So far, the United States has spent $275,000,000,000 ($275 billion) on the war in Afghanistan. Good job! Al Qaeda only spent $200,000 on the 9/11 attacks. Losers! We’ll show them what spending real money on a war looks like! How’s that war going by the way? Well, its not clear we are calling it a war anymore:

Because the task in Kandahar is so delicate, U.S. commanders talk about squeezing rather than driving out the Taliban. The military has struggled to come up with a description of the upcoming fight avoiding terms like campaign, operation and battle because because those words and others have annoyed Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

So the U.S. is calling it “Hamkari Baraye Kandahar,” which translates as “Cooperation for Kandahar.” Karzai simply calls it a “process.”

Whatever it’s called, U.S. military leaders say that unless it succeeds, the rest of the plan for pacifying Afghanistan is hollow.

(deep sigh)…How will we know of “it” succeeds until if we don’t know what “it” is? After spending close to $300 billion, we still can’t explain we still can’t explain what we are trying to achieve in Afghanistan? (banging head on desk)

There are two points I would like to highlight, one good and one bad. The first is that it recognizes that our capacity to project power abroad depends on the strength of our economy. I am really glad to see this. I have been worried for some time the we are making military commitments abroad that we can’t finance. We are going to have to adjust one way or another. I am pleased to see that the NSS argues we must fix our economy so we can maintain our military strength.

The bad point is the clear contradiction at the center of the strategy:

Going forward, there should be no doubt: the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security …As we do, we must recognize that no one nation – no matter how powerful – can meet global challenges alone.

Like many others, I am not sure what this means. How can we underwrite global security if the challenges we face are too large for us to handle alone?

The operation in Marjah is supposed to be the first blow in a decisive campaign to oust the Taliban from their spiritual homeland in adjacent Kandahar province, one that McChrystal had hoped would bring security and stability to Marjah and begin to convey an “irreversible sense of momentum” in the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan.

Instead…President Barack Obama’s plan to begin pulling American troops out of Afghanistan in July 2011 is colliding with the realities of the war.

There aren’t enough U.S. and Afghan forces to provide the security that’s needed to win the loyalty of wary locals. The Taliban have beheaded Afghans who cooperate with foreigners in a creeping intimidation campaign. The Afghan government hasn’t dispatched enough local administrators or trained police to establish credible governance…

Progress in Marjah has been slow…in part because no one who planned the operation realized how hard it would be to convince residents that they could trust representatives of an Afghan government that had sent them corrupt police and inept leaders before they turned to the Taliban.

So what do we learn from this article? We learn that Marjah was supposed to deliver a strong blow to the Taliban in the area, but it has failed to do that and McChrystal is frustrated as a result. Why did the operation not succeed as much as he hoped:

• Not enough troops.
• Taliban kills people who cooperate with the US and Afghan governments.
• Not enough police or civil servants.
• People don’t trust the Afghan government because it sent corrupt police and incompetent civil servants in the past.

As usual, Michael Cohen gets it right:

The notion that the challenges we’ve seen in Marjah were unexpected is utterly ludicrous. And if its true, it suggests a lack of military planning that is downright scandalous. The problems we are seeing today in Marjah were completely predictable…For anyone to plead ignorance three months later is a good indication of how divorced from reality this entire mission has become.

Yup.

The US military plan seems to be predicated on the notion that the US will bloody the Taliban, seize some level of control in Kandahar province and push the Taliban closer to negotiations…

If we’re wrong in Kandahar and it doesn’t push the Taliban toward negotiation; what do we do next? Do we stay and go through the long process of stabilizing and pacifying the city? Do we leave with the job undone?

Josh Bartlow’s reporting from Kandahar suggests Cohen is asking the right question:

In Kandahar, the Taliban’s most powerful weapon has become the calculated assassination…By executing those who work or sympathize with the government, the Taliban has made clear that those supporting the American military effort here are risking their lives. Each new death brings more dread in a city of hunters and hunted.

The killings take aim at the fundamental goal of the U.S. military’s planned summer offensive in Kandahar: to build a credible local government that responds to the needs of the people. In the past month, about six people have quit the already understaffed provincial government, and other federal ministry representatives in the province have taken leave. Targeted by bombs and killings of their local staff, foreigners working for U.S. government contractors and the United Nations have fled for Kabul.

The Times of Kabul suggests that the only strategy ISAF has left that could work is an exit strategy.

Which will be bloodier: the Battle for Kandahar or the Battle for Who Lost Afghanistan?

Afghan President Hamid Karzai is weighing approval of an expansive new business deal that could give his controversial half-brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, increased influence over the lucrative security business that protects supply convoys for U.S.-led forces in southernAfghanistan…

Karzai’s critics view the security consolidation as a covert effort to solidify Ahmed Wali Karzai’s already-unrivaled hold on power in Kandahar. His grip on the city is widely seen as a major obstacle to establishing good local governance, a critical requirement for the success of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency operation.

“The concern seems to me to be that he may be creating a security force which responds to him and subverts the formal institutions and formal security forces of the Afghan state,” said Carl Forsberg, a research analyst and Afghan specialist at the Institute for the Study of War in Washington.

I wonder how Forsberg came to that conclusion. Here’s my guess.

Let’s look at the beginning of the article. According to DeYoung:

The Obama administration’s campaign to drive the Taliban out of Afghanistan’s second-largest city is a go-for-broke move that even its authors are unsure will succeed.

The bet is that the Kandahar operation, backed by thousands of U.S. troops and billions of dollars, will break the mystique and morale of the insurgents, turn the tide of the war and validate the administration’s Afghanistan strategy.

There is no plan B…

As troops battle insurgent forces entrenched among the population on the outskirts of the city, the birthplace of the Taliban movement, U.S.-mentored Afghan police will establish a presence in the relatively secure center…

Senior U.S. military officials briefing American reporters in Kabul early last month described extensive “clearing operations” planned in the outlying Kandahar districts of Zhari, Argandab and Panjwai, where the Taliban is entrenched.

OK, it sounds like a plan: troops battle insurgents in the dangerous suburbs, while the Afghan police take over the secure center. But just when you think you’ve read a battle plan, the article makes the point that, contrary to what you have just read, this is not a military operation:

Afghan President Hamid Karzai said last week that military force would be used only “if and when and where needed…in consultation with the community.”…

“It’s not a military operation in the normal sense of the word,” an administration official said…

The name of the offensive – Hamkari Baraye Kandahar, or Cooperation for Kandahar – was carefully chosen to avoid the word “operation,” which suggests violence. The administration official described it benignly as a “military presence” and Karzai has defined it as a “process.”…

Avoiding the civilian casualties that have plagued U.S. operations elsewhere will be particularly difficult in and around Kandahar, an urban and farming area of 2 million people…

OK, I am a bit confused at this point. DeYoung starts off by telling us this is the go-for-broke strategy that even military commanders are not sure will work. Recall, “there is no plan B.” She then discusses the battle plan (i.e., a military operation), which seems logical given that ISAF is going for broke. Then she tells us, in fact, its not a military operation. Yet a few sentences later she says that avoiding civilian causalities – in what may or may not be a military operation – will be difficult. This would seem to confirm that it is a military operation (why else would it be difficult to avoid civilian casualties?). But what do I know?

Ugh! (banging head on desk) I am totally confused.

Michael Cohen gets the last word:

Why are we continuing on a mission – that by the military’s own analysis – is almost certainly out of the scope of our capabilities and the capabilities of our host country partner? And perhaps more directly, why aren’t our civilian policymakers asking this question of the uniformed military?

First, I do not believe that the US needs to be engaging business people at this point. The absolute best thing the US can do to help Afghan business people is to improve security in Afghanistan. A recent GAO report makes clear that the security situation is deteriorating and that all the development projects in the world won’t make a difference as long as there is no security.

Second, I will stand by my tongue-in-cheek suggestion that ISAF’s use Wali Karzai’s private security firm is an example of working with Afghan business people – because it directly focuses on security. This was a harsh criticism, but a valid one. ISAF will never gain control of Kandahar without Karzai’s support. At the moment, Karzai is deliberately keeping the Afghan police in Kandahar weak so ISAF will need to rely on his incompetent private security guards. Thus, not only is the person that ISAF needs to secure Kandahar ripping off ISAF, he is making the security situation worse.

Third, my point about red tape was not that this is what the survey finds. My point was that we don’t need surveys to tell us that people in Afghanistan want security.

I agree that my tone in the post was biting, but I have been – and will continue to be – a harsh critic of policies in Afghanistan that do not seem to me to be contributing to improving security. I did not mean to attack Willhauck or the survey. I meant to attack a policy that thinks it is important to survey business people in the middle of a war.

…total attacks against coalition forces between September 2009 and March 2010 increased by about 83 percent in comparison to the same period last year, while attacks against civilians rose by about 72 percent. Total attacks against the ANSF increased by about 17 percent over the same period…DOD data indicate that, overall, more than 21,000 enemy-initiated attacks were recorded in 2009—an increase of about 75 percent over the total number of attacks in 2008.

The report also helpfully reminds us that successful reconstruction and development projects are “contingent on improved security,” and thus, “the lack of a secure environment has continued to challenge reconstruction and development efforts.” In English, I think this means that most development projects in Afghanistan are pretty much a waste of money.

Huh, didn’t see that one coming.

Perhaps it is time to encourage Afghan leaders to listen to their own business people’s views on what needs to be done to spur economic growth, new jobs, and higher living standards…

While the military operations in the south – moving from Helmand to Kandahar – will remain a hot topic, talks [between Karzai and the Obama administration] should also emphasize improving the Afghan economy since success in that realm will reverberate across nearly every other sphere of society…

Why not encourage the Afghan government to engage the indigenous private sector more proactively in order to identify obstacles to growth in the domestic economy and to fashion appropriate reforms?

Does this the type of private sector development count? Got to love the spirit of a true believer! I don’t mean to pick on Willhauck, but the survey he cites strikes me as a bit pointless. Lack of security – not red tape for starting a business – is the basic problem facing Afghanistan today and you don’t need a survey to find out that people don’t like IEDs and trigger happy private security. Political stability is the best thing that could happen to encourage private sector development in Afghanistan. You don’t need a survey to find this out, either.

the system of prevention failed while the system of apprehension worked…and those are two different systems.

I am going to say something few of our elected officials have the courage to say: a free society must make trade-offs between security and civil liberties. While there is no clear line – that is for democracies to solve themselves – you can’t have a police state and a democracy. I don’t know if we can do terrorism prevention (I have my doubts), but I am certain that a robust terrorism prevention policy can’t exist in a democracy.