a few short days you will have the dubious honor of presiding over the longest war in US history! Yeah!

So far, the United States has spent $275,000,000,000 ($275 billion) on the war in Afghanistan. Good job! Al Qaeda only spent $200,000 on the 9/11 attacks. Losers! We’ll show them what spending real money on a war looks like! How’s that war going by the way? Well, its not clear we are calling it a war anymore:

Because the task in Kandahar is so delicate, U.S. commanders talk about squeezing rather than driving out the Taliban. The military has struggled to come up with a description of the upcoming fight avoiding terms like campaign, operation and battle because because those words and others have annoyed Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

So the U.S. is calling it “Hamkari Baraye Kandahar,” which translates as “Cooperation for Kandahar.” Karzai simply calls it a “process.”

Whatever it’s called, U.S. military leaders say that unless it succeeds, the rest of the plan for pacifying Afghanistan is hollow.

(deep sigh)…How will we know of “it” succeeds until if we don’t know what “it” is? After spending close to $300 billion, we still can’t explain we still can’t explain what we are trying to achieve in Afghanistan? (banging head on desk)

The White House released its long-awaited National Security Strategy (NSS) today. There are lots of reviews of it, so I won’t go into great detail about it (except to note that I agree with Andrew Exum, the laundry list and lack of prioritization is disappointing and will probably create more problems than it solves).

There are two points I would like to highlight, one good and one bad. The first is that it recognizes that our capacity to project power abroad depends on the strength of our economy. I am really glad to see this. I have been worried for some time the we are making military commitments abroad that we can’t finance. We are going to have to adjust one way or another. I am pleased to see that the NSS argues we must fix our economy so we can maintain our military strength.

The bad point is the clear contradiction at the center of the strategy:

Going forward, there should be no doubt: the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security …As we do, we must recognize that no one nation – no matter how powerful – can meet global challenges alone.

Like many others, I am not sure what this means. How can we underwrite global security if the challenges we face are too large for us to handle alone?

Wishful thinking isn’t enough edition:

The operation in Marjah is supposed to be the first blow in a decisive campaign to oust the Taliban from their spiritual homeland in adjacent Kandahar province, one that McChrystal had hoped would bring security and stability to Marjah and begin to convey an “irreversible sense of momentum” in the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan.

Instead…President Barack Obama’s plan to begin pulling American troops out of Afghanistan in July 2011 is colliding with the realities of the war.

There aren’t enough U.S. and Afghan forces to provide the security that’s needed to win the loyalty of wary locals. The Taliban have beheaded Afghans who cooperate with foreigners in a creeping intimidation campaign. The Afghan government hasn’t dispatched enough local administrators or trained police to establish credible governance…

Progress in Marjah has been slow…in part because no one who planned the operation realized how hard it would be to convince residents that they could trust representatives of an Afghan government that had sent them corrupt police and inept leaders before they turned to the Taliban.

So what do we learn from this article? We learn that Marjah was supposed to deliver a strong blow to the Taliban in the area, but it has failed to do that and McChrystal is frustrated as a result. Why did the operation not succeed as much as he hoped:

• Not enough troops.
• Taliban kills people who cooperate with the US and Afghan governments.
• Not enough police or civil servants.
• People don’t trust the Afghan government because it sent corrupt police and incompetent civil servants in the past.

As usual, Michael Cohen gets it right:

The notion that the challenges we’ve seen in Marjah were unexpected is utterly ludicrous. And if its true, it suggests a lack of military planning that is downright scandalous. The problems we are seeing today in Marjah were completely predictable…For anyone to plead ignorance three months later is a good indication of how divorced from reality this entire mission has become.

Yup.

Michael Cohen succinctly summarizes – and adeptly questions – the justification of the Battle for Kandahar:

The US military plan seems to be predicated on the notion that the US will bloody the Taliban, seize some level of control in Kandahar province and push the Taliban closer to negotiations…

If we’re wrong in Kandahar and it doesn’t push the Taliban toward negotiation; what do we do next? Do we stay and go through the long process of stabilizing and pacifying the city? Do we leave with the job undone?

Josh Bartlow’s reporting from Kandahar suggests Cohen is asking the right question:

In Kandahar, the Taliban’s most powerful weapon has become the calculated assassination…By executing those who work or sympathize with the government, the Taliban has made clear that those supporting the American military effort here are risking their lives. Each new death brings more dread in a city of hunters and hunted.

The killings take aim at the fundamental goal of the U.S. military’s planned summer offensive in Kandahar: to build a credible local government that responds to the needs of the people. In the past month, about six people have quit the already understaffed provincial government, and other federal ministry representatives in the province have taken leave. Targeted by bombs and killings of their local staff, foreigners working for U.S. government contractors and the United Nations have fled for Kabul.

The Times of Kabul suggests that the only strategy ISAF has left that could work is an exit strategy.

Which will be bloodier: the Battle for Kandahar or the Battle for Who Lost Afghanistan?