Political violence in a historical perspective

Jared Loughner’s attempt to kill Representative Gabrielle Giffords is tragic and completely unjustifiable. Six others died in the attempt, including US District Judge John Roll. I have no doubt that the event will become politicized as an extreme symptom of the polarized political atmosphere in the US today. I am going to eschew the histrionics that our democracy is falling apart. Sadly, political killings have long been a feature of US history. Nowhere is this more evident than in the civil rights struggle that lasted for more than 100 years, from the assassination of President Lincoln through the deaths of John F. Kennedy, Robert F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, and Malcolm X in the 1960s.

What seem relevant to me is that in the US, we do not glorify lone perpetrators of political violence. I have never met a person who admires John Wilkes Booth, Lee Harvey Oswald, or John Hinckley, Jr. This strikes me as relevant. In the US, however strongly we may disagree, we do not condone lone violence as an acceptable as a means to political end.

How do we prevent election violence?

USAID asked for my thoughts.

Democratic decline, Filipino style

Today’s attack on local opposition supporters in the Philippines is a chilling reminder of what Freedom House’s Arch Puddington called the global “decline in freedom” – for three straight years, Freedom House has measured a net drop in democratic indicators around the world. The Philippines is just one example; five years ago, this country rated as “Free,” but today the New York Times reports the abduction of 40 people who were on their way to file gubernatorial election candidacy papers in the province of Maguindanao. Up to 30 have been killed, most of them women, including the wife and sister of the candidate. While this is the most brutal single attack in recent history, it is indicative of a trend of extrajudicial killings and impunity in this once-impressive democracy. With cases like this, it seems unlikely the global democratic deficit will be making a strong about-face anytime soon.

Can the Taliban govern?

I refrain from commenting too much on Afghanistan because lots of other people who are more knowledgeable than I am write about it frequently.  However, I have been reading a fair bit about whether or not the Taliban can govern and I think I add value to this question, so I will put in my two cents.  Whether the Taliban can govern is the wrong way to ask a good question.  The better question is whether the Taliban can get compliance from people who do not support them.  As anyone who has watched The Godfather will know, the answer is yes.

The logic is simple.  When the Taliban shows up in your village they basically offer two choices.  Cooperate and we will allow you to live or don’t cooperate and we won’t.  Whether or not people will cooperate is based on the credibility of the threat.  The Taliban has shown over and over that the threat is credible.  Thus, people have an incentive to cooperate even if they do not particularly like the Taliban’s style of justice.

When International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) soldiers show up in a village, they ask for cooperation and promise security from the Taliban in return.  Sounds like a good deal if you don’t like the Taliban.  The question is whether people who do not like the Taliban will cooperate with ISAF soldiers.  The answer to the question depends on whether the promise to provide security from the Taliban is credible.  In the past it has not been.  Instead, ISAF soldiers have tended to clear the Taliban out of a village and leave.  Once they leave however, the Taliban return and make good on their promise to retaliate on those who cooperated with ISAF troops.  Thus, it is rational for Afghans not to cooperate with ISAF and cooperate with the Taliban even if they like ISAF more than the Taliban.

The essence behind the counter-insurgency strategy ISAF is designing is clear, hold, and build.  But we can state it more clearly: a credible threat to provide security from the Taliban.  If they can provide it, they can gain cooperation from the Afghans as long as they like ISAF forces more than the Taliban.  ISAF doesn’t need to be popular to gain cooperation if its promise to provide security is credible, just more popular than the Taliban.

Violence follows Gabon’s flawed election

Violence erupted following the announcement that Ali Bongo, son of the late former President Omar Bongo, won last Sunday’s election in Gabon.  Omar Bongo ruled Gabon for 41 years, from 1967 until his death last June, and was the world’s longest serving president.

Most people watching the election expected that violence would occur because few believed it would be free and fair.  The main opposition candidates, Pierre Mamboundou and Mba Obame have both claimed the election was fraudulent as well.  There is widespread evidence they are correct.  First, while only 50% of Gabon’s population is over voting age, the total number of registered voters accounts for 60% of the population.  One government official even admitted that they had registered dead people.  Second, African Union election observers reported major irregularities at polling stations, including unsealed ballot boxes, security forces improperly entering polling stations, ballots that did not list all candidates, and poll workers refusing to allow registered voters to cast their ballots.

Ali Bongo has “won” the election.  Now the hard part starts.  Gabon, like the US, uses plurality rules for its presidential elections.  This means that the person who receives the most votes wins, regardless of whether that candidate obtains a majority.  According to the official results, Bongo received 42% of the vote and turnout was very low, between 30% and 40%.  This means that in the best case scenario – a free and fair election did occur – close to 60% of voters cast their ballot against Bongo.  Since evidence suggests the election was rigged in Bongo’s favor, in all likelihood the actual percent of Gabonese who support him is far, far lower.