The clash between reality and policy in Sudan

Pessimistic prognosis on Sudan:

President Omar al Bashir’s government has failed to pass key democratic reforms promised by the Agreement, and without these reforms, there is no way the results of the elections will be accepted and offer a milestone for the peace process.

On the contrary, fraudulent elections engineered to strengthen Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP), close the doors to political negotiations in Darfur and undermine the southern-based Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) both in the South and in national institutions.

A sham poll would most likely lead to a new escalation of violence in Darfur and compromise the holding of the referendum. And if the referendum does not go ahead on schedule, the South will probably declare unilateral independence, plunging. Sudan back into civil war.

Election observers from the Carter Center are concerned.  I guess they should be concerned, but it seems to me that they are neglecting the nature of the problem.  The BBC has a story today about how the country is going off the rails, focusing on one town in the south, Malakal.  The story quotes Dr. Gabriel Gatwech, one of the town’s residents.  According to Gatwech, “Northern and Southern Sudanese cannot live peacefully together. There is a total lack of trust.”  This seems to me to get closer to the problem and holding elections under these conditions is a terrible idea.  Upton Sinclair once said “It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his job depends on not understanding it.”  If your job is to run elections in Sudan, I suspect it’s difficult to understand how bad of an idea it is to hold them under these conditions.

Time to rethink Sudan

The International Crisis Group has just released a frightening report on Sudan

Sudan is sliding towards violent breakup…Both parties want elections for the wrong reasons. The National Congress Party (NCP) wants votes in April 2010 that would allow it to regain the political legitimacy it needs both to protect President Bashir against the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant and to be in a stronger position to declare a state of emergency if needed, including in the event of a new war. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) is concerned that derailed elections might jeopardize its overriding goal of holding the referendum [on independence for southern Sudan] on schedule. It threatens to declare unilateral independence if pushed to accept a referendum postponement…

It is essential to move rapidly on a number of fronts, including to negotiate a Darfur peace agreement that allows all Darfuris to vote in national elections; to implement legal reforms necessary for a free and fair national election process; and to agree on the commissions for the South’s self-determination referendum…Time is also required to negotiate a framework for the negotiations over how two highly interdependent states will relate to each other…These processes require strong, united international facilitation, as well as support from other major political forces in Sudan…

If implementation again lags badly, it will be necessary to concentrate on achieving the minimum essential to prevent return to deadly chaos: namely ensuring that the South’s referendum is held on schedule, with a day-after arrangement is in place.

It is quite ridiculous to believe that international negotiators can solve all of these issues in four months.  Thus, we need “to concentrate on achieving the minimum essential to prevent return to deadly chaos.” I had a long talk with someone who works on Sudan, and asked whether the US government was rethinking its strategy and calling to postpone the election.  The answer, sadly but predictably, was no.  I guess we have learned nothing from Afghanistan and Iraq, so let me make this clear: holding an election when we think it will cause a civil war is not a good idea.

A Closer Look at US D&G Funding

In a recent post, I discussed how pleased I was to see that the Obama administration is asking for a sizable increase for Democracy and Governance (D&G) programs in its 2010 budget request.  Since then I have taken a closer look at the numbers to get a sense of what they tell us about the priorities of the administration in this area.  There is some good news and some less than good news.

First the less than good news.  D&G funding is overwhelmingly and increasingly concentrated in a small number of countries in conflict.  Just over 50% of all D&G funding goes to four countries, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Sudan, and one-fourth of the requested increase is for these countries. The governance challenges these countries face suggest that D&G programs in them face a high likelihood of failure.  As one might infer from my recent post on Afghanistan, D&G programs are unlikely to be successful in a country where soldiers openly and publicly demand bribes from foreign election observers on election day while neglecting their duty to provide security.

At the same time, there is some good news.  The administration is increasing funding for a number of countries where democratic institutions are functioning, but where democratic consolidation is not yet certain (and in some cases where serious backsliding is occurring), specifically Bangladesh, Bolivia, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Lebanon, Liberia, Serbia, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Serbia, and Ukraine.  I am very pleased to see funding increases in these countries as D&G programs are likely to be most successful in countries where governments are trying to govern democratically and/or where pressure forces them to do so.  Greater funding for these countries amounts to almost one-third of the total requested increase.  Nevertheless, total D&G funding for these countries is only about 10% of global D&G funding and only 20% of the amount for Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Sudan.

In sum, we are far from using D&G funds in their most productive way.  While D&G programs can help stabilize a country in a post-conflict environment, they are no substitute for security.  In my opinion, concentrating funds in countries where security is the main challenge is a questionable policy.